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We also need a moratorium on the construction of any new 
generating facility that burns coal without the capacity to safely trap and 
store carbon dioxide.1 
 
U.S. coal deposits contain more energy than all the worlds oil 
reserves combined.  Given this, removing coal from our energy-supply 
equation is irresponsible.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 17, 2007, the Bureau of Air and Radiation, Air 
Permitting Section of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment 
(KDHE) recommended the issuance of an Air Quality Construction 
Permit under state air quality legislation to the Sunflower Electric Power 
Corporation (Sunflower).  The permit would have allowed Sunflower 
to construct two new 700 megawatt coal-fired steam generating units and 
associated ancillary equipment at the site of its existing generating 
station located in Holcomb, Kansas.3  The very next day, Roderick 
                                                     
 *  Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas.  My thanks go to Richard E. 
Levy, Christopher R. Drahozal, and Raj Bhala for their valuable analytical input, and to Christopher 
Steadham, Faculty Services Librarian at the University of Kansas School of Law, for his valuable 
research assistance. 
 1. Al Gore, The Nobel Lecture given by the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2007 (Dec. 10, 2007) 
(transcript available at http://nobelpeaceprize.org/eng_lect_2007c.html). 
 2. Senator Sam Brownback, Plant Denial Not in States Best Interest, WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 
11, 2007, at 11A.  Senator Brownback, one of Kansass U.S. Senators, added that KDHEs denial of 
the Sunflower permit applications is not supported by the laws and statutes of Kansas, [and] is not 
in the best interests of Kansas nor [sic] the environment.  Id. 
 3. BUREAU OF AIR RADIATION, AIR PERMITTING SECTION, KAN. DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVT, 
RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, SUNFLOWER ELECTRIC POWER CORP., HOLCOMB EXPANSION, AIR 
QUALITY CONSTRUCTION PERMIT APPLICATION (Oct. 17, 2007), available at http://www. 
kdheks.gov/download/KDHE_Response_to_Comments_10.17.07.pdf [hereinafter KDHE STAFF 
RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY]. 
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Bremby, the Secretary of KDHE, announced that the agency was 
denying Sunflowers application for a construction permit for the two 
plants.4 
Sunflowers plans to construct and operate two new coal-fired power 
plants in Holcomb fueled a divisive debate in Kansas.  That debate 
mirrors in some respects the divergence of views reflected in the 
quotations by former Vice President Al Gore and Kansas Senator Sam 
Brownback reproduced at the beginning of this Article.  The Sunflower 
application drew significant support in the western part of the state and 
strong opposition in portions of eastern Kansas, conforming to one of the 
traditional fault lines on many politically charged issues within the state.5  
The fate of the Sunflower units split the states labor unions; the regional 
United Steelworkers opposed them, while the state AFL-CIO supported 
them.6  A majority of the Republican members of the state House of 
Representatives had sent a letter urging Kansas Governor Kathleen 
Sebelius, a Democrat, to approve the plants, arguing that without it, our 
state and its citizens will lose access to the low-cost energy source and 
millions in economic development.7  As a result of these opposing 
forces, KDHEs decision on the fate of the Sunflower plants was bound 
to generate controversy, no matter which way it went.8 
While the denial of the Sunflower application might have stoked the 
fury of the projects supporters no matter what its basis, Secretary 
Brembys justification for refusing to license the two new units was the 
real headline grabber.9  Bremby based his denial on the substantial 
endangerment to health and the environment in Kansas that would result 
                                                     
 4. Letter from Roderick L. Bremby to Sunflower Electric Power Corporation, Mr. Wayne 
Penrod (Oct. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Bremby Letter].  A videotaped version of Brembys decision, 
recorded on October 18, 2007, is available at http://www.kdheks.gov/press_room.htm (click on 
Video). 
 5. Opposition was especially strong in the region between Topeka and Kansas City.  Steven 
Mufson, Power Plant Rejected over Carbon Dioxide for First Time, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2007, at 
A1.  Holcomb is in the southwestern part of Kansas, west of Dodge City and Garden City, north of 
Liberal, and relatively close to the Colorado border. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. The results of one opinion poll released at the beginning of 2008 indicated that 62% of 
Kansans supported KDHEs decision to deny Sunflowers air permit application and 31% opposed 
it.  Scott Rothschild, Kansans Support Decision to Nix Power Plants, Want to Focus on Wind 
Energy, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Jan. 4, 2008, at A3, available at http://www2.ljworld. 
com/news/2008/jan/04/kansans_support_decision_nix_coal_plants_want_focu/.  Lobbyists spent 
almost $800,000, mostly on advertising, in an effort to turn public opinion against KDHEs decision.  
The Holcomb plants supporters spent six times as much on lobbying as the plants opponents.  Kan. 
Lobbyists Spend Big to Defend Coal Plants, CLIMATEWIRE, Apr. 17, 2008. 
 9. See, e.g., Mufson, supra note 5. 
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from carbon dioxide emissions generated by the plants operation.10  
According to some characterizations of the decision, the denial 
represented the first time that any state denied a permit for a large coal-
fired power plant solely because of its potential impact on climate 
change.11  The Holcomb plants proponents not only attacked the denial 
on policy grounds, but also charged that the Secretary lacks the statutory 
or regulatory authority to deny an air pollution permit on the basis of its 
potential to contribute to climate change.  Accordingly, they challenged 
the denial in both administrative and judicial forums.12  In addition, the 
2008 session of the Kansas legislature was dominated by a furious effort 
by supporters of the proposed Holcomb plants to overturn the denial.  
That fight culminated in a close vote upholding Governor Sebelius 
decision to veto three bills that would have reversed Secretary Brembys 
decision and stripped KDHE of most of its authority to regulate 
emissions of carbon dioxide and other pollutants that contribute to 
climate change.13 
This Article is not intended to dwell primarily on the policy debate 
surrounding Sunflowers proposal to build two new coal-fired units, 
although it addresses the policy implications of using coal or other 
resources to generate electricity.  Instead, this Article focuses on the 
legality of KDHEs decision to refuse to issue a permit for the Holcomb 
units.  The analysis of the legality of that decision is most immediately 
relevant to the outcome of litigation brought in the Kansas courts by 
Sunflower and other plant supporters to invalidate Secretary Brembys 
decision.14  In addition, the contention in this Article that KDHE acted 
within the scope of its statutory authority in denying air quality permits 
for the Holcomb plants may be relevant to efforts by environmental 
agencies in other states to limit the contribution to climate change of 
coal-fired power plants or other industrial facilities that generate 
greenhouse gas emissions.  In particular, the analysis may be relevant to 
decisions by those agencies to block the construction and operation of 
coal-fired power plants or other facilities based on legislation similar to 
                                                     
 10. See infra notes 25770 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Matthew L. Wald, Citing Global Warming, Kansas Denies Plant Permit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 20, 2007, at C4. 
 12. See infra notes 287295 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 30105 and accompanying text. 
 14. At the time this Article was written, the Kansas legislatures efforts during the 2008 session 
to reverse Secretary Brembys decision had reached an unsuccessful conclusion.  If legislative 
efforts to reverse that decision are revived in future legislative sessions, or if an agreement is reached 
pursuant to which the agency voluntarily reverses its position, the Kansas courts might not reach the 
merits of the challenges to the denial that were filed after Secretary Brembys decision. 
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the endangerment provision cited by Secretary Bremby in denying 
operating permits for the proposed Holcomb units. 
Part II of the Article serves two purposes.  First, it provides 
background information on the degree to which coal-fired electric 
generating facilities in the United States contribute to climate change.  
Second, it provides regulatory context for KDHEs decision denying a 
permit for the Sunflower project.  It summarizes the status of federal 
regulation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  It also describes state 
efforts to fill the void created by the virtual absence of a meaningful 
federal climate change program to date, especially in connection with 
stationary sources of GHGs.  In particular, it provides examples of 
actions in several other states that reflect a broader nationwide (albeit not 
always coordinated) effort by state legislators and regulatory agencies to 
minimize the contribution of electric power generation to climate change. 
Parts III and IV focus on the fate of the Holcomb units.  Part III 
describes Sunflowers application, the Attorney Generals opinion sought 
by KDHE on the disposition of that application, KDHEs decision to 
deny an air quality permit for the Holcomb units, and the aftermath of 
that decision.  Part IV analyzes the legality of KDHEs denial of the 
Sunflower application.  It addresses not only the relevant Kansas statutes, 
but also the case law construing the federal environmental statutes that 
mirror the Kansas statute primarily relied upon by KDHE.  I conclude 
that the denial of air quality permits for the Sunflower units is within 
KDHEs authority to take actions to prevent the substantial 
endangerment to public health and the environment arising from GHG 
emissions.  I reach this conclusion even though the denial was based on 
projected as opposed to ongoing emissions and even though, at the time 
of the decision, neither Kansas nor the federal government had 
designated GHGs as air pollutants for air quality regulatory purposes.  
Part V briefly assesses the implications of KDHEs decision for the 
future of coal-fired electricity generation and the development of an 
energy policy for Kansas in the climate change era. 
II. COAL, ELECTRIC POWER, AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
Global climate change resonated as an environmental threat to a 
greater extent in 2007 than it ever has before.15  Throughout the year, the 
                                                     
 15. See The Challenge that Will Define Our Age, 25 ENVTL. F. No. 1, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 20, 20 
(predicting that a quarter century from now, 2007 will stand out as a watershed that saw a 
complete makeover in humanitys views on global warming − even in the United States, large 
majorities now want immediate action). 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)16 issued a series 
of reports that surveyed the latest scientific developments in climate 
change, culminating in a Synthesis Report issued in November 2007.17  
Climate change also generated international headlines in October 2007 
when the Norwegian Nobel Committee selected former Vice President 
Al Gore and the IPCC as joint recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize.18  The 
year ended with a meeting in Bali, Indonesia of the United Nations 
Climate Change Conference pursuant to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.19  At that meeting, representatives of 
more than 180 nations adopted the Bali roadmap, which charts the 
course for a new negotiating process to be concluded by 2009 that will 
ultimately lead to a post-2012 international agreement on climate 
change.20 
In addition to these events of international scope, climate change 
garnered headlines as a result of legal developments of national 
significance within the United States.  In April 2007, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided in Massachusetts v. EPA21 that the federal Clean Air Act 
                                                     
 16. The IPCC describes itself as a scientific intergovernmental body set up by the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
to 
provide the decision-makers and others interested in climate change with an objective 
source of information about climate change.  The IPCC does not conduct any research 
nor does it monitor climate related data or parameters.  Its role is to assess on a 
comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the latest scientific, technical and 
socio-economic literature produced worldwide relevant to the understanding of the risk of 
human-induced climate change, its observed and projected impacts and options for 
adaptation and mitigation. 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, ABOUT IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
about/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).  [T]he IPCC is open to all member countries of WMO 
and UNEP and hundreds of scientists all over the world contribute to the work of the IPCC as 
authors, contributors and reviewers.  Id. 
 17. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment_report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [hereinafter IPCC SYNTHESIS 
REPORT].  The Synthesis Report summarizes reports of the IPCCs three Working Groups issued 
earlier in 2007.  The first Working Group report dealt with The Physical Science Basis for climate 
change; the second Working Group report covered Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability; and the 
report of Working Group III analyzed Mitigation of Climate Change.  All three reports are 
available in full at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/assessments-reports.htm. 
 18. See The Norwegian Nobel Committee, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 (Oct. 12, 2007), 
http://nobelpeaceprize.org/eng_lau_announce2007.html. 
 19. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992). 
 20. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The United Nations Climate 
Change Conference in Bali, http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php (last visited Mar. 2, 
2008).  This website links to all of the official documents approved at the Bali conference. 
 21. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
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(CAA)22 vests authority in the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to regulate GHG emissions from mobile sources23 and that EPA 
failed to provide a reasoned explanation for denying a petition by 
states and environmental groups to exercise that authority by regulating 
GHG emissions from motor vehicles.24  Later in the year, two federal 
district courts rejected claims that federal law preempts state restrictions 
on GHG emissions from cars and trucks.25  As the year drew to a close, 
Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 
which requires the Secretary of Transportation to phase in corporate 
average fuel economy standards between model years 2011 and 2020 of 
at least thirty-five miles per gallon for the total fleet of passenger and 
non-passenger automobiles manufactured in a model year.26  According 
to the White House, this increase in the fuel economy standards first 
developed under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 
(EPCA)27 represents a major step forward in expanding the 
production of renewable fuels, reducing our dependence on oil, and 
confronting global climate change.28  Finally, on the same day that 
President Bush signed the 2007 energy legislation, EPA denied 
Californias request that EPA waive the CAAs prohibition on state 
mobile source emission standards so that California could implement 
legislation restricting GHG emissions from motor vehicles.29 
                                                     
 22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017671q (2000). 
 23. Section 202(a) of the CAA provides that EPAs Administrator shall by regulation 
prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of 
new motor vehicles . . . which, in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.  42 U.S.C. § 7521(a).  The Court 
held that because GHGs fit well within the [CAAs] capacious definition of air pollutant, . . . EPA 
has the statutory authority to regulate [GHGs].  Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1462. 
 24. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1463. 
 25. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007); 
Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007).  
Neither decision addressed whether the CAA preempts state regulation of GHG emissions from 
mobile sources.  Instead, they decided that neither the Energy Policy Conservation Act of 1975 nor 
the federal governments power to conduct foreign policy preempted the California or Vermont 
regulations challenged in those cases. 
 26. Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102(a), 121 Stat. 1492 (2007) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 
32902(a)(1)). 
 27. Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 301, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 
3290632919 (2000)). 
 28. The White House, Fact Sheet: Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (Dec. 19, 
2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071219-1.html.  Because the 
combustion of motor gasoline by motor vehicles is a major source of carbon dioxide emissions, 
increasing the corporate average fuel economy standards can reduce CO2 emissions by requiring 
auto manufacturers to produce vehicles that use less fuel for each mile traveled. 
 29. See Press Release, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, America Receives a National 
Solution for Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://yosemite.epa. 
gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/41b4663d8d3807c5852573b6008141e
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Amidst all of this internationally and nationally important activity, it 
would be easy to overlook the denial by KDHE of an application to 
construct two new coal-fired electricity generating units.  The decision 
merits attention, however, for several reasons.  First, coal-fired power 
plants comprise a significant portion of the GHGs emitted in the United 
States.  Second, KDHEs denial of Sunflowers permit application was 
not the only state action in 2007 that suspended or stopped plans to build 
coal-fired power plants based on the impact the plants might have on 
climate change.  Washington, Florida, North Carolina, and other states 
reached similar decisions, indicating that KDHEs decision is not an 
aberration.  Instead, its decision is consistent with a trend toward a 
reduced role across the country for coal-fired power in the generation of 
electricity.30  Between 2000 and 2006, utilities announced plans to build 
more than 150 coal plants.31  By the end of 2007, ten of those had been 
constructed and another twenty-five were in the process of being 
constructed.32  Plans for at least fifty-nine of the proposed coal plants 
were halted or suspended in 2007 alone, however.33  Of those, fifteen 
were rejected by state or local regulators or courts.34  Third, Kansas is not 
                                                                                                                       
5!OpenDocument.  According to EPA Administrator Stephen L. Johnson, the denial allowed the 
Bush Administration to mov[e] forward with a clear national solution − not a confusing patchwork 
of state rules.  Id.  Within two weeks of the denial, California sued EPA in the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that the denial was erroneous.  Bob Egelko, State Fights BackSues 
EPA on Greenhouse Gas Emissions, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 3, 2008, at 1.  EPA issued its formal notice 
denying Californias waiver application in March 2008.  California State Motor Vehicle Pollution 
Control Standards; Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for 
Californias 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor 
Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008).  The provisions of the CAA relevant to the denial of 
Californias waiver application are section 209(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000) (prohibiting the 
adoption or enforcement of state standards controlling emissions from new motor vehicles subject to 
the CAA); section 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (authorizing EPA to waive the prohibition for 
California, the only state that adopted emission standards before March 30, 1966); and section 177, 
42 U.S.C. § 7507 (allowing other states to adopt standards identical to any California standard for 
which EPA has issued a preemption waiver). 
 30. See Marc Gunther, Coal Plants Get Burned, FORTUNE MAG., Mar. 2, 2007 (These are 
troubled times for any company trying to build a coal-fired power plants [sic] . . . .  Opposition is 
mounting to coal plants because they contribute to global warming.). 
 31. SourceWatch, Coal Plants Cancelled in 2007, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php? 
title=Coal_plants_cancelled_in_2007 (last visited Apr. 4, 2008). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. (finding that concerns about climate change played a major role in cancellation or 
abandonment of coal plant proposals in fifteen states); see also Rebecca Smith, Coals Doubters 
Block New Wave of Power Plants, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2007, at A1 (stating that U.S. power 
companies had announced plans to build up to 150 new coal-fired plants, but that as plans for this 
fleet of new coal-powered plants move forward, an increasing number are being canceled or 
development slowed, in large part due to concern over the impacts of CO2 emissions on climate 
change).  According to that article, written before KDHEs denial of the Sunflower permit 
application, decisions in several states blocking coal-fired plants have shown that coals future 
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normally one of the states that quickly come to mind when listing the 
states that have taken leadership roles in the past in developing 
innovative environmental policies.  KDHEs denial (whether or not it is 
ultimately upheld in court or withstands legislative challenge) may be a 
sign, therefore, that the momentum in favor of government action to 
address climate change has reached deep into the nations heartland, 
even if it has not yet made much of an impact on Pennsylvania Avenue.35 
A. Whats Coal Got to Do with It? 
The denial of Sunflowers application to construct two coal-fired 
generating units and similar actions in other states that restrict the 
construction or operation of coal-fired electric generating facilities are 
premised on a link between the GHGs that coal-fired power plants emit 
and exacerbation of the adverse effects of climate change.  The following 
two subsections briefly describe the current scientific understanding of 
the causes of climate change and the role of coal-fired power production 
in the United States in contributing to it. 
1. Anthropogenic Activity, Greenhouse Gases, and Climate Change 
The consensus of most mainstream scientists around the world who 
are interested in climate change is that climate change is occurring, that 
human activity is at least a significantly contributing factor, and that the 
generation of GHGs through the combustion of fossil fuels is one of the 
primary culprits.36  The IPCCs Fourth Assessment Report, for example, 
endorses all of these postulates.  The IPCC concluded that [w]arming of 
the climate system is unequivocal, as reflected in increases in global air 
and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising 
                                                                                                                       
prospects are dimming.  Id.  The factors that have induced utilities to cancel coal-fired projects have 
included rising construction costs, inadequate financing, reduced demand, and concerns about future 
regulation of GHGs.  See SourceWatch, supra note 31.  Cf.  John G. Edwards, Coal Plant Plans 
Fade Across U.S., LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 4, 2008, at D1 (citing environmental groups claim that 
twenty-six coal-fired power plants were scrapped between March 2006 and the end of 2007). 
 35. See Editorial, The One Environmental Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2008, at A16 (The 
overriding environmental issue of these times is the warming of the planet. . . . There is also a 
growing appetite for decisive actioneverywhere, it seems, except the White House.). 
 36. Climate change skeptics remain, both inside and outside the scientific community.  The 
non-scientists sometimes couch their doubts sarcastically.  See, e.g., John Tierney, Editorial, In 
2008, a 100 Percent Chance of Alarm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2008, at D1 (describing how journalists 
and scientists use hurricanes, wild fires and starving polar bears to make global warming seem real 
to the public at large); George F. Will, Editorial, Fuzzy Climate Math, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2007, 
at A27 (describing the indoctrination of Americans on climate change and the production of Ben 
& Jerrys ice cream as a sinister contributor to climate change). 
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sea levels.37  The IPCC attributed various additional changes (such as 
changes in both hydrological and terrestrial systems) to rising 
temperatures with either a high or very high degree of confidence.38 
Global GHG emissions due to human activities have increased since 
pre-industrial times, and have increased by 70% between 1970 and 2004.  
According to the IPCC, carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most important 
anthropogenic GHG, with increased annual emissions of about 80% 
from 1970 to 2004.39  As a result, global atmospheric concentrations of 
CO2 and other GHGs (including methane and nitrous oxide) have 
increased dramatically and now exceed by far the natural range over the 
last 650,000 years.40  The increased concentrations of GHGs are due 
primarily to fossil fuel use, with land-use change providing another 
significant but smaller contribution.41  The IPCCs Fourth Assessment 
Report also concluded that [m]ost of the observed increase in globally-
averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to 
the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations.42  Human 
                                                     
 37. IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 17, at 1.  The IPCC reported that eleven of the years 
between 1995 and 2006 rank among the twelve warmest years since 1850, when instrumental 
recording of global surface temperatures began.  Further, the increases have been widespread, 
although they have generally been greater at higher northern latitudes.  Id. 
 38. Id. at 23. 
 39. Id. at 4.  The National Research Council has referred to CO2 as the chief GHG.  
Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting COMMITTEE 
ON THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, DIVISION ON EARTH AND LIFE STUDIES, NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS (2001), 
available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10139), rehg en banc denied, 433 F.3d 66 
(D.C. Cir. 2005), revd, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).  CO2 is [t]he most important greenhouse gas 
because [i]t is emitted in by far the greatest quantities, even though other GHGs are more potent 
than CO2.  Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and Overview, in  GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. 
LAW 5 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007).  Methane, another GHG, has a global warming potential 
(GWP) of twenty-three; it is 23 times more potent than carbon dioxide on a ton-by-ton basis.  Id.  
The GWP of nitrous oxide is 296, while the GWP of sulfur hexafluoride is 22,200.  Id. 
 40. IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 17, at 4. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 5.  The majority opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA began with the following 
description of this causal link: 
A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase 
in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.  Respected scientists believe the 
two trends are related.  For when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it acts 
like the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of 
reflected heat.  It is therefore a speciesthe most important speciesof a greenhouse 
gas. 
127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007).  Chief Justice Roberts, who concluded that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing to sue, was not willing to concede the existence of a problem, much less a causal link 
between human activity and that problem.  See id. at 1463 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (Global 
warming may be a crisis . . . . Indeed, it may ultimately affect nearly everyone on the planet in 
some potentially adverse way . . . .).  Cf. id. at 147778 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (The Courts alarm 
over global warming may or may not be justified . . . .). 
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activities extend to other aspects of climate change.  They are very likely, 
for example, to have contributed to sea level rise over the second half of 
the 20th century and likely to have contributed to wind pattern changes 
that affect extra-tropical storm track and temperature patterns.43 
According to the IPCCs Fourth Assessment Report, [t]here is high 
agreement and much evidence that if current environmental policies are 
not changed, global GHG emissions will continue to increase, causing 
further warming and other climate changes during this century that 
would very likely be larger than those observed during the 20th 
century.44  Although the changes would differ across the globe, they are 
very likely or likely to include reduction or disappearance of late summer 
sea ice in the Arctic (with resulting increases in sea levels), increased 
frequency of hot extremes and heavy precipitation, increased tropical 
cyclone intensity,45 changes in annual river runoff patterns, and 
decreased water resources in semi-arid areas such as the western United 
States.46  Additional projected changes that will affect the United States 
include warming in the western mountains, causing reduced snowpack, 
increased winter flooding, and decreased summer flows that result in 
fiercer competition for scarce water resources; slight increased aggregate 
yields of rain-fed agriculture during the early years of the 21st century, 
but [m]ajor challenges are projected for crops that are near the warm 
end of their suitable range or which depend on highly utilized water 
resources[;] increased number, intensity and duration of heatwaves, 
which may cause adverse health impacts; and increased stresses on 
coastal communities.47  The IPCC Report warned that anthropogenic 
warming could lead to abrupt or irreversible changes, including sea level 
rises measured in meters, major changes in coastlines and flooding of 
low-lying areas, and species extinctions.48 
                                                     
 43. IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 17, at 6. 
 44. Id. 
 45. For discussion of the debate over whether there is a link between human-induced climate 
change and tropical storms such as hurricanes in the Atlantic Ocean, see Robert L. Glicksman, 
Global Climate Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas from Hurricanes and Rising Sea Levels: The 
Costs of Doing Nothing, 52 LOY. L. REV. 1127, 118497 (2006). 
 46. IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 17, at 8. 
 47. Id. at 10. 
 48. Id. at 13. 
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2. Coal, Electricity, and GHG Emissions in the United States 
The United States is responsible for between 20 and 25% of global 
CO2 emissions.49  Nearly 85% of total U.S. GHG emissions (measured 
by global warming potential) are from CO2.50  Based on data from 2004, 
the United States emits on a per capita basis two times the CO2 that Great 
Britain and Japan do, more than five times the amount China emits, and 
nineteen times more than India.51  Between 1990 and 2004, U.S. 
emissions of all GHGs increased by 15.8% and emissions of CO2 
increased by 19.6%.52  The largest sources of CO2 emissions in the 
United States are power plants and transportation sources.53  In 2005, 
about 40% of CO2 emissions and 84% of all GHG emissions from U.S. 
energy sources came from power plants.54  The electric power sector was 
primarily responsible for the increase in U.S. emissions of CO2 between 
1990 and 2004; 55% of the emissions increase came from that sector.55  
Because coal has the highest carbon content of any fossil fuel, burning 
coal to produce electricity generates more carbon emissions per unit of 
energy than burning oil or natural gas does.56  Between 1990 and 2004, 
CO2 emissions in the United States from coal-fired power plants 
                                                     
 49. See, e.g., EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 649 (2007) (explaining the U.S.s responsibility for 25% of global CO2 emissions).  Cf. 
Gerrard, supra note 39, at 6 (asserting the U.S. was responsible for 20.6% of worldwide GHG 
emissions in 2000).  By some accounts, China has overtaken the United States as the worlds biggest 
emitter of CO2.  See, e.g., John Vidal & David Adam, China Overtakes US as Worlds Biggest CO2 
Emitter, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (U.K.), June 19, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
environment/2007/jun/19/china.usnews. 
 50. Gerrard, supra note 39, at 8. 
 51. U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, THE CARBON BOOM: STATE AND NATIONAL TRENDS IN CARBON 
DIOXIDE EMISSIONS SINCE 1990 9 (2007), available at http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/ 
up/WJ/upWJ1agKj7szeI-OUSnI1A/carbonboom07.pdf [hereinafter CARBON BOOM]. 
 52. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, U.S. EMISSIONS INVENTORY 2006, INVENTORY OF U.S. 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 19902004 2-1 (2006), available at http://yosemite. 
epa.gov/OAR/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/RAMR6MBSC3/$File/06_Complete_Report.p
df [hereinafter EMISSIONS INVENTORY 2006].  During the same period, U.S. emissions of some other 
GHGs, such as methane and nitrous oxide, fell (by 10% and 2%, respectively).  Id. at 25. 
 53. CARBON BOOM, supra note 51, at 4. 
 54. Id. at 9; ANDREW G. KEELER, NATL REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., STATE COMMISSION 
ELECTRICITY REGULATION UNDER A FEDERAL GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE POLICY 23 
(2008), available at http://nrri.org/pubs/electricity/08-01.pdf.  See also Gerrard, supra note 39, at 9 
(providing a 39% figure for 2004). 
 55. CARBON BOOM, supra note 51, at 5; see also EMISSIONS INVENTORY 2006, supra note 52, 
at 2-22 ([E]missions from electricity generation accounted for the largest portion (33%) of U.S. 
greenhouse gashouse emissions in 2004.). 
 56. Those two fossil fuels contain about 25% and 45% less carbon than coal, respectively.  
CARBON BOOM, supra note 51, at 19. 
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increased by about a quarter, representing about 75% of the emissions 
increase in the electric power sector and 42% of all CO2 emissions 
increases.57  During the same period, CO2 emissions from the industrial 
sector fell slightly and increases from the commercial and residential 
sectors amounted to only 4% and 9%, respectively.58  Increases in CO2 
emissions have continued since then: During the first forty-nine weeks of 
2007, they rose 3.3% compared to the same period during the previous 
year.59 
Different regions of the United States rely to a different extent on 
coal-fired power plants to generate electricity.  The ten states that emitted 
the highest amounts of CO2 in 2004 were (in descending order): Texas, 
California, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Florida, Indiana, Illinois, New York, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi.60  The ten states whose CO2 emissions 
increased the most between 1990 and 2004 were: Texas, Florida, Illinois, 
North Carolina, Georgia, Missouri, Arizona, Indiana, Virginia, and 
Alabama.61  CO2 emissions from the plains states (Iowa, Kansas, 
Missouri, Nebraska, and the Dakotas) rose by 24% between 1990 and 
2004, behind only the Southeast and the Mountain West (where 
emissions increased by 31% in each region).62  The top ten states for CO2 
emissions from coal-fired power plants in 2004 were: Texas, Ohio, 
Indiana, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Kentucky, West Virginia, Georgia, 
Missouri, and Alabama.63  Between 1990 and 2004, the plains states 
experienced a 40% increase in CO2 emissions from coal-fired power 
plants, second only to the Pacific West (where emissions increased by 
65%).64 
About half of the nations electric power is provided by coal 
combustion, but about three-quarters of power in Kansas comes from 
coal.65  Energy-related CO2 emissions from all sources in Kansas totaled 
                                                     
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 16 tbl. 1. 
 59. U.S. Coal Use Rises, Boosting CO2 Emissions in 2007, GREENWIRE (Dec. 14, 2007), 
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2007/12/14/13. 
 60. CARBON BOOM, supra note 51, at 17 tbl. 3. 
 61. Id. at 18 tbl. 4. 
 62. Id. at 17 tbl. 2. 
 63. Id. at 20 tbl. 6.  But cf. CLEAN AIR WATCH, FLORIDAS DIRTY DOZEN: MEETING THE 
SUNSHINE STATES GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION GOALS 3 (2008) (listing Florida as the third 
largest emitter of CO2 from power plants) (citing U.S. EIA, Florida Electricity Profile, 2006 Edition, 
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/florida.html)), available at http:// 
www.cleanairwatch.org/Documents%20&%20Reports/Florida%20Dirty%20Dozen.pdf [hereinafter 
DIRTY DOZEN]. 
 64. CARBON BOOM, supra note 51, at 1920. 
 65. Governor Says Rejection of Air Permit for Power Plant Will Improve Public Health, 38 
ENVT REP. (BNA) 2363, 2364 (Nov. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Rejection].  According to Kansas 
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67.7 million metric tons in 1990 and 76.1 million metric tons in 2004, an 
increase of 12%.66  Emissions of CO2 from coal-fired power plants in 
Kansas rose from 25.2 million metric tons in 1990 to 35.9 million metric 
tons in 2004, a 42% increase.67  Kansas generated 23.7 million megawatt 
hours of electricity from coal in 1990 and 34.6 million in 2004, a 46% 
increase.68  Clearly, then, coal-fired power production is a significant 
component of the energy mix in Kansas, and increasingly so in recent 
years. 
B. Regulatory Restrictions on Coal-Fired Power Generation 
Because electricity production, and coal-fired power plants in 
particular, contribute significantly to CO2 emissions in the United States, 
coal-fired power generation is a logical candidate for emission controls 
or other regulatory restrictions designed to mitigate climate change.  This 
section summarizes the regulatory status of electric generating facilities 
under both federal and state air pollution and related laws.  As the 
discussion below indicates, state governments have played the primary 
role to date in restricting CO2 and other GHG emissions from electric 
generating facilities. 
1. Federal Regulation 
For years, EPA denied that it had the authority to regulate emissions 
of CO2 and most other GHGs under the CAA.  In 2007, the Supreme 
Court decisively rejected EPAs claim that it lacks the authority to 
regulate GHG emissions from mobile sources under section 202 of the 
CAA.69  The Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA that GHGs fit well 
within the [CAAs] capacious definition of air pollutant.70  The Court 
found that section 202 conditions the exercise of that authority on the 
exercise of EPAs judgment, but that such judgment must relate to 
whether an air pollutant cause[s] or contribute[s] to air pollution which 
                                                                                                                       
Governor Kathleen Sebelius, Kansas ranks tenth in the nation in per capita production of GHGs.  Id. 
 66. CARBON BOOM, supra note 51, at 35 app. A. 
 67. Id. at 37 app. B. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2000) (mandating that EPA issue standards applicable to the 
emission of any air pollutant from motor vehicles which, in the Administrators judgment, may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare). 
 70. 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007).  The Act defines air pollutant as any air pollution agent or 
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including 
source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter which is 
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.  42 U.S.C. § 7602(g). 
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may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.71  
Thus, if EPA makes a finding of endangerment, it must regulate 
emissions of the relevant pollutant from motor vehicles.72  The issue in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, therefore, was whether EPA had offered a 
reasoned explanation for refusing to decide whether the effects of GHG 
emissions pose an endangerment.  The Court held that it had not done 
so.73  EPA has not yet responded to the Courts decision, but the agency 
would seem to have an uphill battle defending a finding that GHGs do 
not cause or contribute to an endangerment.74 
Massachusetts v. EPA did not involve EPAs authority to regulate 
GHGs from stationary sources such as electric generating facilities.  The 
Courts holding nevertheless almost assuredly supports the conclusion 
that the CAA authorizes EPA to regulate GHG emissions from stationary 
sources as well as mobile sources.  The CAA creates several different 
regulatory programs that apply to stationary sources, most of which also 
apply to air pollutants for which the agency makes certain findings.  
Because the definition of an air pollutant is the same in each of those 
contexts, GHG emissions from stationary sources as well as motor 
vehicles qualify as air pollutants.  The CAA authorizes EPA to issue 
national ambient air quality standards to protect the public health and 
welfare.75  It requires that EPA list as a so-called criteria pollutant 
                                                     
 71. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1462 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 146263. 
 74. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Massachusetts v. EPA Heats Up Climate Policy No Less than 
Administrative Law: A Comment on Professors Watts and Wildermuth, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 32, 37 (2007) (Barring congressional intervention, this decision will cause the EPA to 
regulate the emission of greenhouse gases.); Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective 
Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of 
Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579 (2008) (stating that the Courts decision all but 
forc[es] the EPA to regulate GHG emissions); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Controlling Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Mobile SourcesMassachusetts v. EPA, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,535, 10,538 (2007) 
([T]he Courts opinion pushes EPA to find that GHGs need to be regulated.).  Late in 2007, 
President Bush signed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.  Pub. L. No. 110-140, 
121 Stat. 1492 (2007).  That Act raised the corporate average fuel economy standards for passenger 
automobiles to 35 miles per gallon by 2020.  Id. § 102(a)(2) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 
32902(b)(2)(A)).  EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson hinted that the energy bill makes it 
unnecessary for EPA to adopt mandatory controls on GHG emissions from motor vehicles, despite 
Massachusetts v. EPA.  See Dawn Reeves, Environmentalists Eye Suit to Force EPA GHG 
Endangerment Finding, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Jan. 4, 2008, at 1, 1 (Johnson suggested that the fuel 
economy mandates may satisfy [Massachusetts v. EPA].); Stephen D. Cook, Waxman Opens 
Investigation into Denial of Californias Greenhouse Gas Limit Waiver, 39 ENVT REP. (BNA) 12, 
1213 (Jan. 4, 2008) (quoting Johnson as stating that the energy bill amounts to a comprehensive 
solution for motor vehicles). 
 75. The CAA defines welfare broadly to include, but not be limited to, effects on soils, 
water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, 
damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on 
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each air pollutant whose emissions, in the Administrators judgment, 
cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated 
to endanger public health or welfare and whose presence in the 
ambient air results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary 
sources.76  The similarity of the findings that trigger the obligation to 
list air pollutants as criteria pollutants and to regulate emissions from 
motor vehicles is obvious.  Once EPA lists a pollutant as a criteria 
pollutant, it must establish national ambient air quality standards for the 
pollutant.77  The CAA then requires each state to develop an 
implementation plan that is designed to achieve the standards through 
techniques such as enforceable emission limitations.78  EPA and the 
states share the authority to enforce plan provisions.79 
The suitability of the national ambient air quality standard provisions 
to restricting emissions of GHGs is not clear because those provisions 
make the states responsible for achieving or maintaining concentrations 
of the criteria pollutants involved that are measured locally.  The effects 
of GHG emissions are not localized.80  The point is moot at the present 
time because EPA has given every indication that it has no intention to 
regulate GHGs from stationary sources, under the CAAs national 
ambient air quality standard provisions or otherwise, in order to combat 
climate change.81 
Another of the CAAs regulatory programs that could provide the 
basis for regulating GHG emissions from electric generating facilities 
addresses air pollution from new stationary sources.  Section 111 of the 
statute requires that EPA compile a list of categories of stationary 
                                                                                                                       
economic values and on personal comfort and well-being, whether caused by transformation, 
conversion, or combination with other air pollutants.  42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
 76. Id. § 7408(a)(1)(A)(B). 
 77. Id. § 7409(b). 
 78. Id. § 7410(a)(1)(2). 
 79. Id. § 7413. 
 80. See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 37 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,653, 10,653 (2007) (The threat of climate change does not hinge on where GHG 
emissions occur.  On the contrary, because these gases quickly assimilate into the global atmosphere, 
emissions in Florence, Italy, have the same global impact as those released in Florence, 
California.). 
 81. The portion of EPAs Web site that describes EPAs plan for addressing climate change 
notably lacks any reference to mandatory federal controls on GHG emissions from stationary 
sources.  See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Current and Near-Term Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Initiatives, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/policy/neartermghgreduction.html (last visited Mar. 
2, 2008).  Similarly, the George W. Bush Administration fought against the adoption of mandatory 
targets for reducing GHG emissions at the 2007 Bali Climate Change Conference.  See Joshua Boak, 
U.S. Firms Urge Emissions Goal, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 2007, at 1, available at http://www. 
chicagotribune.com/business/chi-sat_balibizdec15,1,7573594.story. 
13 - GLICKSMAN FINAL III.DOC 6/17/2008  8:14:17 PM 
532 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
sources82 that, in the Administrators judgment, cause[], or contribute[] 
significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare.83  EPA must establish nationally 
uniform, technology-based standards of performance for each listed 
source category.84  The Act makes it unlawful for any new source to 
operate in violation of an applicable standard of performance.85  Because 
the new source standards of performance determine the required degree 
of emission controls on the basis of what is technologically possible, 
rather than on the basis of the impact of different levels of emissions on 
ambient air quality, the non-localized nature of GHG emissions would 
not hinder efforts to address climate change through section 111 of the 
CAA.86 
                                                     
 82. Section 111 defines a stationary source as any building, structure, facility, or installation 
which emits or may emit any air pollutant.  42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3); see also id. § 7602(z) (The 
term stationary source means generally any source of an air pollutant except those emissions 
resulting directly from an internal combustion engine for transportation purposes or from a nonroad 
engine or nonroad vehicle . . . .). 
 83. Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A). 
 84. Id. § 7411(b)(1)(B).  A standard of performance 
means a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission 
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction 
which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality 
health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines 
has been adequately demonstrated. 
Id. § 7411(a)(1). 
 85. Id. § 7411(e). 
 86. Regulation under section 111 would be limited to sources that qualify as new sources, 
however.  A new source means any stationary source, the construction or modification of which is 
commenced after the publication of regulations (or, if earlier, proposed regulations) prescribing a 
standard of performance under this section which will be applicable to such source.  Id. § 
7411(a)(2).  Coal-fired power plants that predate the adoption of section 111 standards for stationary 
source categories that emit GHGs would therefore not be covered by those standards, at least until 
they make physical changes that qualify as modifications.  EPA refused in 2008 to regulate 
emissions of CO2 and other GHGs when it issued standards of performance for new stationary 
sources in the petroleum refining industry.  U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Standards of Performance for 
Petroleum Refineries, Final Rule, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t1_notices/nsps_043008.pdf.  
According to EPA, the CAA affords it significant flexibility in determining which pollutants are 
appropriate for regulation under section 111(b)(1)(B).  Id. at 94.  In addition, EPA asserted that 
nothing in the CAA mandates that EPA include a new standard of performance for an air pollutant 
not already covered by the standard of performance under review.  Id. at 95.  EPA added: 
In this instance, it is reasonable for EPA not to promulgate performance standards for 
GHG emissions as part of this 8-year review cycle.  We believe that the nature of GHG 
emissions renders them readily distinguishable from other air pollutants for which we 
have previously promulgated new performance standards concurrent with an 8-year 
review of the existing standards.  Indeed, GHG emissions present issues that we have 
never had to address in the context of even an initial NSPS rulemaking for a source 
category.  These differences warrant proceeding initially through a more deliberate 
process, i.e., the announced advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR), than in 
this source category-specific rulemaking. 
Id. at 97-98. 
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A third possibility would be for Congress to amend the CAA to 
authorize EPA to restrict, or authorize EPA to regulate, GHG emissions 
from electric power plants under an entirely new regulatory program.  
Such a step would not be unprecedented.  When Congress amended the 
CAA in 1990, it created a new program to limit emissions of sulfur 
dioxide and oxides of nitrogen that contribute to acid deposition.87  The 
program applies primarily to coal-fired electric generating facilities, a 
principal source of those pollutants.88  The acid deposition control 
program includes a cap-and-trade program that allows regulated facilities 
to meet their regulatory obligations by purchasing emission allowances 
instead of by cutting their own emissions.89  Most of the bills introduced 
in Congress to deal with global climate change during the past few years 
have included a similar emissions trading program for CO2.90 
To date, EPA has not used any of the existing CAA regulatory 
mechanisms to regulate GHG emissions from stationary sources such as 
electric power plants, and Congress has not passed legislation mandating 
GHG emission reductions from electric generating facilities.91  
Constraints on GHG emissions from those facilities have derived instead 
from state law. 
                                                     
 87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 76517651o. 
 88. See, e.g., id. § 7651c(e), Table A (listing particular facilities that qualify as affected 
sources for purposes of the acid deposition control provisions); id. § 7651d(a)(1) ([E]ach existing 
utility unit . . . is subject to the limitations and requirements of this section.). 
 89. See id. § 7651b (describing the allowance program). 
 90. E.g., S. 485, 110th Cong. § 703 (2007); H.R. 4226, 110th Cong. §§ 121146, 161165 
(2007); S. 843, 108th Cong. § 704 (2003).  Some of the legislation contains provisions specifically 
directed at electric generation units.  See, e.g., S. 309, 110th Cong. § 708 (2007). 
 91. There is at least one other CAA regulatory program that might be used to address climate 
change.  Section 112 creates a primarily technology-based regulatory program for stationary sources 
that emit hazardous air pollutants.  Congress itself included in the statute a long list of air pollutants 
that qualify as hazardous.  42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1).  CO2 is not on that list.  EPA has the power to 
add pollutants to the statutory list.  To do so, EPA must find that a pollutant 
may present, through inhalation or other routes of exposure, a threat of adverse human 
health effects (including, but not limited to, substances which are known to be, or may 
reasonably be anticipated to be, carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic, neurotoxic, which 
cause reproductive dysfunction, or which are acutely or chronically toxic) or adverse 
environmental effects whether through ambient concentrations, bioaccumulation, 
deposition, or otherwise. . . . 
Id. § 7412(b)(2).  This provision would appear to authorize EPA to list CO2 or other GHGs as 
hazardous air pollutants on the basis of a finding that they may present . . . a threat of . . . adverse 
environmental effects whether through . . . bioaccumulation . . . or otherwise.  Id.  The potential 
adverse health effects of CO2 are discussed infra at notes 38897 and accompanying text. 
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2. State Regulation 
Despite (or because of) the federal governments failure to impose 
mandatory controls on GHG emissions from stationary sources, many 
states have taken steps to limit GHG emissions by electric generating 
facilities.  State regulation has taken various forms.  These include 
renewable portfolio standards requiring that power be produced from 
alternative energy sources that generate relatively low levels of GHG 
emissions.  They also include regional or state-by-state limits on GHG 
emissions from stationary sources generally or from power plants in 
particular.  These limits are often accompanied by emissions trading 
programs similar to the CAAs federal acid deposition control program.  
Recently, the tools used by the states to reduce emissions that contribute 
to climate change have expanded to include the denial of permits or 
licenses to coal-fired plants or the issuance of permits conditioned on 
actions to reduce the applicants impact on climate change.92 
a. Renewable Portfolio Standards 
More than twenty states (although not Kansas) have enacted 
renewable portfolio standards (RPS) as a means of minimizing reliance 
on traditional, carbon-laden fossil fuels to generate electricity.93  These 
standards are designed to increase the percentage of energy supplied by 
renewable resources.  The standards typically require that a minimum 
percentage (which varies widely from state to state) of a utilitys power 
plant capacity or generation come from renewable sources such as solar, 
                                                     
 92. This article does not address the initiatives taken by the states to reduce GHG emissions 
from motor vehicles.  For a more thorough assessment of the different approaches states have taken 
to address climate change, see Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is 
Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say 
About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006); Robert McKinstry, Jr. & 
Thomas D. Peterson, The Implications of the New Old Federalism in Climate-Change 
Legislation: How to Function in a Global Marketplace When States Take the Lead, 20 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 61 (2007). 
 93. See Rules, Regulations, and Policies for Renewable Energy, http://www.dsireusa.org/ 
summarytables/reg1.cfm?&CurrentPageID=7&EE=1&RE=1 (illustrating the policies implemented 
in each state) (last visited Feb. 15, 2008); PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, STATES 
WITH RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_is_being_done/ 
in_the_states/rps.cfm (briefly describing each states legislation and approach) (last visited Feb. 15, 
2008); see also J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case 
of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1523 (2007) (Legislatures in twenty-two states now 
require their electric utilities to generate some energy from renewable sources.). 
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wind, or biomass.94  RPS programs can increase the role of renewable 
energy by increasing the required percentage over time.95  RPS programs 
often include a credit trading mechanism whose function is to provide 
flexibility in compliance options for utilities and to reward the efficient 
use of renewable energy technologies.96  As one source has noted, RPS 
standards have the potential to . . . become effective levers for 
substantially reducing [GHG] emissions if the renewable portfolio 
percentage is set high enough. . . .  RPS measures can thus be integral to 
reducing [GHGs] in the long run, as an increased reliance on renewables 
will displace fossil fuels.97 
b. Emission Controls and Cap-and-Trade Programs 
Probably the most prominent state program for controlling GHG 
emissions from the electricity sector is the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) in which several northeastern and mid-Atlantic states 
are participating.  That program mandates reductions in CO2 emissions 
from power plants, but it includes a cap-and-trade program that permits 
regulated utilities to comply with their reduction obligations by 
purchasing emissions credits from other regulated entities that exceed 
their mandated emissions cuts.98  The states participating in RGGI agreed 
to cap global warming emissions from the regions power plants at 
current levels and reduce them by 10% by 2019.99 
Similarly, the governors of nine Midwestern states (including 
Kansas) in 2007 signed the Midwestern Regional Greenhouse Gas 
                                                     
 94. Stephanie B. Oshita, The Scientific and International Context for Climate Change 
Initiatives, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 25 (2007); Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Román & Arthur N. Dobelis, 
State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 29 
(2005). 
 95. Kirsten H. Engel & Scott Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case 
of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 21819 (2005). 
 96. Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches: The Ideal Design 
Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading with an Analysis of the European Unions 
CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 934 
n.308 (2005).  According to DeShazo & Freeman, [o]ne important source of uncertainty concerns 
the prospects for markets in renewable energy credits.  Although such markets promise to spur 
growth in renewable energy sources and to reduce compliance costs for utilities, this market is 
currently underdeveloped and trading is largely unregulated.  DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 93, 
at 1523. 
 97. Engel & Saleska, supra note 95, at 219. 
 98. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVEOVERVIEW 1 (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www. 
rggi.org/docs/mou_rggi_overview_12_20_05.pdf (stating that the program controls the right to 
emit . . . , but allows companies to trade emissions permits). 
 99. CARBON BOOM, supra note 51, at 12. 
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Reduction Accord (The Accord).100  The Accord commits the member 
states to the establishment of GHG reduction targets; development of a 
market-based and multi-sector cap-and-trade mechanism to help achieve 
those targets; the creation of a system to enable tracking, management, 
and crediting for entities that reduce GHG; and the development and 
implementation of additional steps as needed to achieve the reduction 
targets.101  The Accord also committed the members to the pursuit of 
cooperative regional initiatives designed to reduce GHG emissions, 
including the provision of electricity transmission adequacy to support 
new wind energy facilities; the creation of renewable fuels corridors and 
coordinated signage to promote renewable fuel usage across the 
Midwest; the use of advanced bioenergy permitting to assist states with 
the latest technologies; and the establishment of a low-carbon energy 
transmission infrastructure to supply the Midwest with sustainable and 
environmentally responsible energy.102 
Individual states also have adopted GHG emission reduction 
requirements for stationary sources, including electric utilities.  The 
California legislature adopted the path-breaking statute of this type, the 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.103  The Act requires a reduction 
in GHG emissions statewide to 1990 levels by 2020,104 and authorizes 
the California Air Resources Board to adopt technology-based emissions 
reduction regulations applicable to categories of sources,105 which are 
anticipated to include electric utilities.106  The statute also authorizes the 
Board to develop an emissions trading program, under which sources 
emitting fewer GHGs than their permits allow may sell emissions credits 
to sources exceeding their individual GHG caps.107 
Some states have adopted specific statutory or regulatory GHG 
emissions caps for new power plants.  Oregons regulations108 offer new 
                                                     
 100. Press Release, Midwest Governors Association, Governors Sign Energy Security and 
Climate Stewardship Platform and Greenhouse Gas Accord, http://www.midwesterngovernors. 
org/govenergynov.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).  This Web page links to the Accord itself, which 
was signed on November 15, 2007.  The other nine signatories were the Governors of Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, and South Dakota and the Premier of Manitoba, 
Canada.  Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 3850038599 (West Supp. 2007).  For discussion of the 
Act, see Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for Federal, 
State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 5358 (2007). 
 104. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550. 
 105. Id. § 38560. 
 106. Id. § 38561(a). 
 107. Id. § 38570; see also Kaswan, supra note 103, at 5558. 
 108. OR. ADMIN. R. 345-024-0550 (2003). 
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power plants various options for meeting their reduction requirements, 
including the operation of certified cogeneration projects, the 
implementation of approved offset projects, or the payment of per ton 
offset fees.109  Washington state legislation mandates that new, large 
fossil fuel-fired electric generating facilities be subject to an approved 
CO2 mitigation plan that involves some combination of payments to third 
parties to provide mitigation, direct purchase of permanent carbon 
credits, and investment in applicant-controlled carbon dioxide mitigation 
projects, including cogeneration.110  Facility approval is subject to the 
requirement that 20% of the total CO2 emissions produced by the facility 
be mitigated.111  Even in states in which regulators have refused thus far 
to impose CO2 emission controls on proposed new coal-fired power 
plants, such as Montana, the need for and the inevitability of such 
controls in the future has been noted.112 
In addition, some states, such as Massachusetts and New Hampshire, 
have established emissions caps for existing power plants.113  New 
Hampshires Clean Power Act imposes annual limits through 2010 on 
emissions of CO2, as well as some criteria pollutants.  Regulated plants 
may comply either by reducing their own emissions or purchasing 
emissions credits through a trading program approved by state 
regulators.114  The state environmental agency may approve off-site 
reduction measures such as carbon sequestration, shutdown of CO2-
emitting sources, and electricity generation through renewable sources.115 
                                                     
 109. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 93, at 1524. 
 110. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.70.020(2)(3) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007). 
 111. Id. § 80.70.020(4). 
 112. Southern Montana Elec. Generation and Transmission Cooperative, Permit #3423-00, at 14 
(May 11, 2007); Mike Dennison, Board Refuses CO2 Rules for Coal-Fired Power Plant, 
MISSOULIAN, Jan. 12, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.missoulian.com/articles/2008/ 
01/11/nes/mtregional/2news08.txt.  The Montana permit proceedings are described more fully infra 
at note 381. 
 113. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 93, at 1524.  Massachusetts became the first state to set a 
CO2 emissions standard for existing power plants when the Massachusetts Department of 
Environmental Protection adopted a multi-pollutant rule.  The rule set new emissions standards for 
carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury.  Id. at 1524 n.78 (citing 310 MASS. 
CODE REGS. 7.29(1) (2004)). 
 114. Id. at 1524 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125-O:3 to 125-O:4 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006)); 
see also Kevin L. Doran, Can the U.S. Achieve a Sustainable Energy Economy from the Bottom-Up? 
An Assessment of State Sustainable Energy Initiatives, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 95, 10405 (2006). 
 115. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 93, at 152425. 
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c. Refusals to Permit or Build Coal-Fired Plants 
Another development in state efforts to reduce the contribution of 
power plants to climate change is the denial by state regulators of 
permission to construct or operate such plants.  The refusal of state 
legislative and regulatory bodies to allow certain kinds of electricity 
producing facilities is not unprecedented.116  Indeed, in at least one 
instance, a state adopted a sweeping moratorium on the construction of 
certain kinds of electric generating facilities.  In 1976, the California 
legislature amended the Warren-Alquist Act to bar the construction of 
nuclear fission thermal power plants pending issuance by a state agency 
of a finding that there has been developed and that the United States 
through its authorized agency has approved and there exists a 
demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of high-level nuclear 
waste.117  Because the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission was in 
no position to approve such technology, either at the time the statute was 
amended or in the foreseeable future, the statute in effect amounted to a 
state-wide moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants for 
the indefinite future.118  In 1983, the Supreme Court upheld the Warren-
Alquist Act, holding that it was not preempted by the Atomic Energy 
Act.119 
To date, no state has gone that far in restricting the development of 
coal-fired electric facilities.120  In 2007, however, three states denied 
                                                     
 116. State public utility commissions have long refused to allow the construction of capacity that 
is not needed or refused to allow utilities to pass the costs of excess capacity on to the ratepayers.  
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police 
the Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. L.J. 2031, 2049 (1989) (State utility commissions and state 
legislators have responded to the large rate increases requested to reflect these investments by 
denying utilities recovery of tens of billions of dollars in costs.).  See generally Robert L. 
Glicksman, Allocating the Cost of Constructing Excess Capacity: Who Will Have to Pay for It 
All?, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 429 (1985) (discussing issues relating to the construction of excess 
capacity at the Wolf Creek nuclear power facility in Kansas); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory 
Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497 
(1984) (discussing issues relating to large-scale energy projects which in hindsight would be 
considered mistakes). 
 117. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.2(a) (West 2008). 
 118. See Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1031 (1987) (stating that the moratorium was precisely what California voters 
intended). 
 119. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Commn, 461 U.S. 190 
(1983). 
 120. Federal legislators, however, have considered legislation that would prevent any plant using 
traditional coal-fired technology from proceeding.  See, e.g., Moratorium on Uncontrolled Power 
Plants Act of 2008, H.R. 5575, 100th Cong., § 2(a) (2008) (prohibiting any permitting authority 
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permits for coal-fired plants and in another state, plans to construct 
eleven new coal-fired plants were dramatically curtailed121 in light of the 
public outcry spurred by the original proposal.122  The regulatory climate 
for coal-fired power is clearly becoming more hostile at the state level.  
The remainder of this section describes the regulatory and political 
obstacles that prevented the construction of coal-fired plants in states 
such as Washington, Florida, North Carolina, and Texas in 2007.  With 
these descriptions as background, Part III below analyzes in more depth 
KDHEs denial of the Sunflower applications. 
i. Florida 
The Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC) in 2007 denied 
permission to construct a coal-fired power plant.123  Florida Power & 
Light Company (FPL) filed the petition for a determination of need for 
two electric power plants in Glades County.124  FPL proposed to put into 
service by 2013 and 2014 two ultra-supercritical pulverized coal 
(USCPC) generating units with a combined net capacity of 1960 
megawatts.125  The Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act126 (Siting 
Act) is designed to balance increased demand for electric power with 
the broad interests of the public, including use of the states natural 
resources.127  The Siting Act lists a series of factors that the FPSC must 
consider in deciding whether to approve a proposed new electric 
generating facility, without specifying the weight to be afforded each.128  
The FPSC must take into account the need for electric system reliability 
and integrity, the need for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost, the 
                                                                                                                       
from issuing a permit for a proposed new coal-fired electric generating unit under the Clean Air 
Act, unless the permit requires the unit to use state-of-the-art control technology to capture and 
permanently sequester carbon dioxide emissions from such unit); see also Amanda Griscom Little, 
Lets Call the Coal Thing Off, GRIST, Mar. 9, 2007, http://www.grist.org/cgi-bin/printthis. 
pl?uri=/news/muck/2007/03/09/nocoal/index.html (describing a bill being drafted by Senator John 
Kerry). 
 121. See infra notes 12377 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Little, supra note 120 (stating that the groups struck a truce and agreed to cut the 
number of new coal plants down to three). 
 123. In re Petition for Determination of Need for Glades Power Park Units 1 and 2 Electrical 
Power Plants in Glades County, by Fla. Power & Light Co., Docket No. 070098-E1, Order No. PSC-
07-0557-FOF-EI, Order Denying Petition for Determination of Need, (July 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.psc.state.fl.us/library/filings/07/05350-07/05350-07.pdf [hereinafter Glades Power 
Decision]. 
 124. Id. at 1. 
 125. Id. 
 126. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.501403.518 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008). 
 127. Glades Power Decision, supra note 123, at 2 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.502). 
 128. Id. 
13 - GLICKSMAN FINAL III.DOC 6/17/2008  8:14:17 PM 
540 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
need for fuel diversity and supply reliability, and whether the proposed 
plant is the most cost-effective alternative available.129  In addition, the 
agency must consider the conservation measures taken by or reasonably 
available to the applicant . . . which might mitigate the need for the 
proposed plant.130  Finally, the Siting Act authorizes the FPSC to 
consider other matters within its jurisdiction which it deems 
relevant.131 
The FPSC concluded that it was in the public interest to deny FPLs 
petition for determination of need.132  It found that the applicant failed 
to demonstrate that the proposed plants were the most cost-effective 
alternative available, taking into account the uncertainty associated with 
future natural gas and coal prices and with emerging energy policy 
decisions at both the state and federal level.133  In addition, the 
Commission relied on a 2005 amendment to the Siting Act which 
authorized the Commission to consider fuel diversity as a factor in 
determining need.134  The FPSC recognized the need for additional 
generation to meet current and future growth and declared that 
uncertainty about cost-effectiveness alone will not necessarily control 
the outcome of every need determination decision.  We find in this 
case, however, that the potential benefits regarding fuel diversity 
offered by FPL in support of the [proposed plants] fail to mitigate the 
additional costs and risks of the project, given the uncertainty of 
present fuel prices, capital costs, and current market and regulatory 
factors.135 
The FPSCs decision was the first time it rejected a new power plant 
since 1992.136  The decision did not mention climate change or GHG 
emissions.  Instead, it was couched vaguely in terms of uncertainty over 
fuel prices, capital costs, and unidentified regulatory factors.  
Nevertheless, environmental concerns contributed to the outcome.  FPL 
had claimed that the plants would have included filters, scrubbers, and 
other systems that would have cut CO2 emissions generated by the 
                                                     
 129. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.519(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Glades Power Decision, supra note 123, at 2 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.519(3)). 
 132. Id. at 4. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 34. 
 136. Jim Ash, Commission Denies Coal Plant Near Everglades, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, 
June 6, 2007, at 1E. 
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burning of coal by as much as 90%.137  Still, the plants would have 
emitted more mercury than any of FPLs existing plants.138  The fact that 
the plant would have been located in the middle of the Everglades also 
may have been a factor in the denial.139  Climate change also played a 
role.  FPSC members indicated that they were concerned that the price of 
coal could become unstable if Congress decides to regulate GHGs.140  
They also indicated that they regarded CO2 as well as mercury emissions 
as risks if the plant were approved.141  An environmental consultant 
testified before the FPSC that FPL could incur annual penalties for 
emitting CO2 between $120 to $400 million under climate change 
legislation being considered by Congress.142  Governor Charlie Crist had 
previously made it clear that he preferred that no new coal-fired power 
plants be licensed,143 and had issued an executive order requiring the 
adoption of standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from power 
plants to 2000 levels by 2017 and to 1990 levels by 2025.144 
According to one account, the decision in the Glades Power Park 
case 
mark[ed] the first time global warming has played a role in a PSC 
decision . . . .  The PSCs decision was motivated by its belief that not 
building the plant would save customers huge costs, including the cost 
of cutting GHG emissions.  The decision could be the harbinger of the 
PSCs approach to the five other proposals for new coal-fired power 
plants that are pending.145 
The Executive Director of Associated Industries of Florida asserted that 
[t]his idea that somehow this plant is going to help control climate 
                                                     
 137. Curtis Morgan, FPL in Fight to Ease Doubts on Coal, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 11, 2007, at 
1B. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Ash, supra note 136 (Senator Lee Constantine from Altamonte Springs believed many 
factors contributed to this decision, but one factor was that the plant would have been in the middle 
of the Everglades and were spending billions of dollars to clean up the Everglades.). 
 140. Marc Caputo & Curtis Morgan, FPLs Plan for Clean S. Florida Coal Plant Rejected, 
MIAMI HERALD, June 6, 2007, at 1A. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Jim Ash, Consultant: Coal Plant an Expensive Mistake, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 
18, 2007, at 4B. 
 143. See Letter to the Editor, Warning!, Coal Plants Face Rocky Road, TALLAHASSEE 
DEMOCRAT, June 7, 2007, at 2B (Governor Crist stating that his preference is no coal period). 
 144. Fla. Exec. Order No. 07-127, §§ 1, 2(1) (2007), available at http://www.flgov. 
com/pdfs/orders/07-127-emissions.pdf.  According to one report, the state will need to retire or 
repower some of its older coal-fired power plants.  DIRTY DOZEN, supra note 63, at 4. 
 145. David Hodas, Changing Course Towards an Energy-Efficient Future, 39 TRENDS No. 2, 
Nov./Dec. 2007, at 8. 
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change for the world is a joke when China is putting up a power plant 
every day.146  Nonetheless, FPL reacted to the decision by claiming that 
it was likely to decide to build more natural gas-fired plants to meet 
Floridas growing energy needs and to intensify its efforts to build one or 
two nuclear reactors.147 
ii. Washington 
Several months after the FPSCs decision, the State of Washingtons 
Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (EFSEC) also refused to 
endorse a proposal to construct a coal-fired power plant.148  This time, 
the decision was based more explicitly on climate change-related 
concerns.  Energy Northwest (ENW) proposed to construct the Pacific 
Mountain Energy Center, a combined cycle 793-megawatt electrical 
generating facility which would operate on synthetic gas produced from 
petroleum coke, a byproduct of refining, or coal.  According to the 
EFSEC, ENWs proposal was the first to involve an Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) project with carbon 
sequestration.  The agency described the project as involving 
environmental technology that seeks to minimize carbon emissions, to 
recapture byproducts such as sulfur, and to utilize as its fuel, products 
such as petroleum coke, a refinery waste product that might otherwise 
not be recycled, and coal.149 
State legislation gave EFSEC the authority to recommend to the 
governor whether the state should enter into a site certification agreement 
that would authorize a power plant applicant to construct and operate the 
facility.150  About seven months after ENW filed its application, the 
legislature amended the statute to impose conditions on pending 
applications.151  In particular, the statute requires new facilities 
generating more than 1100 pounds of GHGs per megawatt hour of 
electricity to sequester GHGs to that level or below.152  Under the 
amended law, EFSEC must adopt criteria for evaluating an applicants 
                                                     
 146. Caputo & Morgan, supra note 140. 
 147. Id. 
 148. In re Application No. 200601, Energy Nw., Pac. Mountain Energy Ctr. Power Project, 
Adjudicative Order No. 2, Council Order No. 833, Order: Staying Adjudicative Proceeding (Nov. 
27, 2007), available at http://www.efsec.wa.gov/FILES/orders/833%20-%20PMEC%20stay% 
20adjud.pdf [hereinafter Energy Northwest Decision]. 
 149. Id. at 1. 
 150. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 80.50). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 2 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 80.80.040(11)). 
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carbon sequestration plan, including but not limited to provisions 
requiring financial assurances sufficient to ensure successful 
implementation of the plan; geological or other approved sequestration 
commencing within five years of plant operation; monitoring the 
effectiveness of the implementation of the sequestration plan; penalties 
for failure to implement the plan on schedule; and the purchase of 
emissions reductions in the event of plan failure.153  The amended statute 
specified that an application pending on the date the law became 
effective (which only applied to the ENW application) include a carbon 
sequestration plan (or a GHG reduction plan, or GGRP) demonstrating 
how the project would satisfy these conditions, and that the applicant 
make a good faith effort to implement the plan.154  Only after preparing 
a detailed sequestration plan, receiving a site certification agreement, and 
making a good faith effort to implement the plan, may an applicant who 
finds implementation not feasible be excused from its terms and 
allowed to purchase greenhouse gas offsets.155 
ENW filed its GGRP in July 2007.  It took the position that it was 
impossible to prepare a plan as contemplated by the statute due to the 
technological and economical infeasibility of geological sequestration.  
Instead, ENW proposed: 
To prepare a specific plan in the future, perhaps as late as 2020, when 
geological sequestration becomes a proven technology for use by 
power plants and a number of asserted technological, engineering, and 
legal questions have been answered.  In the interim, ENW proposed to 
consider offsets based on assumptions that it enumerated in its 
GGRP.156 
The issue before EFSEC was whether ENWs submission complied 
with the statute.  It concluded unanimously that it did not, that it is 
therefore insufficient as a matter of law, that its provisions cannot be 
supplemented to the level of minimal sufficiency by mere revisions, and 
that its flaws are pervasive and affect the processing of the entire 
application.157  EFSEC therefore suspended the proceeding pending 
action by ENW to cure those flaws.  According to EFSEC, the basic 
flaw in ENWs GGRP was that: 
                                                     
 153. Id. n.2 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 80.80(11)(a)(f)). 
 154. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 80.80.040(13)). 
 155. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 80.80.040(13)). 
 156. Id. at 23. 
 157. Id. at 4. 
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[I]t is not a plan at all in terms of the statuteit does not identify 
specific steps it will take to implement sequestration.  Instead, it is a 
plan to make a plan, and it vows to begin making specific steps toward 
implementing geological sequestration at some future time, after 
geological sequestration becomes commercially accepted for use in 
reducing emissions of fossil-fueled power plants.  It proposes that 
eventually, at some indefinite future time, it will seek to develop a 
specific plan for accomplishing the purposes of the statute.  In the 
meantime, it argues, . . . it may purchase offsetting [GHG] emission 
rights from unspecified sources because a specific plan is futile and it 
need not make a good faith effort to comply with the letter of the 
statute.158 
EFSEC interpreted the statute as requiring an applicant to make 
specific plans for specific actions to accomplish a specific goal,159 
sequestration of GHGs, and receive a Site Certification Agreement from 
the Governor.  These requirements must be met 
before [the applicant] can ask for relief by the purchase of offsets.  
Then, only after ENW has made a good faith effort to implement the 
plan, and only after [EFSEC] has agreed that implementation is not 
feasible, may it be excused from compliance with plan 
implementation and allowed to purchase offsetting emission rights.160 
EFSEC rejected ENWs claims that compliance was futile, that it made a 
good faith effort to comply, and that the doctrine of impossibility should 
apply.161  ENW argued that its approach was a legitimate effort to engage 
in adaptive management by allow[ing] details of compliance to be 
developed through different measures, over time, allowing learning from 
and improving upon compliance measures.162  EFSEC responded that 
the statute does not allow adaptive management to substitute for the 
                                                     
 158. Id.  EFSEC added: 
The principal flaw in the GGRP is its failure to present a plan to achieve geological 
sequestration.  It does not detail specific actions ENW will take.  Instead, the GGRP 
merely states that because geological sequestration of power plant emissions is not a 
conventional technology, and because uncertainties exist in technical and legal aspects of 
geological sequestration, it will not begin to prepare a specific plan until technical and 
legal questions are resolved.  In this regard, ENWs GGRP fails to meet the plain 
language of the statuteit is a plan to prepare a plan at some indefinite later date. 
Id. at 6. 
 159. Id. at 4. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 7.  EFSEC also concluded that ENW failed to meet the financial assurances, 
monitoring, and penalty identification requirements of the statute, and that the GGRP did not include 
the required provisions for purchase of emissions reductions.  Id. at 6. 
 162. Id. at 7. 
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specific statutory requirements.  Further, it disagreed that ENWs GGRP 
qualified as adaptive management, a decisionmaking process which 
pursues specific goals through clearly identified means.  Instead, the 
GGRP was a proposal to develop goals and measures later.163 
About a month after EFSEC stayed further processing of ENWs 
application, it clarified that its decision was a temporary, interim 
measure, and that it would resume processing the application when 
ENW corrected the deficiencies identified in the order.164  ENW claimed 
that operation of the proposed plant using natural gas power would 
comply with state emission requirements.  Accordingly, EFSEC should 
not quibble about the sequestration plan.165  EFSEC responded that 
ENWs application was for an IGCC facility with sequestration, using 
natural gas as a backup fuel.  EFSEC could not certify the project as an 
IGCC plant because ENW failed to comply with the sequestration plan 
requirements.  If ENW wants to propose a natural gas plant with pre-
fitting for possible later IGCC operation, based on a future application 
for that purpose, it is free to amend its application to do so.166 
The ENW decision, like the FPL decision, rejected a utilitys plans to 
put into service a new coal-fired power plant.  The FPL decision rested 
primarily on matters traditionally considered by state utility 
commissionsthe cost of service to be supplied by the plant if 
approvedalthough a recent statutory amendment relating to fuel 
diversity played a part.  The FPSC rested its decision on the uncertainty 
attributable to the impact of unspecified regulatory factors, a veiled 
reference to the cost of compliance with future federal or state climate 
change regulation.167  The ENW decision was based squarely on the 
potential environmental impact of unsequestered CO2 emissions.  
EFSECs decision responded to a set of statutory requirements enacted to 
deal specifically with ENWs proposed plant.  Although it provides 
another example of the increasing regulatory obstacles facing proposed 
new coal-fired power plants, it is likely to have little value as precedent 
in licensing decisions in a state (such as Kansas) lacking the kind of 
statutory sequestration requirements in effect in Washington. 
                                                     
 163. Id. 
 164. In re Application No. 2006-01, Energy Nw., Pac. Mountain Energy Project, Council Order 
No. 835 (Wash. Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council Dec. 21, 2007) (Clarifying Order), at 2, 
available at http://www.efsec.wa.gov/pmec.shtml. 
 165. Id. at 4. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See supra notes 69115 and accompanying text. 
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iii. North Carolina 
North Carolina energy regulators in 2007 took a less absolute 
approach than the refusals to license new coal-fired power plants 
reflected in the Florida and Washington decisions.  In 2005, Duke 
Energy sought a certificate of public convenience and necessity allowing 
it to construct two new 800-megawatt coal-fired electric generating 
facilities, along with related transmission facilities.168  In March 2007, 
the state utilities commission granted the certificate, but only in part, and 
subject to conditions.  The commission concluded that the public 
convenience and necessity supported the construction of only one plant.  
The certificate was conditioned, however, on the retirement by Duke of 
four existing units at the site of the new plant.  In addition, the 
commission required Duke to invest 1% of its annual retail electricity 
revenues in energy efficiency and demand reduction programs.  Finally, 
the agency required Duke to retire older coal-fired units (in addition to 
the four existing units at the proposed new plant site) on a megawatt-by-
megawatt basis, after considering the impact on reliability.  The utilities 
commission explained that its decision would allow Duke to increase its 
baseload generating capacity without significantly increasing its 
environmental footprint.169 
Duke had considered the use of IGCC technology, which the 
commission described as an emerging coal technology that causes less 
pollution than other forms of coal-fired generation.170  The commission 
concluded that Duke could not rely on IGCC technology to supply its 
short-term need for additional generating capacity because IGCC units 
had not yet been constructed as a large-scale electric generating resource.  
It also found that a cost effective method for carbon sequestration is, at 
best, an unresolved issue and that it was unclear whether IGCC would 
operate as effectively as its proponents claim.171  The agency reasoned 
that approval of only one new generating unit, instead of the two sought 
by Duke, would allow more time for IGCC technology to develop before 
Duke needed to build more baseload capacity.  Approving one unit 
now, the commission concluded, together with the retirement of older, 
                                                     
 168. In re Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket No. E-7, Sub 790 (N.C. Util. Commn Mar. 21, 
2007) (Order Granting Certificate of Public Convenience Necessity with Conditions), available at 
http://ncuc.commerce.state.nc.us/cgibin/webview/senddoc.pgm?dispfmt=&itype=Q&authorization=
&parm2=ZAAAAA08070B&parm3=000123542. 
 169. Id. at 9. 
 170. Id. at 25. 
 171. Id. at 27. 
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coal-fired units, limits Dukes carbon footprint and serves as a hedge 
against the prospect of carbon regulation.172  Thus, even though the 
commission acknowledged that the abundance of domestic supplies of 
coal as compared to natural gas makes coal a more attractive choice for 
baseload generation,173 it took a go-slow approach due to the 
contribution of coal-fired power to the problems associated with climate 
change.  The commission did so even though the factors relevant to the 
issuance of a certificate of convenience and necessity, at least as 
described by the commission, do not explicitly include environmental 
impact, no less impact on climate change.174  In the wake of the decision, 
Duke indicated that it was reassessing its plans.175  The Division of Air 
Quality of the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources subsequently approved an air quality permit for the new coal-
fired boiler, provided Duke shuts down four older units and identifies 
additional CO2 offsets to mitigate the new units CO2 emissions and 
achieve carbon neutrality by 2018.176 
The North Carolina decision is noteworthy for at least two reasons.  
First, like EFSECs decision, the state agencies relied explicitly on their 
desire to minimize the contribution of electricity generation to climate 
change, notwithstanding the fact that GHGs were not being regulated 
under state law.177  Second, unlike the FPSC and EFSEC decisions, the 
disposition of the North Carolina permit application did not rest on 
recent legislation designed, explicitly or otherwise, to deal with climate 
change.  The state utilities commission instead rested its decision on 
more general legislative criteria not adopted with climate change in 
mind. 
iv. Texas 
In a fourth situation that came to a head in 2007, ambitious plans for 
the construction of a series of coal-fired power plants were severely 
                                                     
 172. Id. at 33. 
 173. Id. at 29. 
 174. Id. at 7 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.1). 
 175. See Little, supra note 120. 
 176. Press Release, N.C. Dept of Envt and Natural Res., Office of Public Affairs, Revised Air 
Permit Approved for Duke Power Plant, (Jan. 29, 2008), available at http://www.enr. 
state.nc.us/html/news_releases.html. 
 177. See Statement of William G. Ross Jr., Secretary, N.C. Dept of Envt and Natural Res., 
(Jan. 29, 2008), available at http://www.enr.state.nc.us/html/news_releases.html (stating that the 
Duke permit requires implementation of a CO2 mitigation plan to make the facility carbon neutral by 
2018 [a]lthough carbon emissions are not yet regulated). 
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curtailed before they ever got off the drawing board, in part because of 
the CO2 emissions that the plants would have generated.  In April 2006, 
the TXU Corporation announced that it would build eleven new coal-
fired power plants.  Texas Governor Rick Perry tried to fast-track 
issuance of permits for the eleven plants.178  The project quickly 
generated opposition, however.  TXUs chief executive neglected to 
curry favor with consumers, community groups, or state legislators, who 
either doubted the need for the additional generating capacity or feared 
that the plants would result in increased electricity prices.179  
Environmental groups objected not only because of the plants impact on 
local pollution, but also because of their contribution to climate change.  
The eleven new plants would have generated seventy-eight million tons 
of CO2 annually, adding to the carbon emissions that already made Texas 
the nations largest CO2 emitter.180  When some of TXUs shareholders 
complained about the carbon footprint the plants would create, the chief 
executive reacted dismissively.  He responded that Congress was not 
likely to regulate GHGs in the near future and that, even if it did, TXU 
could retrofit the plants to curtail emissions.181 
The companys rejoinder did not assuage the concerns of those 
opposed to the plants on environmental grounds, and the companys 
share price fell.  By the summer of 2006, TXU had become a national 
symbol of a carbon dioxide emitter.182  When Dallas mayor Laura 
Miller organized a coalition of Texas cities to intervene in TXUs coal 
plant hearings, TXU became convinced that the original plan to build 
eleven plants was doomed.183  In November 2006, Texas Pacific Group, 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., and Goldman Sachs approached TXU 
about buying the company for $45 billion and taking it private.  The 
prospective buyers asked William Reilly, the Administrator of the federal 
                                                     
 178. Elizabeth Souder, TXU Bidder Seeing Green, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 25, 2007, at 
1A. 
 179. Elizabeth Souder et al., Missteps Led up to TXU Deal, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 
2007, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/industries/energy/stories/030407dnbustxu. 
3b59709.html. 
 180. Marc Gunther, TXU Faces a Texas Coal Rush, FORTUNE, Feb. 5, 2007.  TXU is fighting 
not just the usual activists from the Sierra Club and Public Citizen but environmental groups like 
Environmental Defense and the Natural Resources Defense Council, which are ordinarily business-
friendly.  (With GE, DuPont, and others, they formed the coalition of big companies to lobby for 
carbon caps.)  Id. 
 181. Souder et al., supra note 179. 
 182. Id.  See also Elizabeth Souder, TXU to Take Buyout, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 26, 
2007, 1A, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/industries/energy/ 
stories/022607bustxusale.e41a46.html (describing the original TXU plan as a symbol of global 
warming nationally, as Congress debates whether to place limits on [GHG] emissions). 
 183. Souder et al., supra note 179. 
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EPA during the first Bush presidency and a vice president of Texas 
Pacific Group, to help negotiate the deal.184 
Reilly negotiated an agreement with two major environmental 
groupsEnvironmental Defense and the Natural Resources Defense 
Councilunder which the groups agreed to drop pending lawsuits to 
block construction of the plants and support the buyout.185  In return, the 
TXU buyers agreed to build only three of the eleven coal plants 
originally proposed, to cut electricity prices, to reduce emissions of 
regulated air pollutants by 20%, to reduce CO2 emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2020, and to support legislation restricting GHG emissions.186  In 
addition, the buyers promised to consider the use of coal gasification 
technology for future plants, which would allow the capture and storage 
of CO2 when sequestration technology is more fully developed.187  
TXUs chief executive admitted that public opposition to the plant was 
one reason he made the deal.  The buyers also would pursue more wind 
power and double the amount spent on energy efficiency programs to 
$80 million for the next five years.188  In February 2007, TXUs Board of 
Directors agreed to sell the company.189  The company agreed not to 
propose building any traditional, pulverized coal plants outside of Texas, 
despite plans to do so in the Northeast.190  It subsequently announced 
plans to more than double its current purchase of wind power and to 
invest $400 million in conservation programs and incentives for 
consumers to lower use during peak hours.  TXU also indicated that it 
would reopen several natural gas plants. 
The implications of the TXU deal for the future of coal-fired power 
apparently were not confined to Texas.  The regional director of 
Environmental Defense characterized the agreement as a watershed 
moment in Americas fight against global warming.191  Environmental 
groups generally viewed the TXU agreement as sending a signal to other 
power companies considering the development of coal-fired plants 
nationwide that public and political opinion had turned against coal and 
                                                     
 184. Souder, supra note 182. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Souder, supra note 178.  Despite the agreement, TXU did not completely abandon its 
interest in coal-fired electricity production.  At the time of the buyout, TXU was seeking regulatory 
approval for three additional coal plants.  Canceling Plans for Coal Plants Leaves Texas in a Jam, 
N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., Mar. 9, 2007, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/ 
dws/bus/industries/energy/stories/030407dnbuscoaljam.8983a0.html [hereinafter Texas in a Jam]. 
 191. Souder, supra note 178. 
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that shareholders might now see old-style coal plants as an unacceptable 
risk.192  These predictions seemed pretty close to the mark.  Subsequent 
to the TXU deal, utilities in several other states cancelled plans for new 
coal-fired electric facilities,193 and coal-fired plants in other jurisdictions 
were opposed on the basis of the impact they would have on climate 
change.194  The hostile reception generated by plans to build new coal-
fired plants increased investors interest in natural gas, renewable, and 
nuclear energy sources.195 
v. Other States 
Recent proposals to build coal-fired power plants in other states also 
have foundered.  Although the decisions in these states restricting the 
ability of utilities to rely on coal-fired power have been based primarily 
on need rather than environmental factors, regulators have also expressed 
concern over the GHGs emitted by coal-fired electricity generation.196  
                                                     
 192. Randy Lee Loftis & Elizabeth Souder, Studying All Sides of TXUs Sale: Coal Plant 
Controversy Not Going Away, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 27, 2007 at 1A. 
 193. Albert Raboteau, To Dismay of Power Utilities, Coal Emissions Are Under Fire, ROANOKE 
TIMES, July 29, 2007, at A10 (stating that plans for new coal-fired plants had been cancelled in eight 
states in the previous year). 
 194. See, e.g., Greg Edwards, Dominion Coal May Send Rates Up, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, July 17, 2007, at B7 (proposed 585-megawatt power plant which would include 
equipment to capture CO2 emissions when the equipment becomes commercially available); Michael 
Sluss, Coalition Opposes Power Station, ROANOKE TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A1 (describing 
campaign by environmental groups to block the Dominion Virginia Power proposed plant in part 
based on its CO2 emissions). 
 195. Texas in a Jam, supra note 190. 
 196. Virginia regulators, for example, objected to or sought to modify plans for coal-fired 
facilities thought to involve excessive CO2 emissions.  See Greg Edwards, Plant Also Concerns SCC, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 1, 2007, at B9 (reporting that State Corporation Commission 
staff concluded that Dominions proposed plant did not qualify as carbon-capture compatible); Rex 
Springsteen & Rex Bowman, Panel Wants Cleaner-Burning Plant, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, 
Dec. 1, 2007, at B9 (describing request by Virginias Air Pollution Control Board that Dominion 
Virginia Power reduce the 5.3 million tons of CO2 it would emit annually under its current design).  
The Virginia State Corporation Commission ultimately approved the plant, but, as of this writing, 
the plant still needed approval from the Virginia Air Pollution Control Board.  Greg Edwards, SCC 
Approves Coal Plant: Dominion Va. Power Proposes Building a Plant in Wise County, RICHMOND 
TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 2008.  Two weeks after its action in the Dominion matter, however, the 
Commission rejected a proposal by American Electric Power to build a $2.23 billion clean coal plant 
in West Virginia on the ground that the utilitys cost estimate was not credible.  The Virginia 
Commissions approval was needed because the utilitys Virginia customers would have had to pay 
for the plants construction.  See Va. Halts Plans for Neighboring Plant, GREENWIRE, Apr. 15, 2008, 
http://www.eenews.net/ 
Greenwire/2008/04/15/archive/6?terms=virginia+halts.  The West Virginia Public Utility 
Commission had previously granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the plant.  
AEP Receives Approval to Build IGCC Plant from WV PSC, available at http://www.aep. 
com/newsroom/newsreleases/default.asp?dbcommand=displayrelease&ID=1440. 
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The Oregon Public Utility Commission (OPUC) rejected a bid by 
PacifiCorp to build two new coal-fired power plants on the ground that 
the utility failed to justify the need for that much baseload capacity.  In 
addition, the agency concluded that the proposal to build a combined 
1109 megawatts of new coal-fired generation was inconsistent with the 
utilitys own OPUC-approved plan to focus on conservation, renewable 
resources, and demand-side measures to meet electricity demand.197  
According to one Commissioner, OPUC really skated on the CO2 issue 
in this ruling.198  But OPUC stated that it expected the utility to explore 
bridging strategies that would allow it to delay a commitment to coal 
until cleaner technologies, such as IGCC, become commercially 
feasible.199  In addition, regulators viewed skeptically PacifiCorps plan 
to sell surplus power to customers in other states in light of the aversion 
to coal-fired generation in those states.  OPUC noted, for example, that 
California had recently limited imports of coal-fired power from other 
states to plants whose emissions are comparable to natural gas-fired 
plants.200 
State regulators have also wounded proposed coal-fired projects 
more indirectly.  In late 2007, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission 
(MPUC) refused to require Xcel Energy to buy power from a 600-
megawatt coal-fired power plant proposed by Excelsior Energy.201  The 
MPUC had declared just a few months earlier that it would consider 
requiring a number of utilities to enter power-purchase agreements with 
the proposed plant, which would have been an innovative coal-
gasification facility potentially capable of capturing its CO2 emissions.202  
It cited growing disillusionment with coal, assurances from Xcel that it 
did not need the additional power, and the high cost to Xcels customers  
 
                                                     
 197. Brian Wingfield, Oregon Regulators Frown on Big Coal Push by PacifiCorp, 35 ENERGY 
DAILY No. 11, Jan. 18, 2007. 
 198. Steve Hooks, PUC Turns Down PacifiCorp Coal-Fired Proposals, ENERGY TRADER, Jan. 
18, 2007, at 4. 
 199. Id.; see also Gail Kinsey Hill, PacifiCorps Coal Proposal Bites the Dust at the PUC, 
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 17, 2007, at D1 (noting that the alternate strategy would allow 
PacifiCorp to delay a commitment to coal until a cleaner technology, known as integrated 
gasification, could be developed and commercialized). 
 200. Wingfield, supra note 197.  The Executive Director of the Oregon Citizens Utility Board 
characterized coal plants as tremendously risky, and anticipated significant regulation of carbon 
emissions in the future.  Dave Anderton, Doubts Cloud Coal-Plant Plan, DESERT MORNING NEWS, 
Feb. 7, 2007, at E4. 
 201. H.J. Cummins, PUC Cools to the Idea of a Clean Coal Plant, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL 
STAR TRIB., Nov. 2, 2007, at 1D; IGCC Rides a Regulatory Seesaw, 111 POWER ENGG 28, Nov. 
2007; PUC Rejects Iron Range Power-Plant Project, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 2, 2007, at C2. 
 202. IGCC Rides a Regulatory Seesaw, supra note 201. 
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of the proposed plants output as reasons for refusing to compel Xcel to 
purchase power from the proposed plant.203 
The Chairman of the MPUC described the regulatory environment 
for coal-fired power plants as having undergone a paradigm shift, 
noting the delay or cancellation of coal-gasification projects in several 
other states.204  It was in the context of this increasingly hostile 
regulatory atmosphere that KDHE addressed the coal-fired units 
proposed for Holcomb, Kansas in the fall of 2007. 
III. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE HOLCOMB PLANTS 
Despite the absence of federal regulation restricting GHG emissions 
from stationary sources, many states, individually or collectively, have 
taken steps to minimize the contribution to global climate change of 
coal-fired electric generating facilities, one of the largest sources of CO2 
emissions.  These efforts have included renewable portfolio standards 
designed to increase the slice of electric power derived from renewable 
or low-carbon fuels, emissions reduction requirements applicable to 
broad categories of stationary sources or to power plants in particular, 
cap-and-trade programs, and carbon sequestration requirements.  Each of 
these approaches has the potential to make it difficult if not impossible 
for utilities to pursue plans to enhance generating capacity by operating 
facilities that burn coal to produce electricity. 
Kansas has resorted to none of these regulatory devices.  Yet, the 
KDHEs October 2007 decision on the Sunflower Electric Power 
Corporations bid to build two new coal-fired generators places Kansas 
among the states that have denied permission to construct coal-fired 
power plants on the basis of the CO2 emissions these plants generate.  
KDHE either could not or chose not to base its denial of the Sunflower 
applications on the grounds that formed the basis of the decisions by 
Florida and Washington regulators to reject coal-fired power plant 
applications.  KDHE might have relied on the uncertainty of the cost of 
coal-fired power resulting from emerging federal and state energy and 
environmental policies that the FPSC cited in denying FPLs 
                                                     
 203. See PUC Rejects Iron Range Power-Plant Project, supra note 201; Cummins, supra note 
201. 
 204. Cummins, supra note 201.  In other states, regulators have recently approved of plans to 
construct coal-fired power plants.  See, e.g., Ruling Allows Two Elk Plant Construction to Proceed, 
TRIB.COM, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.trib.com/articles/2008/03/04/news/wyoming/0422dd8d67 
c003f987257400001dca2b.txt. 
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application.205  KDHE could not have cast its decision along the lines of 
EFSECs denial of ENWs application because Kansas lacks a statute 
mandating the formulation and implementation of carbon sequestration 
plans.206  Instead, KDHE based its denial of the Sunflower application 
directly on the adverse impacts on public health and the environment that 
construction of the Holcomb generators would cause by virtue of their 
CO2 emissions.207 
The legal basis for KDHEs decision was quickly challenged.  Some 
members of the state legislature claimed that, because KDHEs decision 
was not authorized by statute, the decision gave rise to separation of 
powers concerns.208  One representative argued that the decision is not 
based upon any statutory authority.  It is an arbitrary decision. . . .  And 
the legislative branch of government has a decision to make: Do we 
stand by and let the executive branch make up the rules or do we reassert 
our power?209 
This Part describes the Sunflower application, the Kansas Attorney 
Generals Opinion that addressed KDHEs authority to consider the 
climate change impacts of the Holcomb units, the KDHE staff 
recommendation, KDHE Secretary Brembys decision denying 
permission to build those units, and the reactions that Brembys decision 
prompted among opponents and supporters of the proposed Holcomb 
units.  Relying on an interpretation of the relevant statutory text and its 
evolution and on case law interpreting analogous provisions of the 
federal pollution control statutes, Part IV concludes that existing statutes 
vest KDHE with the authority to deny applications for coal-fired power 
plants on the basis of their projected contribution to climate change. 
A. The Holcomb Application 
Sunflower sought permission in February 2006 to build coal-fired 
generators in Holcomb, Kansas, adjacent to its existing Holcomb coal-
fired generator.210  Sunflowers original plans included three steam 
generating units, but the utility requested in June 2007 that KDHE 
                                                     
 205. See supra notes 13244 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra notes 15155 and accompanying text. 
 207. See infra notes 25870 and accompanying text. 
 208. John Taylor, Rep. Expects Huge Fight Over Coal Plants, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Jan. 5, 
2008, at 1B. 
 209. Id. (statement of Rep. Kenny Wilk). 
 210. KDHE STAFF RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 1. 
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remove one of the generating units from consideration.211  Each new unit 
would have been a super-critical 700 megawatt, pulverized coal-fired 
boiler.212  They would have burned Powder River Basin low-sulfur, sub-
bituminous coal as primary fuel and natural gas as a backup.213  The 
utilitys existing coal, lime, and ash handling equipment would have 
been altered to double throughput capability.214  The utility planned to 
add two new cooling towers and two emergency generators.215 
The plants were designed by Sunflower to be part of a bio-energy 
center that would include an ethanol plant and a facility to use an 
experimental algae process to capture CO2 emissions from the generating 
units.216  The two units had the potential to emit eleven million tons of 
CO2 annually.217  According to Sunflower, however, the bioenergy center 
would have cut the plants CO2 emissions to 3.6 million tons a year.218 
The application prompted opposition on a variety of grounds.  One 
complaint derived from Sunflowers plans to export much of the power 
produced by the two new units.  The electricity produced by the two 
units would have been shared by sixty-seven cooperatives located in 
Kansas and neighboring states.219  One unit would have supplied power 
to Kansas.  The other would have been owned by a rural cooperative, 
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, and would have 
provided electricity to eastern Colorado.220  According to Governor 
Sebelius, only 15% of the proposed plants electric output would have 
been consumed by Kansans; the rest would have been exported to users 
in Texas and Colorado.221  These facts fueled concern that most of the 
adverse effects resulting from the plants operation would be borne by  
 
                                                     
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Mufson, supra note 5; see also Stephen R. Morris & Melvin Neufeld, Sebelius Rejection of 
Permits Is Disastrous, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 11, 2007, at B10 (stating that the integrated bioenergy 
center would have included a biodiesel and ethanol plant, an anaerobic digester, a dairy farm, and a 
microalgae reactor, which would have used CO2 to grow algae for renewable fuels production, and 
that the technology would have rendered the expansion nearly carbon neutral). 
 217. Utility Sues Over Coal-Plant Denial, WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 17, 2007, at 1B. 
 218. See id. (Sunflower estimated the bioenergy center would have cut the coal plants carbon 
dioxide emissions from 11 million tons a year to 3.6 million tons.). 
 219. Wald, supra note 11. 
 220. Tri-State is subject to a renewable portfolio standard in Colorado which requires that it use 
renewable energy sources to meet 10% of its sales.  It currently uses less than 1% renewable 
resources and two-thirds of its power comes from coal.  Mufson, supra note 5. 
 221. Rejection, supra note 65, at 2364. 
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Kansans, while the new generating capacity would largely benefit 
consumers in other states. 
Environmental groups claimed that the technology envisioned for 
use at the bioenergy center was too experimental to be a reliable means 
for minimizing the plants CO2 emissions.222  The attorneys general of 
eight eastern states reacted to the Holcomb application in similar 
fashion.223  They requested that KDHE not issue the permit unless 
Sunflower designs the plant in a way that minimizes the generation of 
(CO2) emissions and/or allows the capture of such emissions.224  All 
eight states had made reduction of CO2 emissions a priority, but, 
according to the attorneys general, 
the annual emissions from the Holcomb plant extension would cancel 
out all the emissions reductions resulting from the RGGI.  With a 
lifetime of more than 60 years, the Holcomb units, if built as proposed, 
might well emit more than one billion tons of CO2 in total, thus 
significantly contributing to the public health and environmental 
damage associated with global warming.225 
The letter also argued that state and federal laws required issuance of 
a CAA permit by KDHE to Sunflower before construction on Holcomb 
could begin.226  Because the plants would be located in an area in 
compliance with the CAAs national ambient air quality standards, 
Sunflower had to show, before KDHE could issue a permit to it, that the 
units would use the best available control technology (BACT).227  The 
attorneys general asserted that the CAA required the use of innovative 
fuel combustion techniques to achieve the maximum degree of 
                                                     
 222. High Court Takes on Coal Appeals, WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 30, 2007, at 3B. 
 223. Letter to Kansas Department of Health and the Environment, Rick Bolfing, from attorneys 
general of eight other states, Comments Regarding Proposed Holcomb Station Expansion Air 
Quality Construction Permit (Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://www.kdheks.gov/ 
download/States_Atty_General_Letter_12.15.2006.pdf [hereinafter State AGs Letter]. 
 224. Id.  Attorneys general of states in the northeast and California have submitted similar letters 
urging agencies responsible for ruling on air quality permits in other states to limit CO2 emissions 
from coal-fired power plants.  See, e.g., Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., et al., to Joseph C. Eller, 
S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Brown Letter] (urging South Carolina environmental agency to refuse to issue permit to 
proposed new 1320 megawatt coal-fired power plant unless it is designed to minimize CO2 
emissions or allow for the capture and secure sequestration of those emissions). 
 225. State AGs Letter, supra note 223, at 2. 
 226. Id. at 3. 
 227. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2000) (prohibiting the construction of any new or modified 
major emitting facility in a prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) area unless the facility is 
subject to the best available control technology).  PSD areas are those with ambient concentrations 
of the CAAs criteria pollutants that are lower than required by the national ambient air quality 
standards.  Id. §§ 7407(d)(1)(A), 7471. 
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reduction for each pollutant subject to regulation under the [CAA].228  
They claimed that the CAAs legislative history indicates that Congress 
intended that BACT analysis include the full range of production 
methodologies, including IGCC, which they characterized as an 
established and available production process.229  The attorneys general 
also charged that KDHE must consider the energy, environmental, and 
economic impacts of each unit as part of its BACT analysis.230  They 
added that, even if the increased CO2 emissions resulting from the 
proposed Holcomb units might not require their own BACT analysis as 
regulated pollutants under EPAs interpretation of the CAA,231 the 
detrimental environmental effects of these emissions had to be 
considered under the environmental impacts prong of BACT.232 
B. The Attorney Generals Opinion 
Recognizing that a rejection of the Sunflower application based on 
its effect on climate change would be without precedent in Kansas, 
KDHE solicited an opinion from the states Attorney General on the 
legality of a denial of the application on those grounds.  The Attorney 
General responded in an Opinion dated September 24, 2007.233  
According to the Opinion, the question posed was 
                                                     
 228. State AGs Letter, supra note 223, at 3.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (defining best 
available control technology, in part, as an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of 
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under [the CAA] emitted from or which results from 
any major emitting facility, which the permitting authority . . . determines is achievable for such 
facility through application of . . . innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of each such 
pollutant).  KDHEs staff concluded that the units proposed by Sunflower required a PSD permit 
because one or more of the [PSD] regulated air pollutants from the proposed activity exceeds the 
significance level(s).  KDHE STAFF RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 2.  According to 
the staff, 
BACT applies to each new or modified . . . emissions unit . . . for each pollutant having a 
potential to emit, or an increase in potential to emit, above the PSD significance level(s).  
For the proposed Sunflower generating units, the increase in potential-to-emit is above 
the PSD significance level for NOx, SO2, CO, PM/PM10, sulfuric acid mist, lead, and 
VOCs and was reviewed under the PSD regulations. 
Id. at 3.  The staff recommendation identified BACT for oxides of nitrogen, carbon monoxide, sulfur 
dioxide, volatile organic compounds, particulate matter, lead, and sulfuric acid, id., but not for CO2. 
 229. State AGs Letter, supra note 223, at 3 (citing 123 Cong. Rec. 18472 (1977)). 
 230. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (defining best available control technology to require 
permitting agency to tak[e] into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other 
costs). 
 231. At the time, it was EPAs position that it lacked the authority under the CAA to regulate 
CO2.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 232. State AGs Letter, supra note 223, at 3. 
 233. Kan. Op. Atty Gen. No. 2007-31 (Sept. 24, 2007) [hereinafter AG Opinion], available at 
http://www.kdheks.gov/press_room.htm (click on Attorney Generals Opinion). 
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whether, in the absence of federal or state regulations setting limitations 
for a specific pollutant, K.S.A. 65-3012 authorizes the [S]ecretary [of 
KDHE] to deny or modify an air quality permit, or place a stay on 
issuance of an air quality permit until state or federal regulations are 
enacted that address the pollutant.234 
The Opinion notes that when an application for an air quality control 
permit is filed with KDHE, the [S]ecretary may deny the application 
pursuant to K.S.A. 65-3008b for specified reasons.235  Its analysis 
focuses, however, on section 65-3012.  Under that provision of the 
Kansas Air Quality Act, 
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the [S]ecretary may 
take such actions as may be necessary to protect the health of persons 
or the environment: (1) Upon receipt of information that the emission 
of air pollution presents a substantial endangerment to the health of 
persons or to the environment . . . .236 
Once section 65-3012 has been triggered, the Secretary may take actions 
includ[ing] but not limited to those specified in the statute.237  The 
Opinion noted that these include: 
(1) issuing an order to an owner or operator to prevent an act or 
eliminate a practice with respect to a facility or site, including 
temporary cessation of operation, (2) commencing an action, or 
requesting the attorney general or county attorney to commence an 
action, to enjoin acts or practices, and (3) applying for a court order 
directing compliance with the order of the [S]ecretary.238 
The Opinion stated that the Attorney Generals office had found no 
appellate court decisions interpreting these provisions.239  Accordingly, 
the Attorney General ascertained the legislatures intent by analyzing the 
text of section 65-3012, which he found to be plain and 
unambiguous.240 
                                                     
 234. Id. 
 235. Id.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3008b(c) (2002) authorizes the Secretary to deny a permit if the 
owner or operator of such a source fails to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the secretary that any 
other stationary source owned or operated by such person is in compliance with all applicable 
emission limitations and standards under the Kansas Air Quality Act and the federal CAA. 
 236. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012(a) (2002). 
 237. Id. § 65-3012(b). 
 238. AG Opinion, supra note 233 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012(b)). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
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The Attorney General interpreted the plain language of the statute to 
contemplate[] preventive as well as remedial actions on the part of the 
secretary in order to protect persons and the environment in situations 
where the secretary receives information that emission of air pollution 
presents substantial endangerment to either.241  The Opinion pointed out 
that both the terms air pollution242 and air contaminant243 are broadly 
defined.244  The Attorney General reasoned, based on these provisions, 
that the Secretary need not wait to take action under section 65-3012 to 
prevent air pollution until there are federal or state regulations 
establishing limitations on a particular pollutant, as long as he makes 
the findings required by section 65-3012(a).245 
The Opinion added that the legislative history of section 65-3012 
supports this expansive reading of the Secretarys authority.  Before 
1993, the Air Quality Act limited the Secretary to taking remedial 
action when the agency found that any person is causing or 
contributing to air pollution and that such pollution creates an emergency 
which requires immediate action to protect human health or safety.246  
Under those circumstances, KDHE, after following appropriate 
procedures and with the concurrence of the Governor, could issue an 
order requiring the immediate reduction or discontinuation of air 
contaminants.  The Kansas legislature amended the statute in 1993, 
patterning the amended statute on the states hazardous waste statute.247  
That law authorizes the Secretary, upon receipt of information that 
the . . . disposal of any waste may present a substantial hazard to the 
health of persons or to the environment . . . may take such action as . . . 
necessary to protect the health of such persons or the environment.248  
According to the Attorney General, [t]hose actions include preventing 
the act or eliminating the practice constituting the hazard.249  The 
                                                     
 241. Id. 
 242. The statute defines air pollution to mean (unless the context clearly requires otherwise) 
the presence in the outdoor atmosphere of one or more air contaminants in such quantities and 
duration as is, or tends significantly to be, injurious to human health or welfare, animal or plant life, 
or property, or would unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life or property, or would 
contribute to the formation of regional haze.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3002(c) (2002 & Supp. 2007). 
 243. The statute defines air contaminant to mean dust, fumes, smoke, other particulate matter, 
vapor, gas, odorous substances, or any combination thereof, but not including water vapor or steam 
condensate.  Id. § 65-3002(a). 
 244. AG Opinion, supra note 233. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012(a) (1993)). 
 247. That statute, section 65-3419(e), has not been amended since 1993. 
 248. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3419(e) (2002). 
 249. AG Opinion, supra note 233, at 2. 
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Opinion admitted that it is not clear from the then-KDHE Secretarys 
written testimony to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources whether the change was meant to enhance the Secretarys 
authority, rather than merely to update . . . outdated language.250  The 
Opinion reasoned, however, that when the legislature amends a statute, 
it is presumed that the legislature intended to make a change.  
Therefore, we beli[e]ve that the legislature bestowed upon the secretary 
the power to take preventive measures to address air pollution before it 
occurred.251 
Based on the statutory text and the legislative history, the Attorney 
General expressed his bottom line as follows: 
[I]f the secretary makes a factual determination that a particular 
emission constitutes air pollution and that such emission presents a 
substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the 
environment, then even in the absence of federal or state regulations 
setting limitations for a particular pollutant, K.S.A. 65-3012(a)(1) 
authorizes the secretary to take actions as necessary to protect the 
health of persons or the environment.  Such actions may include 
denying an air quality permit application on the basis of anticipated 
emissions of a particular pollutant or modifying a proposed permit to 
address such pollutant.252 
C. The KDHE Staff Recommendation 
Several weeks after issuance of the Attorney Generals Opinion, 
KDHEs staff recommended issuance of an air quality construction 
permit to Sunflower to allow it to build the two new 700-megawatt coal-
fired steam generating units at its Holcomb generating station.253  Its 
recommendation identified plant operating conditions, including 
enforceable limitations on emissions of various air pollutants, not 
including CO2, as well as emissions testing and monitoring and 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements.254  The staff made only two 
brief references to GHGs.  It noted that one of the public comments filed 
with KDHE had argued that the agency should address CO2 issues.  The 
                                                     
 250. Id. at 3. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id.  The Opinion also expressed serious reservations, however, that section 65-3012 
would allow the Secretary to issue an indefinite stay of a permit until such timeif everthat state 
regulations are adopted addressing a particular pollutant.  Id.  These reservations were based in part 
on due process concerns.  Id. 
 253. KDHE STAFF RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, supra note 3. 
 254. Id. at 1. 
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staff responded that [t]here are no provisions to regulate carbon dioxide 
in PSD permits.  These comments were referred to Secretary Bremby for 
further policy considerations.255  Similarly, the Sierra Club had argued 
that KDHE was required to deny the permit because the proposed plant 
would emit GHGs and mercury at rates that pose a substantial 
endangerment to the public health and the environment.  The staff made 
the same response, referring the issue to Secretary Bremby.256 
The staff recommendation does not conflict with the Attorney 
Generals Opinion.  It states that KDHE lacks the specific authority to 
address CO2 issues when it issues PSD permits.  The Attorney Generals 
Opinion, however, does not address the scope of KDHEs authority to 
deny a permit under the PSD provisions of the CAA and associated 
Kansas statutes and regulations.  Instead, the Opinion is based upon an 
interpretation of section 65-3012 of the Kansas Air Quality Act.  The 
staff recommendation explicitly avoided addressing the scope of the 
Secretarys authority to address climate change under that provision, 
deferring the issue to the Secretary for resolution on policy grounds. 
D. KDHEs Decision and Its Aftermath 
KDHE Secretary Ronald Bremby announced his decision on October 
18, 2007, the day after the release of the staff recommendation (and 
nearly a month after the issuance of the Attorney Generals Opinion).257  
In his brief letter, Bremby began by referring to his duty as KDHE 
Secretary under the Kansas Air Quality Act to protect the public health 
and environment from actual, threatened or potential harm from air 
pollution.258  Bremby interpreted the Act and KDHEs implementing 
regulations as vesting in the Secretary broad authority to protect health 
and the environment, including the denial of an air quality permit under 
section 65-3008a.259  Bremby also cited section 65-3012.260  He read that 
statute to authorize the Secretary to take actions necessary to protect 
health and the environment from the emission of air pollutants that 
present a substantial endangerment, which may be a threatened or 
potential harm as well as an actual harm.261  Bremby noted the Supreme 
                                                     
 255. Id. at 9. 
 256. Id. at 1415. 
 257. Bremby Letter, supra note 4. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
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Courts decision in April 2007 in Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the 
Court held that CO2 qualifies as an air pollutant under the federal 
CAA.262  He reasoned that [t]he Kansas air quality act similarly has a 
broad definition of what constitutes air pollution.263  The Secretary also 
referred to the Supreme Courts recognition of the deleterious impact of 
greenhouse gases on the environment in which we live.264  Similarly, 
Bremby concluded that the information gathered during the Sunflower 
permit proceeding provides support for the position that emission of air 
pollution from the proposed coal fired plant, specifically carbon dioxide 
emissions, presents a substantial endangerment to the health of persons 
or to the environment.265  Based on that information, Secretary Bremby 
denied the permit. 
KDHE issued a press release the same day, quoting Bremby and 
reiterating the basis for his decision.266  The release quoted Bremby as 
stating that he decided to deny the Sunflower permit [a]fter careful 
consideration of my responsibility to protect the public health and 
environment from actual, threatened or potential harm from air 
pollution under sections 65-3008, 65-3008a, and 65-3012.267  Bremby 
added that it would be irresponsible to ignore emerging information 
about the contribution of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases to 
climate change and the potential harm to our environment and health if 
we do nothing.268  The release characterized Brembys decision as a 
first step in emerging policy to address existing and future carbon 
dioxide emissions in Kansas.269  It noted that the two new Sunflower 
                                                     
 262. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 145960 (2007)). 
 263. Id.  See also Written Testimony of Roderick L. Bremby, Secretary, Kan. Dept of Health & 
Envt, House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, Hearings on 
Massachusetts v. U.S. EPA Part II: Implications of the Supreme Courts Decision, Mar. 13, 2008, 
at 2 (The Supreme Courts finding that greenhouse gases are an air pollutant within the meaning of 
the federal Clean Air Act supports and confirms my own determination that CO2 constitutes air 
pollution within the meaning of the Air Quality Act.) [hereinafter Bremby Testimony]. 
 264. Bremby Letter, supra note 4. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Press Release, Kan. Dept of Health & Envt, KDHE Denies Sunflower Electric Air Quality 
Permit (Oct. 18, 2007), available at http://www.kdheks.gov/news/web_archives/2007/ 
10182007a.htm [hereinafter Sunflower Press Release]. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id.  According to the release, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have 
recognized the need for public health agencies to take the lead on educating the public about the 
health impacts of climate change and [have] adopted priority health actions to prepare for, respond to 
and manage the associated health risks of climate change.  Id. 
 269. Id.  According to Bremby, KDHE will work to engage various industries and stakeholders 
to establish goals for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and strategies to achieve them.  This is 
consistent with initiatives underway in states leading the effort to address climate change.  Id.  As 
an example, the release cited the RGGI mandatory, regional cap-and-trade program for reducing CO2 
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units would have released a projected eleven million tons of CO2 each 
year, and quoted Bremby to the effect that [d]enying the Sunflower air 
quality permit, combined with creating sound policy to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions[,] can facilitate the development of clean and 
renewable energy to protect the health and environment of Kansans.270 
Reactions to the KDHEs decision were not long in coming.  
Governor Sebelius backed the decision.  In an open letter to the people 
of Kansas she applauded the denial as a decision that would improve the 
health of Kansas residents, improve prospects for sustainable economic 
growth, and uphold a moral obligation to be good stewards of this 
beautiful land.271  The governor expressed support for the pursuit of 
other, more promising energy and economic development 
alternatives.272 
Opposition to the decision from other quarters, however, was 
immediate and pointed.  Criticism of the decision reflected two main 
arguments, one based on the alleged absence of legal authority and the 
other on the alleged adverse public policy implications of the permit 
denial.  The first contention rested on the premise that KDHE acted 
outside the scope of its statutory and regulatory authority in denying an 
air quality permit for the Holcomb units.  A spokesperson for Sunflower 
stated that the Supreme Courts decision in Massachusetts v. EPA merely 
permits regulation of CO2, but does not create such regulation, and that 
[t]here are no carbon dioxide regulations in the federal rules or in 
Kansas.273  The President of the Kansas Senate and the Speaker of the 
Kansas House of Representatives argued in a newspaper editorial that 
neither EPA nor Kansas statutes consider CO2 a pollutant.  Kansas law 
does not give the Department of Health and Environment, its secretary or 
the governor the authority to limit an unregulated emission.  In fact, the 
departments most recent Air Quality Report (20042005) makes no 
mention of CO2 . . . .274  Senator Brownback, whose reaction was quoted 
in part at the beginning of this article, added that [o]ne thing remains 
                                                                                                                       
emissions from power plants by 10% by 2020.  See supra notes 9899 and accompanying text. 
 270. Sunflower Press Release, supra note 266. 
 271. Rejection, supra note 65, at 2363. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Wald, supra note 11.  The plants supporters claimed that it was the first time any state had 
denied a permit for a large coal-fired power plant solely because of its potential impact on global 
warming, implying that the decision was unprecedented, and therefore without legal foundation.  Id. 
 274. Morris & Neufeld, supra note 216.  President Morris argued elsewhere that [w]e dont 
really have problems, in my opinion, with clean air here.  Yet were at the forefront of trying to 
regulate something thats arguably, in some peoples view, a pollutant.  There are other folks who 
dont think it is.  Legislators Limited in Fighting Coal Ruling, WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 13, 2007, at 
3B. 
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clear: [c]ritical issues important to Kansas such as climate change should 
be decided by the citizens in Kansas, in concert with the governor, and 
not by administrative fiat.275 
The thrust of the policy-based criticism was that the permit denials 
would have a devastating economic impact on the state to avoid a 
nonexistent or insignificant environmental problem.276  The State Senate 
President and House Speaker asserted that the denial would have a 
considerable negative impact on our state budget, other Kansas 
industries, economic development and the security of our states energy 
future. 277  They added that efforts to mandate carbon reductions below 
market levels will increase energy costs for Kansas consumers and 
businesses [and] companies considering locating or expanding in Kansas 
may reconsider if a reliable source of reasonably priced energy is not 
available.278  Senator Brownback charged that the environmental impact 
of the integrated bioenergy center planned for Holcomb would have 
been positive, not negative.279  He claimed that the center would 
incorporate an ethanol plant and sequester up to 40% of the units CO2 
output.280  The sequestered gas, in turn, would be used to grow algae, 
which could be used to produce earth-friendly biodiesel fuel.281  
According to Senator Brownback, the Holcomb project would displace 
less efficient coal-fired units elsewhere, contribute less to climate change 
                                                     
 275. Brownback, supra note 2. 
 276. Representative Larry Powell of Garden City, Kansas even claimed that the CO2 emitted by 
the Sunflower plants would be beneficial to the state because plants perform better under stress 
(drought, etc.) with increased levels of CO2.  Randy Scholfield, CO2-Warming a Farm Program?, 
WICHITA EAGLE, Dec. 1, 2007, at 7A.  Powell added that over the next fifty years, atmospheric 
CO2 enrichment will boost world agricultural output by about 50 percent.  Scott Rothschild, 
Plants CO2 Would Help Crops, Lawmaker Says, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Nov. 29, 2007, at 1A.  
Powell cited a report by Craig and Keith Idso of the Arizona-based Center for the Study of Carbon 
Dioxide and Global Climate Change.  Id.  The Centers website states that it accepts corporate, 
foundation and individual donations, without disclosing its donors.  CO2 Science, 
https://www.Co2science.org/content/view/22/42/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).  ExxonMobil apparently 
made a $10,000 contribution to the Center in 2001 and StopExxon.org reports that CSCDGC has 
received $90,000 from ExxonMobil between 1998 and 2005.  Center for the Study of Carbon 
Dioxide and Global Change-Source Watch, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title= 
Center_for_the_Study_of_Carbon_Dioxide_and_Global_Change (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).  
Governor Sebelius countered Representative Powells argument by asserting that [l]ess water and 
hotter temperatures will result in fewer crops and less production.  Rejection, supra note 65, at 
2364. 
 277. Morris & Neufeld, supra note 216; see also Legislators Limited in Fighting Coal Ruling, 
WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 13, 2007, at 3B (describing argument of opponents of KDHEs decision that 
if Sunflower is forced to use natural gas instead of coal, the result will be higher rates charged to its 
customers). 
 278. Morris & Neufeld, supra note 216. 
 279. Brownback, supra note 2. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
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than those less efficient plants would,282 and increase the nations energy 
security.283  Senator Brownback feared that the decision would create a 
dangerous precedent: One is left to wonder what Kansas industry is next 
in line on the slippery slope to be denied an air-quality permit.  Is it the 
burgeoning ethanol industry, the booming aircraft industry or the world 
class cattle industry?284  He argued that reasonable electricity prices 
and a stable regulatory environment has traditionally acted as a 
magnet, drawing new businesses to the state and persuading existing 
businesses to expand.285  Secretary Brembys decision throws that to the 
wind with a regulatory decision made outside of statutory authority.286 
Sunflower filed a request for reconsideration with KDHE shortly 
after Secretary Bremby announced his decision.287  The utility also filed 
two lawsuits seeking to overturn the decision.288  It filed one lawsuit in 
the Kansas Court of Appeals.289  The companys main argument echoed 
the criticisms of the decision based on the agencys alleged lack of 
statutory authority.290  According to the suit, KDHE had no authority 
under state law to deny the permit and it applied a statute to prospective 
air emissions that the utility argues applies only to current emissions.291  
It filed a similar lawsuit in Finney County District Court,292 and similar 
suits were filed by Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, 
the Finney County Commission, and the Garden City Chamber of 
                                                     
 282. Id.  KDHE apparently was not convinced that Sunflower demonstrated that the bioenergy 
center would actually cut emissions to 3.6 million tons per year.  See Utility Sues Over Coal-Plant 
Denial, supra note 217 (Many environmentalists say the technology is too experimental for the 
state to count upon it to reduce CO2.).  Similarly, environmental groups claimed that the technology 
envisioned for use at the bioenergy center was too experimental to be reliable.  High Court Takes on 
Coal Appeals, supra note 222. 
 283. Brownback, supra note 2.  Similar criticisms have been leveled against federal 
environmental statutory provisions that regulate new pollution sources relatively rigorously.  These 
sometimes are said to create an incentive for sources to keep older, dirtier plants in operation as 
long as possible in order to avoid triggering the more rigorous controls applicable to new plants.  
The result is arguably bad not only for the environment, but also for the economy, as the 
construction of newer, more efficient and productive plants is delayed.  ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET 
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 451 (5th ed. 2007) (citing Bruce A. 
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 133536 
(1985)). 
 284. Brownback, supra note 2. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Finney County May Sue State over Permit Denial, WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 15, 2007, at 3B. 
 288. Utility Sues over Coal-Plant Denial, WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 30, 2007 at 3B. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
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Commerce.293  In late November 2007, the Kansas Supreme Court 
transferred both cases to it on its own motion, without a request from the 
parties.294  The following April, however, the court issued a one-page 
order which, without explanation, stayed all of the appeals pending the 
completion of the administrative reconsideration proceedings before 
KDHE and the proceedings in Finney County District Court, unless the 
Kansas Supreme Court orders otherwise.295 
Concurrently with the filing of administrative and judicial appeals of 
KDHEs decision, the supporters of the plant sought to reverse the 
decision by statute.  The 2008 session of the Kansas legislature was 
consumed almost entirely by a pitched battle over the fate of the 
Holcomb units.  The legislature passed three bills that would have 
required KDHE to approve Sunflowers application296 and stripped 
KDHE of its authority to regulate GHG emissions in the absence of 
federal regulation.297  More specifically, the second bill would have 
prohibited KDHE from issuing air quality regulations that are more 
stringent than federal requirements absent the approval of the state 
legislature,298 prohibited KDHE from denying air quality permits if the 
provisions of the statute that specifically bear on permitting are met,299 
and allowed KDHE to invoke the substantial endangerment statute only 
in the event that existing sources of air pollution pose an imminent and 
                                                     
 293. High Court Takes on Coal Appeals, supra note 222. 
 294. Id.; see also State Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of Denial of Air Permit for Power Plant, 
38 ENVT REP. (BNA) 2628 (Dec. 7, 2007) (citing Tri-State Generation and Transmission Assn v. 
Kan. Dept of Health & Envt, No. 07-99566 (Kan. Nov. 27, 2007)). 
 295. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Assn v. Kan. Dept of Health & Envt, Nos. 
99,566, 99,567, 99,568 (Kan. Apr. 24, 2008). 
 296. See The House substitute for S.B. 148, § 30(d) (2008), available at http://www. 
kslegislature.org/bills/2008/148.pdf [hereinafter S.B. 148] (providing that any action by the KDHE 
Secretary on an application filed after January 1, 2006, and before the effective date of the 2008 
legislation which seeks the issuance, modification, revision or renewal of a permit, and which is 
still the subject of any administrative or judicial review proceedings, shall be reconsidered by the 
secretary upon the applicants or permittees timely written request).  The Secretary then would 
have been required within fifteen days of such a filing to reconsider his decision and determine in 
accordance with the provisions of this act, as amended, whether the issuance, modification, 
amendment, revision or renewal of any approval or permit requested by the permittee or applicant 
should be issued, modified, amended, revised or renewed.  See also id. § 31(b) (requiring the 
Secretary to affirm the issuance of any permit the terms and conditions of which comply with all 
requirements established by rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to the Kansas air quality 
act). 
 297. See Susanne Pagano, State Lawmakers Approve Legislation to Allow Expansion of Coal-
Fired Plant, 39 ENVT REP. (BNA) 368, Feb. 22, 2008 (describing the enactment of the first bill); 
Scott Rothschild, Second Coal Plant Bill OKd, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Apr. 5, 2008, at 1B; Scott 
Rothschild, Legislature Signs Off Session with Coal Bill, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, May 8, 2008, at 1A. 
 298. S.B. 148, supra note 296, § 30(b)(1) (2008). 
 299. Id. § 30(b)(3). 
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substantial threat to health or the environment.300  Governor Sebelius 
vetoed the first two bills bills.301  The state Senate voted to override the 
two vetoes,302 but the Kansas House fell just short of the votes needed to 
override.303  The plants supporters nevertheless persisted.  The House 
Majority Leader and House Speaker introduced a resolution that would 
allow legislative leaders to hire private counsel to sue Governor Sebelius 
and other executive branch officials for exceeding their constitutional 
authority.304  In addition, on what was supposed to be the last day of the 
wrap-up session of the 2008 legislative term, the Holcomb plants 
supporters inserted into several economic development proposals 
provisions similar to those in the two bills successfully vetoed by the 
Governor.  The Governor promptly vetoed the third bill, and the 
legislature adjourned without mustering an effort to override it.305  The 
                                                     
 300. Section 30(c) of S.B. 148 provided that: 
In as much as K.S.A. 65-3012, and amendments thereto, does not now apply, nor has it 
ever been applicable, to the air quality permitting process, the secretary may not use the 
emergency powers granted by K.S.A. 65-3012, and amendments thereto, in the air quality 
permitting process, nor any powers or discretion under any other statute not strictly 
applicable to the air quality permitting process. 
Id. § 30(c).  Section 33 would have amended § 65-3012(a) to provide that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the secretary may take such action 
against any existing source as may be necessary to  protect the health of persons or the 
environment: (1) Upon receipt of information that the emission of air pollution presents 
an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the 
environment . . . . 
Id. § 33 (emphasis added).  See also Christopher Brown, Governor Vetoes Second Bill to Allow 
Coal-Fired Power Units in Western Kansas, 39 ENVT REP. (BNA) 825, Apr. 25, 2008. 
 301. See Felicity Barringer, Kansas Governor Vetoes Bill to Revive 2 Coal-Fired Plants, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2008, at A10 (describing the Governors veto of the first bill); Brown, supra note 
300, at 824 (describing the Governors veto of the second bill); Susanne Pagano, Governor Vetoes 
Legislation to Allow Expansion of Coal-Fired Power Plant, 39 ENVT REP. (BNA) 623, Mar. 28, 
2008 (describing the Governors veto of the first bill). 
 302. See Scott Rothschild, Power Plant Struggle Resumes, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, May 1, 2008, 
at 1A (second bill). 
 303. See Scott Rothschild, Sebelius Coal Veto Stands, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, May 2, 2008, at 
1A (describing a dramatic showdown in which the Holcomb plants supporters fell four votes 
short of the two-thirds majority needed to override the Governors veto).  After the vote, House 
Speaker Melvin Neufeld predicted that the vote would stunt economic development and increase 
energy costs in the western part of the state.  Id.  The Sierra Club responded that the vote solidifies 
Kansas as a true leader in the fight against global warming.  Id. 
 304. House Concurrent Resolution No. 5042 provided: 
That the legislative coordinating council is authorized to hire private legal counsel . . . to 
bring suit against the governor and other executive branch officers as appropriate on the 
grounds of violation by the executive branch of the constitutional doctrine of separation 
of powers and such other legal  grounds as may be appropriate based on the governors 
and the executive branchs actions relating to the authorization of a coal-fired power 
plant to be located in the Holcomb, Kansas, area of the state. 
H.C.R. 5042 (2008), available at http://www.kslegislature.org/bills/2008/2008_5042.pdf. 
 305. Scott Rothschild, Coal Power Plant Issue Keeps Lawmakers from Wrapping up, 
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legislatures failure to overturn the third veto left the fate of Secretary 
Brembys decision in the hands of the Kansas courts. 
IV. KDHES STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Secretary Brembys denial of the Sunflower air quality permits has 
been challenged on several grounds.306  Some challenges are based on the 
premise that KDHE has misinterpreted the scope of its statutory authority 
and acted outside that authority in rejecting Sunflowers permit 
application.  In particular, the utility and its supporters attacking 
Brembys decision have made two primary assertions that the decision 
exceeds the bounds of KDHEs statutory authority.  First, they claim that 
KDHE erroneously denied a permit for a proposed facility by invoking a 
statute that only authorizes the agency to take actions to abate ongoing 
activities that pose substantial endangerments to health and the 
environment.  Second, they claim that the substantial endangerment 
provision, which provides the principal underpinning of Brembys 
decision, does not apply to substances not already being regulated as air 
pollutants under federal or state law.  Additional challenges attack the 
Secretarys factual and policy determinations, even assuming that he did 
not exceed the bounds of the agencys delegated authority. 
This part focuses primarily on the claims that KDHE lacked the 
statutory authority to deny the Sunflower air quality permits.  Section A 
concludes that, based on the applicable standards of judicial review of an 
administrative agencys statutory authority, those claims should fail.  
Section B establishes the framework for judicial review of the validity of 
the factual and policy determinations underlying the permit denial.  It 
concludes that review of these claims ought to be deferential and that the 
kinds of risks to health and the environment upon which Secretary 
Bremby based his decision are well within the scope of the substantial 
endangerment provision. 
                                                                                                                       
LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, May 4, 2008, at 1A; John Hanna, Sebelius Vetoes Third Bill Allowing Coal-
Fired Plants, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, May 17, 2008, at 4B; Scott Rothschild, Coal Battle Moves to 
Court, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, May 22, 2008, at 1A. 
 306. This article does not address the procedural challenges against KDHEs decision raised by 
Sunflower, including lack of notice, lack of opportunity to be heard, and violation of procedural due 
process rights.  See Sunflower Elec. Power Corp. v. Kan. Dept of Health & Envt, Petition for 
Judicial Review of KDHE Denial of Permit Application Under K.S.A. § 65-3012(a), at 9, 1011, 
Case No. 07CV245 (25th Jud. Dist. at Finney County Nov. 16, 2007). 
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A. Statutory Interpretation Challenges 
In litigation and in public comments criticizing KDHEs denial of 
the Sunflower permit application, those challenging the decision have 
provided at least two reasons why the agency lacked the authority to 
deny the permit.307  First, those who disagree with the decision charge 
that KDHE has the authority under the substantial endangerment statute 
to react to existing emissions from a plant that is already in operation, but 
not to prevent prospective emissions from a proposed plant.308  Second, 
they assert that KDHE may not reject an air quality permit on the basis of 
emissions of pollutants not currently being regulated under the federal 
CAA or the Kansas Air Quality Act.  Neither contention warrants 
overturning the Secretarys decision. 
1. Standard of Review 
The framework for resolution of any litigation challenging the 
validity of KDHEs decision on the Holcomb units is established by the 
Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency 
Action,309 and particularly by that statutes scope of review provisions.  
The Act imposes the burden of proving the invalidity of agency action, 
such as Secretary Brembys decision, on the challenging party.310  The 
Judicial Review Act authorizes Kansass courts to grant relief to a 
party challenging an agencys decision if the agency has acted beyond 
the jurisdiction conferred by any provision of law or the agency has 
erroneously interpreted or applied the law.311  The charges that KDHE 
may not act preventively under the substantial endangerment provision 
                                                     
 307. See supra notes 27375 and accompanying text. 
 308. In the complaint it filed in district court in Finney County, Sunflower asserted that the 
denial is invalid because Secretary Bremby has erroneously interpreted or applied Section 3012, in 
that [the statute] only addresses current air pollution that results from existing stationary and mobile 
sources of air contaminant emissions and thus provides no authority or jurisdiction to the Secretary 
to deny a permit to construct a new source of such emissions.  Petition for Judicial Review of 
KDHE Denial of Permit Application Under K.S.A. § 65-3012(a), supra note 306, at 10; see also id. 
at 8 (noting that before September 2007, the substantial endangerment provision of the Kansas Air 
Quality Act had only been applied to existing pollution that presents an air pollution emergency and 
therefore had never been considered by KDHE in connection with an application for a PSD 
construction permit for a new source of future emissions); Sunflower Elec. Power Corp. v. Kan. 
Dept of Health & Envt, Petition for Review of KDHE Denial of Permit Application Under K.S.A. 
§ 65-3008a(b), at 9 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2007). 
 309. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-601 to 77-631 (1997). 
 310. Id. § 77-621(a)(1); see also Foos v. Terminix, 89 P.3d 546, 551 (Kan. 2004) ([T]he party 
asserting [an agencys] action is invalid bears the burden of proving the invalidity.). 
 311. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-621(c)(2), (4). 
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and may not deny an air quality permit on the basis of emissions of 
unregulated pollutants amount to the contention that KDHE acted 
beyond its jurisdiction under the Air Quality Act and that it has 
erroneously interpreted the Act to enable it to deny permits under 
circumstances that the legislature did not envision.  Thus, resolution of 
these charges requires judicial review of KDHEs interpretation of the 
Act. 
The Kansas appellate courts frequently state that because statutory 
interpretation is a question of law, judicial review of an agencys 
interpretation is unlimited.312  The Kansas courts, however, adhere to 
the doctrine of operative construction, under which an administrative 
agencys interpretation of a statute it is responsible for administering is 
entitled to judicial deference.313  On the one hand, the Kansas Supreme 
Court has stated that [i]f there is a rational basis for the agencys 
interpretation, it should be upheld on judicial review.314  On the other 
hand, the court also routinely announces that [t]he determination of an 
administrative body as to questions of law is not conclusive and, while 
persuasive, is not binding on the courts.315 
The Kansas Supreme Court also has taken the position that judicial 
deference to agency statutory interpretations is particularly appropriate 
when the agency has special competence and experience in the subject 
matter involved in the interpretation.316  It is hard to imagine the Kansas 
Supreme Court concluding that KDHE does not possess such expertise in  
 
                                                     
 312. See, e.g., In re City of Wichita, 59 P.3d 336, 34344 (Kan. 2002) (describing the courts 
review of a tax exemption statute). 
 313. Trees Oil Co. v. State Corp. Commn, 105 P.3d 1269, 1281 (Kan. 2005). 
 314. Foos, 89 P.3d at 551 (quoting Kan. Dept of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. v. Public Employee 
Relations Bd., 815 P.2d 66, 70 (Kan. 1991)). 
 315. Id.; see also Ninemire v. Kan. Dept of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 162 P.3d 22, 25 (Kan. 2007) 
(Under the doctrine of operative construction, courts have given deference to an administrative 
agencys interpretation of a statute it has been charged with enforcing. However, [t]he final 
construction of a statute [always] rests within the courts. (quoting Fieser v. Kan. Bd. of Healing 
Arts, 130 P.3d 555, 557 (Kan. 2006))); Peterson v. Kan. Dept of Health & Envt, 59 P.3d 610 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the agencys interpretation is persuasive but not binding).  The leading 
U.S. Supreme Court case governing judicial review of agency statutory determinations has long been 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which just happens to 
be a CAA case.  For recent commentary on Chevron, see Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, 
Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007); Daniel J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a 
Revised Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent, Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 783 (2007); Linda Jellum, Chevrons Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy 
to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2007). 
 316. Coma Corp. v. Kan. Dept of Labor, 154 P.3d 1080, 1083 (Kan. 2007); Hawley v. Kan. 
Dept of Agric., 132 P.3d 870, 878 (Kan. 2006); Fisher v. Kan. Crime Victims Comp. Bd., 124 P.3d 
74, 78 (Kan. 2005) (quoting In re Appeal of United Teleservices, Inc., 983 P.2d 250, 252 (Kan. 
1999)). 
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matters involving the public health and environmental effects of air 
pollution.317 
The Kansas Supreme Court has recognized limits to the doctrine of 
operative construction.  The doctrine does not apply in the absence of 
uncertainty or ambiguity.318  In addition, the court has professed 
reluctance to apply the doctrine when the issue before it raises questions 
of law on undisputed facts.319  Even then, however, the agencys 
determination on a question of law is persuasive, even if it is not binding 
on a court.320 
One should not make too much of these largely boilerplate 
recitations of the standard of review applicable to judicial review of 
agency statutory interpretations.  Two leading administrative law 
scholars once quipped that the rules governing judicial review have no 
more substance at the core than a seedless grape.321  Still, it is clear that 
the burden of proof is on those challenging the Holcomb units denial.  
Further, at least some, and perhaps considerable, deference is likely to be 
afforded KDHEs interpretation of the scope of its authority under the air 
quality act to deny a permit to a power plant based on the potential 
adverse effects of its emissions of CO2.322 
2. Reactive vs. Preventive Regulation 
One legal issue raised by KDHEs denial of the Sunflower 
application is whether KDHE has the authority to deny a permit on the 
basis of prospective as opposed to current emissions.323  Secretary 
Brembys letter explaining the permit denial cited sections 65-3008a(b) 
                                                     
 317. Cf. Trees Oil Co., 105 P.3d at 1280 (recognizing the District Courts ruling that the Kansas 
Corporation Commission is an agency of special competence and experience in oil and gas matters 
with prevention of waste being of primary importance). 
 318. Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Kline, 150 P.3d 892, 903 (Kan. 2007). 
 319. Graham v. Dokter Trucking Group, 161 P.3d 695, 701 (Kan. 2007) (citing Fieser, 130 P.3d 
at 557). 
 320. Fieser, 130 P.3d at 557. 
 321. Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 771, 780 (1975). 
 322. KDHEs reliance on an opinion of the state Attorney General will not enhance the degree of 
deference to which KDHEs interpretation is entitled.  The Kansas Supreme Court has long held 
that [t]he construction placed upon a statute by the opinion of an attorney general is neither 
conclusive nor binding on the court, and in circumstances where such an opinion is without 
authoritative legal support, it should not be approved or followed.  Perry v. Bd. of County 
Commrs, 132 P.3d 1279, 1288 (Kan. 2006) (citing Greenwood v. Estes, Sav. & Loan Commr, 504 
P.2d 206, 207 (Kan. 1972)). 
 323. See supra note 308 and accompanying text. 
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and 65-3012 as the statutory basis for his decision.324  The KDHE press 
release issued the same day also referred to section 65-3008.325  It is 
obvious that sections 65-3008 and 65-3008b do not preclude the agency 
from denying an air quality permit on the basis of prospective as opposed 
to current emissions; a serious argument to the contrary is impossible to 
make.  The statute prohibits any person from constructing or operating 
any air contaminant emission stationary source if the Secretary finds that 
it may cause or contribute to air pollution, unless an appropriate 
approval or permit has been issued for the source by the secretary under 
the Air Quality Act.326  The prohibition applies to stationary sources that 
may cause or contribute to air pollution,327 rather than to sources that 
have caused or are causing air pollution.  Further, the statute bars the 
construction as well as the operation of an air contaminant emission 
stationary source without a permit.328  It is clear that a source owner must 
apply for and receive a permit before it constructs the source and that 
KDHE is responsible for determining whether to issue a permit at that 
time, which, by definition, is before any emissions are discharged into 
the air. 
If there is any limit on the agencys authority to preclude potential 
future as opposed to ongoing emissions, it must come from section 65-
3012, which was the focus of Secretary Brembys letter, the 
accompanying KDHE press release, and the Attorney Generals opinion 
that KDHE solicited before making a determination on the Sunflower 
permits.  Section 65-3012(a) provides: Notwithstanding any other 
provision of this act, the secretary may take such action as may be 
necessary to protect the health of persons or the environment: (1) Upon 
receipt of information that the emission of air pollution presents a 
substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the 
environment . . . .329  The statute then describes the actions that KDHE 
                                                     
 324. Bremby Letter, supra note 4, at 1. 
 325. Sunflower Press Release, supra note 266, at 1. 
 326. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3008(a) (2002).  An air contaminant means dust, fumes, smoke, 
other particulate matter, vapor, gas, odorous substances, or any combination thereof.  Id. § 65-
3002(a).  The Holcomb units would have emitted air contaminants in the form of the various 
criteria pollutants discussed in the staff recommendation, see supra notes 25356 and accompanying 
text, as well as CO2, which is a gas.  Each unit also would have qualified as a stationary source, 
which means any building, structure, facility or installation which emits or may emit any air 
contaminant.  Id. § 65-3002(l). 
 327. The statute defines air pollution as the presence in the outdoor atmosphere of one or 
more air contaminants in such quantities and duration as is, or tends significantly to be, injurious to 
human health or welfare, animal or plant life, or property, or would unreasonably interfere with the 
enjoyment of life or property.  Id. § 65-3002(c). 
 328. Id. § 65-3008(a). 
 329. Id. § 65-3012(a). 
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may take pursuant to that authorization, includ[ing] but . . . not limited 
to the issuance of an order directing a source to take such steps as 
necessary to prevent the act or eliminate the practice giving rise to the 
endangerment.330  Such an order may include . . . temporary cessation of 
operation.331  In addition, KDHE may commence an action to enjoin 
acts or practices referenced in section 65-3012(a), or request that the 
attorney general or appropriate county or district attorney do so.332  The 
court may issue a restraining order upon a showing by KDHE that a 
person has engaged in those acts or practices.333 
The question is whether section 65-3012 applies only to ongoing 
activities, leaving the permit review provisions of section 65-3008 as the 
exclusive source of KDHEs authority to preclude the commencement of 
new activities (such as stationary source construction) that would, if 
allowed, give rise to undesirable air pollution problems.  Section 65-3012 
is broad enough to allow KDHE to block endangering activities before 
they have begun.  Section 65-3012(b) grants to the Secretary the 
authority to issu[e] an order directing the owner or operator, or both, to 
take such steps as necessary to prevent the act or eliminate the practice 
giving rise to the endangerment.334  An order eliminating a practice is 
necessarily directed at activities that have already begun.  One dictionary 
defines the word eliminate to mean to cause to exist no longer.335  
Another defines it to mean to put an end to.336  Both definitions involve 
the cessation of an activity that has already begun.  But section 65-
3012(b) authorizes KDHE to prevent or eliminate an endangering 
activity.  The same dictionaries make it clear that prevention entails 
blocking an activity that has not yet begun.  One defines the word 
prevent to mean act or do in advance or act before, in anticipation of, 
or in preparation for (a future event, a point in time).337  The other 
defines the word to mean to act ahead of and to keep from happening 
or existing.338  The statute thus grants to KDHE the power to take action 
to protect health and the environment from the adverse effects of a 
                                                     
 330. Id. § 65-3012(b)(1). 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. § 65-3012(b)(2). 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. § 65-3012(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 335. 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1993) 799 (defining 
eliminate) [hereinafter OXFORD ENGLISH]. 
 336. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
eliminate (defining eliminate). 
 337. 2 OXFORD ENGLISH, supra note 335, at 2348 (defining prevent). 
 338. MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
prevent (defining prevent). 
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substantial endangerment either by eliminating it after the activities 
responsible for it have already begun or by preventing it before those 
activities have begun. 
Some of the provisions of section 65-3012(b) are certainly backward 
looking, including the references to cessation of (presumably ongoing) 
operations and to a person that has engaged in the acts giving rise to 
the endangerment.339  The remedies listed in the statute, however, are 
simply illustrative of those authorized by the statute which, as indicated 
in the previous paragraph, undoubtedly encompasses preventive 
measures.  The statute vests KDHE with the authority to take actions 
includ[ing] but not limited to the ones listed.340  Accordingly, the fact 
that some of the listed actions relate to the cessation of ongoing activities 
does not preclude the Secretary from taking actions directed at emissions 
that would pose a substantial endangerment were they to occur in the 
future. 
The evolution of the statutory text also strongly supports the 
conclusion that the Secretary may take actions to block activities (such as 
denying an air quality permit) that present a substantial endangerment 
despite the fact that they have not yet begun.  In particular, the 1993 
amendments to section 65-3012(a) support the conclusion that the statute 
authorizes KDHE to address substantial endangerments to health or the 
environment either by preventing activities that have not yet begun or by 
ordering the cessation of ongoing endangering activities.  As the 
Attorney Generals opinion points out, before 1993, section 65-3012(a) 
limited the Secretary to taking remedial action.341  Remedial action 
might be construed as being limited to efforts to remedy an ongoing 
problem,342 although that reading is not inevitable.343  Even if the 
reference to remedial action is construed in such a narrow way, any 
limit that section 65-3012(a) once imposed on the Secretarys authority 
to act preventively disappeared in 1993, when the state legislature 
amended the provision to authorize KDHE to take such actions as may 
                                                     
 339. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012(b)(1), (2) (2002) (emphasis added). 
 340. Id. § 65-3012(b). 
 341. See supra notes 246 52 and accompanying text. 
 342. But cf. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (2000) (defining remedial action for purposes of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act to mean actions to 
prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause 
substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment). 
 343. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/remedy (emphasis added) (providing one definition of remedy as the legal means to 
recover a right or to prevent or obtain redress for a wrong). 
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be necessary to protect health and the environment.344  The statute on its 
face therefore no longer applies exclusively to remediation of ongoing 
activities, but to any acts the Secretary deems necessary to protect health 
and the environment from a substantial endangerment, including the 
kinds of preventive actions explicitly covered by section 65-3012(b). 
The text of 65-3012(a) provides further support for the conclusion 
that the provision allows the Secretary to prevent harm by blocking the 
initiation of air pollution that threatens health or the environment.  The 
provisions of section 65-3012(a) apply [n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of the Kansas Air Quality Act.345  This introductory provision 
indicates that the Secretarys authority to deny air quality permits for the 
reasons listed in section 65-3008 has no bearing whatsoever on, and does 
not limit in any way, his authority to address substantial endangerments 
under section 65-3012(a) through the denial of an air quality permit. 
Judicial interpretations of the same language in other contexts 
support this conclusion.  One authority on statutory construction 
summarizes the applicable precedents this way: 
[T]he phrase notwithstanding any other provision of law has a special 
legal connotation.  It is considered an express statement of legislative 
intent that a specific statute in which it is contained control in the 
circumstances covered by that statute, despite the existence of some 
other law which might otherwise apply to require a different or a 
contrary outcome.346 
Courts construing federal environmental legislation have interpreted 
notwithstanding provisions identical or similar to the one in section 65-
3012(a) in that fashion.  In one environmental case, for example, a 
federal court of appeals interpreted the emergency powers provision of 
the federal Safe Drinking Water Act.  The statute provides that, 
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of the Act, EPA may take such 
actions as it deems necessary to protect the public health from 
contaminants that may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment.347  Relying on the legislative history, the court concluded 
that EPAs powers under this provision are intended to override any  
 
                                                     
 344. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012(a) (2002). 
 345. Id. (emphasis added). 
 346. 3B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 77:6 (6th ed. 2003).  
But cf. Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1169 
(9th Cir. 2007) (stating that the phrase notwithstanding any other provision of law is not always 
construed literally). 
 347. 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (2000). 
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limitations upon the Administrators authority found elsewhere in the 
statute.348 
One final aspect of the plain meaning of the statutory text belies the 
restrictive interpretation of section 65-3012(a) advanced by Sunflower.  
The reference to an endangerment supports the conclusion that the 
authority delegated to KDHE to take such action as may be necessary to 
protect health and the environment349 extends to activities that have not 
yet begun. The word endangerment is inherently future-oriented.  To 
endanger is to put in danger or peril or to incur a risk or chance of 
harm.350  Actions that address endangerments necessarily seek to prevent 
harm that has not yet occurred.  Whether that harm stems from an 
activity that has or has not yet begun would appear to be irrelevant.  In 
either case, the statute delegates to the Secretary the power to do what is 
necessary to protect health and the environment in the face of the threat. 
This straightforward reading of section 65-3012(a) is supported by 
judicial interpretation of analogous federal environmental statutes.  The 
language of section 65-3012(a) largely tracks the text of various 
endangerment provisions in the federal statutes.  The Kansas provision 
differs in some respects from the analogous federal provisions.  The 
federal provisions, including the CAA endangerment provision, typically 
authorize administrative action or judicial relief to deal with an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to health, welfare, or the 
environment.351  The Kansas Air Quality Act omits the word 
imminent.352  If that omission has any significance, it makes the state 
statute broader in its sweep than the analogous federal statutes because it 
removes the requirement of temporal proximity.353  Under the federal 
                                                     
 348. Trinity Am. Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 150 F.3d 389, 395 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting  H.R. REP. NO. 
93-1185, at 3536 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454, 6487) (emphasis in original)). 
 349. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012(a) (2002). 
 350. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH, supra note 335, at 816 (defining endanger). 
 351. See 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (2000); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (2000) (Clean Water Act 
emergency powers provision); 42 U.S.C. § 300i (Safe Drinking Water Act emergency powers 
provision); 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act imminent hazard 
provision); 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act abatement action provision). 
 352. As indicated above, one of the bills introduced in the Kansas legislature to overturn 
Secretary Brembys decision on the Holcomb plants would have added the requirement that an 
endangerment be imminent, as well as substantial, to trigger the Secretarys authority under § 65-
3012(a).  See supra note 300 and accompanying text.  That change clearly was designed to restrict 
the agencys authority to address endangerments, but the Governors veto prevented it from 
becoming law. 
 353. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 528 (8th Cir. 1975), modified, 529 F.2d 181 
(8th Cir. 1976) (The term endangering, as used by Congress in  [an early version of the federal 
Clean Water Act], connotes a lesser risk of harm than the phrase imminent and substantial 
endangerment to the health of persons as used by Congress in the 1972 amendments to [that 
 
13 - GLICKSMAN FINAL III.DOC 6/17/2008  8:14:17 PM 
576 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
statutes, an endangerment must be both imminent and substantial to 
trigger regulatory authority.  Under the Kansas statute, it need only be 
substantial. 
Another difference between the Kansas statute and the federal 
statutes relates to the verb tense.  Some of the federal provisions 
authorize agency or judicial action when specified activities may 
present an imminent and substantial endangerment.354  It is possible to 
interpret those federal statutes more expansively than the Kansas law 
because they trigger regulatory authority if the specified activities may 
in the future present an endangerment, even if they do not currently do 
so.  The Kansas statute refers to air pollution emissions that present 
(i.e., now, not in the future) a substantial endangerment. 
The absence of the word may from the Kansas statute is not a 
convincing basis for construing its coverage as limited to activities 
already occurring, however.  To begin with, several of the federal 
imminent hazard provisions cover a pollution source or activity that is 
presenting a substantial endangerment.  The CAAs emergency power 
provision is one example,355 and the Clean Water Act is another.356  To 
say that an activity presents a danger is the same as saying that the 
activity is presenting the danger.  Both are continuous or progressive 
verb forms.357  Yet, the courts have not interpreted these two provisions 
more narrowly from a temporal perspective than the endangerment and 
emergency power provisions that are triggered by activities that may 
present an endangerment. 
More importantly, the case law recognizes that, as indicated 
above,358 the very concept of an endangerment is inherently future-
oriented.  One of the early landmark cases in federal environmental law 
interpreted the meaning of an endangerment.  In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,359 
industry challenged EPAs issuance of regulations requiring a phase-out 
of lead additives in motor gasoline.  Section 211(c)(1)(A) of the CAA at 
the time authorized EPA to regulate gasoline additives whose emission 
                                                                                                                       
statute]. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp. 1974))). 
 354. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300i (2000); id. § 6973(a).  Cf. id. § 9606(a) (authorizing action to abate 
endangerment attributable to a release of hazardous substances that may be an imminent and 
substantial endangerment). 
 355. 42 U.S.C. § 7603. 
 356. 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a). 
 357. See UsingEnglish.com, Term: Participles, available at http://www.usingenglish.com/ 
glossary/participles.html (describing the is [followed by the participle form of a verb] construction 
as a continuous or progressive verb form). 
 358. See supra notes 34950 and accompanying text. 
 359. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). 
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products will endanger the public health or welfare.360  EPA issued its 
phase-out regulations based on a finding that automotive emissions from 
the use of leaded gasoline presented a significant risk of harm to the 
public health.361  Industry attacked the regulations, arguing that the will 
endanger standard required a high quantum of factual proof, proof of 
actual harm rather than of a significant risk of harm.362  The court 
disagreed and sustained the regulations.  In doing so, it addressed the 
significance of the term endanger: 
Simply as a matter of plain meaning, we have difficulty crediting 
petitioners reading of the will endanger standard.  The meaning of 
endanger is not disputed.  Case law and dictionary definition agree 
that endanger means something less than actual harm.  When one is 
endangered, harm is threatened; no actual injury need ever occur.  
Thus, for example, a town may be endangered by a threatening 
plague or hurricane and yet emerge from the danger completely 
unscathed.  A statute allowing for regulation in the face of danger is, 
necessarily, a precautionary statute.  Regulatory action may be taken 
before the threatened harm occurs; indeed, the very existence of such 
precautionary legislation would seem to demand that regulatory action 
precede, and, optimally, prevent, the perceived threat.  As should be 
apparent, the will endanger language of Section 211(c)(1)(A) makes 
it such a precautionary statute.363 
The precautionary characterization was significant because it allowed the 
agency to rely upon an expansive range of evidence to justify regulation: 
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to 
come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of 
scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to protect the public 
health, and the decision that of an expert administrator, we will not 
demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect.  Such proof  
 
                                                     
 360. Id. at 7 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c)(1)(A)).  The statute has since been amended to 
authorize EPA to restrict fuel additives that, in the agencys judgment, may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1) (2000).  The Kansas 
statute requires a finding that air pollution presents a substantial endangerment, rather than that it 
will endanger or may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health.  This difference in 
terminology does not undercut the relevance of Ethyl Corp. to interpretation of section 65-3012(a).  
See infra notes 36365 and accompanying text. 
 361. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 7. 
 362. Id. at 12. 
 363. Id. at 13 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).  See also id. at 17 (adding that the will 
endanger standard is precautionary in nature and does not require proof of actual harm before 
regulation is appropriate). 
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may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of the statute 
is to be served.364 
Thus, a statute that authorizes administrative or judicial action to 
prevent an endangerment is designed to prevent the relevant harm to 
health before it occurs, rather than to constrain the agency or the court by 
requiring them to wait until harm has begun before acting.  KDHEs 
denial of the Sunflower permits was based on the Secretarys finding that 
emission of air pollution from the proposed coal fired plant, specifically 
carbon dioxide emissions, presents a substantial endangerment to the 
health of persons or the environment.365  That is precisely the kind of 
finding anticipated by the statute.  It is consistent with the thrust of a 
precautionary statute such as section 65-3012, as the Sunflower permit 
denial both anticipated a threat of substantial harm from the proposed 
units CO2 emissions and was designed to prevent that harm from 
occurring. 
The statute interpreted in Ethyl Corp. differs somewhat from section 
65-3012(a).  The CAA provision interpreted by the court in Ethyl Corp. 
authorized regulation upon a finding that lead additives will endanger 
health or welfare, whereas the Kansas Air Quality Act authorizes KDHE 
to act when emissions present[] an endangerment.  This difference 
creates the possibility that the word will in the CAA provision makes it 
future-oriented in a way that the Kansas statute is not.  Under this 
reading, the CAAs fuel additive provision allowed EPA to stop action 
before it occurred on the basis of a finding that the action would 
otherwise have endangered health, welfare, or the environment.  The 
Kansas Act thus might require that the activity already be occurring, even 
if the harm is merely anticipated and has not yet occurred.  Under this 
reading, the Kansas endangerment statute would not apply because the 
Sunflower plant has not even been constructed yet. 
The argument is unconvincing for several reasons.  First, lead was 
already being used in gasoline at the time that EPA issued its regulations 
so the court had no reason to consider whether the activity already had to 
be taking place to trigger the CAAs endangerment provision, or whether 
an activity that had been proposed and that would have contributed to an 
endangerment if it were to take place would also have been covered.  The 
distinction between ongoing and proposed activities simply was not at  
 
                                                     
 364. Id. at 28 (footnote omitted). 
 365. Bremby Letter, supra note 4, at 12. 
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issue, so the court could not have intended to limit its holding to ongoing 
activities. 
Second, another early landmark environmental case interpreting the 
emergency powers provision of the Clean Water Act undercuts the 
argument.  In Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,366 the United States, several 
states, and several environmental groups sought an injunction ordering 
Reserve Mining to stop discharging wastes from its Minnesota iron ore 
processing plant into the air and into Lake Superior.  When the district 
court ordered that the discharges immediately cease, thus effectively 
closing the plant, Reserve Mining appealed.367  The plaintiffs request for 
an order enjoining the water discharges was based on a provision of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act authorizing EPA to request that the 
Attorney General bring suit to abate water pollution which is 
endangering the health or welfare of persons in a state other than that in 
which the discharge originated.368  Despite the fact that the statute 
applied to pollution that is endangering health or welfare, instead of to 
pollution that will endanger health or welfare, the Reserve Mining 
court relied on the interpretation of the term endanger advanced in the 
Ethyl Corporation case.369 The Eighth Circuit characterized the Ethyl 
Corporation case as one that involved a problem analogous to the one 
now before us,370 and it deem[ed] pertinent the interpretation given to 
the term endanger by Judge Wright of the District of Columbia Circuit 
in his analysis of the congressional use of the word endanger in the 
context of a provision of the Clean Air Act.371  One statute (the CAA 
provision interpreted in Ethyl Corporation) applied to activities that will 
endanger health or the environment, while the other (the Clean Water 
Act provision involved in Reserve Mining) applied to pollution that is 
endangering health or welfare.  That distinction, however, did not 
preclude the court in Reserve Mining from treating the earlier courts 
                                                     
 366. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), modified, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 367. Id. at 499. 
 368. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).  The current version of that provision is 
33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (2000), which allows EPA to seek an order to halt a pollution source that is 
presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or welfare from continuing to cause 
or contribute to the endangerment. 
 369. Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 51920.  Actually, the Eighth Circuit relied upon a dissenting 
opinion by Judge J. Skelly Wright in a panel opinion in Ethyl Corp.  Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 Envt 
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  When the case was reheard by the D.C. Circuit en banc, 
Judge Wright wrote the majority opinion in the version of the case discussed supra notes 35965 and 
accompanying text.  Judge Wrights earlier dissent contained essentially the same analysis he later 
advanced in his 1976 majority opinion for the en banc court. 
 370. Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 519. 
 371. Id. at 528.  See also id. at 536 (citing Ethyl Corp. as support for the proposition that a 
proper assessment of the health hazard rests upon a proper analysis of the probabilities of harm). 
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interpretation of the applicable scope of the statute as relevant to the 
scope of the Clean Water Acts endangerment provision.372 
Third, covering threatened harm from future as well as existing 
activities is more consistent with the precautionary thrust of 
environmental endangerment provisions such as the ones at issue in Ethyl 
Corp. and Reserve Mining and the endangerment provision relied on by 
Secretary Bremby in denying Sunflowers application.  The essential 
thrust of modern environmental law is to shift the focus from reacting to 
harm after it occurs to preventing harm before it occurs.  Statutory and 
regulatory environmental law developed in large part because of the 
perception that traditional common law remedies in suits such as 
nuisance and trespass provided inadequate protection of public health 
and environmental values. 
Suppose, for example, that the battle over the Sunflower plants had 
taken the form of a common law nuisance action in which the plants 
neighbors sought to enjoin it based on the adverse effects caused by the 
plants operation on the plaintiffs health and property values.  The 
plaintiffs would likely have had a more difficult time prevailing if they 
brought their suit before the plant was constructed rather than waiting 
until after it had begun operating.  The former situation would likely 
have been regarded as an anticipatory nuisance action, and the courts 
traditionally were hesitant to enjoin activities before the fact on the basis 
of a risk that they might cause harm.373 
                                                     
 372. None of the substantial endangerment or emergency action provisions of the federal 
pollution control statutes uses the will endanger phraseology anymore.  Instead, all allow 
government action when the regulated activity is presenting or may present an endangerment or 
its equivalent.  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (CWA; is presenting); 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (Safe Drinking 
Water Act; may present); id. § 6973(a) (RCRA; may present); id. § 7603 (is presenting); id. § 
9606(a) (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; may be an 
endangerment).  These statutes are all treated as precautionary in nature, whether they use the is 
presenting or may present terminology. 
 373. One writer has described the traditional judicial antipathy to anticipatory nuisance actions 
as follows: 
  The judicial disdain underlying anticipatory nuisance is that the plaintiff is asking a 
court to rule that a proposed use of land is unreasonable before the use actually occurs.  
This has been referred to as the despotism of the anticipatory nuisance concept.  This 
despotism, because it prevents landowners from doing with their land as they please or 
deem reasonable, makes most courts hesitant to enjoin a proposed action without the 
plaintiff first meeting a very high burden of proof. 
George P. Smith, II, Re-validating the Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 687, 697 
(2005) (citations omitted).  Serena M. Williams, The Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine: One Common 
Law Theory for Use in Environmental Justice Cases, 19 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 223 
(1995), supports the expansion of anticipatory nuisance doctrine to address environmental justice 
claims. 
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It was precisely those kinds of situations that statutory environmental 
law in general, and, in particular, the endangerment provisions they 
contained, were designed to address: 
 The importance of protecting human life and the environment led 
the 1960s reformers [who helped develop modern environmental law] 
to reject tort law as the basis of government regulation of technological 
risks.  In a tort system, persons who have been injured by corporate 
behavior have the burden of initiating expensive legal action to prove 
that their injury was caused by the defendants actions.  Moreover, 
someone who anticipates a potential injury usually cannot obtain 
protection against that risk.  Although injunctive relief is theoretically 
available in actions such as private nuisance to avoid harms alleged to 
be the imminent result of technological development, the courts are 
reluctant to enjoin such anticipatory nuisances on the basis of the 
plaintiffs speculation. . . . 
 [Statutory r]isk regulation was a paradigm shift from the common 
law because Congress authorized regulators to act on the basis of 
anticipated harm, which permitted regulators to reduce personal and 
environmental risks despite an ignorance of mechanism.  As John 
Applegate has pointed out, risk regulation therefore changed the 
baseline of government regulation in fundamental ways: Regulation 
based on risk permits regulatory action based on ex ante collective 
danger rather than ex post individual injury, and also operates 
preventively to avert injury to the public as a whole. 
 The Ethyl Corporation case, decided in 1976, illustrates this new 
political orientation. . . .  The court determined that EPA could act 
before the threatened harm occurs and that no actual injury need 
ever occur.  This interpretation was justified because the very 
existence of such precautionary legislation would seem to demand that 
regulatory action precede, and, optimally, prevent the perceived 
threat.374 
It is of course possible to design a system in which regulatory relief 
is available to shut down a plant that has been built but that has not yet 
begun to operate (or has begun to operate but has not yet caused harm), 
but not a plant that is still in the planning stages.  It makes no sense, 
                                                     
 374. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A 
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 56 (Stanford University Press 2003) (quoting John S. Applegate, The 
Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 261, 273 (1991); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (emphasis in 
original)).  In the same article, Professor Applegate explained that regulation of risk instead of 
harm . . . contrasts with, and is a reaction to, the traditional tort law rule that damages can be 
recovered only for actual harm or for the definite likelihood of future harm to the individual 
plaintiff.  Applegate, supra, at 27172. 
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however, to allow a plant to be built and only then to shut it down if the 
inability to operate it without running afoul of the endangerment 
provision is discernable even before the plant is constructed.  Forcing the 
government to wait until the plant has been built, and perhaps until it has 
begun operating, not only runs contrary to the precautionary thrust of 
statutory endangerment provisions, it also puts at risk whatever costs 
have been sunk into plant construction and the livelihoods of those hired 
to help operate a plant that is shut down before or shortly after it begins 
operating.  The Kansas courts adhere to the canon that statutes should be 
construed, if possible, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.375  
Requiring KDHE to await the initiation of an activity that it already 
knows would present a substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment before it may exercise its authority to protect against the 
endangerment under section 65-3012 would produce precisely the kind 
of absurd result that the Kansas courts have long sought to avoid. 
The likely reaction of an air pollution source to KDHEs issuance of 
an abatement order in a manner consistent with Sunflowers narrow 
interpretation of section 65-3012 only serves to reinforce the flawed 
nature of the argument that section 65-3012 only allows KDHE to abate 
ongoing activities.  Assume that KDHE were to issue an order under 
section 65-3012 shutting down a plant that is already built and has begun 
operating on the ground that its CO2 emissions present a substantial 
endangerment.  Assume further that the source is able to show that 
KDHE knew before construction commenced that the CO2 emissions it 
would generate would create a substantial endangerment.  Despite that 
knowledge, KDHE issued an air quality permit (because all of the 
permitting requirements of section 65-3008 were met).  KDHE waited to 
exercise its authority under section 65-3012 until operations had begun 
because it lacked the authority to do so earlier.  Under those 
circumstances, the source would likely protest mightily.  It might argue, 
for example, that KDHEs issuance of the permit, and its failure to resort 
to section 65-3012 to block plant construction, created a reasonable 
expectation by the source that its operation would comply with the law.  
As a result, KDHE should be estopped from seeking to prohibit any 
emissions it knew about when it issued the permit.376  Alternatively, the 
                                                     
 375. See, e.g., Dillon Real Estate Co. v. City of Topeka, 163 P.3d 298, 310 (2007) (quoting In re 
M.R., 38 P.3d 694 (Kan. 2002)) (As a general rule, statutes are construed to avoid unreasonable 
results.); Pruter v. Larned State Hosp., 26 P.3d 666, 672 (Kan. 2001) (quoting Landry v. Graphic 
Tech., Inc., 2 P.3d 758 (Kan. 2000)) (In interpreting statutes, we must avoid interpretations that 
would lead to absurd or unreasonable results.). 
 376. Cf. Kan. City Heartland Constr. Co. v. Maggie Jones Southport Cafe, Inc., 824 P.2d 926, 
93233 (Kan. 1992) (quoting Lines v. City of Topeka, 577 P.2d 42, Syl. ¶ 4, (Kan. 1978). (A party 
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source might argue that KDHEs invocation of the substantial 
endangerment statute to block the sources operation after construction 
was complete amounted to a compensable taking.  The argument might 
be based on the contention that an abatement order under section 65-
3012 frustrated the sources reasonable investment-backed expectations, 
given KDHEs previous issuance of a permit and its failure to warn the 
source that its anticipated method of operation would give rise to an 
abatable endangerment.377  These arguments are far from clear 
winners,378 but it is difficult to imagine that the legislature would have 
wanted the Secretarys substantial endangerment authority to be 
restricted to situations that necessarily raise these kinds of fairness 
concerns. 
Once again, judicial interpretation of analogous federal 
environmental statutory provisions cuts against the argument that section 
65-3012 is properly read to authorize abatement only of ongoing 
activities.  The portion of the courts opinion in Reserve Mining that 
deals with the appropriate remedy indicates that courts applying 
endangerment statutes may be more reluctant to halt ongoing operations 
than to stop construction of the activity posing the threat before it begins.  
Although the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that the iron 
ore processing plant was posing an endangerment to the public health, it 
modified the district courts order requiring immediate cessation of the 
plants operation.  Instead, it chose to afford the company a reasonable 
opportunity and a reasonable time to construct facilities to accomplish an 
abatement of its pollution of air and water and the health risk created 
thereby.  In this way, hardship to employees and great economic loss 
incident to an immediate plant closing may be avoided.379  Assuming 
                                                                                                                       
asserting equitable estoppel must show that another party, by its acts, representations, admissions, or 
silence when it had a duty to speak, induced it to believe certain facts existed.  It must also show it 
rightfully relied and acted upon such belief and would now be prejudiced if the other party were 
permitted to deny the existence of such facts.). 
 377. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (declaring that 
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, 
of course, relevant considerations in determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred). 
 378. See, e.g., Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. State Corp. Commn, 715 P.2d 19, 2327 (Kan. 
1986) (rejecting utilitys argument that order of the State Corporation Commission requiring utility 
to enter into contract to purchase electricity from a cogenerator or small power producer amounted 
to a compensable regulatory taking); Frontier Ditch Co. v. Chief Engr of Div. of Water Res., 704 
P.2d 12, 16 (Kan. 1985) (citing In re Moseleys Estate, 164 Pac. 1073 (Kan. 1917); State ex rel. 
Brewster v. Piper, 176 Pac. 626 (Kan. 1918)) (stating that there is a long and undeviating line of 
decisions which hold that laches and estoppel do not operate against the state). 
 379. Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 537.  The court added that [i]n the absence of proof of a 
reasonable risk of imminent or actual harm, a legal standard requiring immediate cessation of 
industrial operations will cause unnecessary economic loss, including unemployment, and, in a case 
such as this, jeopardize a continuing domestic source of critical metals without conferring adequate 
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that the government can supply the evidence necessary to demonstrate a 
substantial endangerment, therefore, it should be able to take steps to 
prevent the endangerment even before the activity that poses it is 
constructed. 
In short, the Kansas Air Quality Act on its face authorizes the 
Secretary of KDHE to take such action, including denial of an air quality 
permit, under section 65-3012 that he deems necessary to address 
activities that pose a substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment, despite the fact that the activities have not yet begun.  Even 
if the statutory text is ambiguous on that point, the evolution of section 
65-3012 (especially the 1993 amendments to that provision), judicial 
interpretations of identical or analogous federal environmental statutes, 
the canon against interpreting statutes in a manner that produces absurd 
results, and the outcry that regulated sources would surely raise if the 
Secretary waited to block a plant until after it has been constructed 
(despite the Secretarys knowledge of a sources endangering 
characteristics at the permitting stage), all compel the conclusion that 
Secretary Brembys interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference.  
Brembys interpretation need not be the same one that a reviewing court 
would have reached on its own.  It need not even be the best 
interpretation, in the courts view.  As long as it has a rational basisand 
the analysis in this section demonstrates that Brembys interpretation 
doesKansas judicial precedents require a reviewing court to uphold 
it.380 
3. Actions Addressing Unregulated Pollutants 
A second basis for challenging KDHEs authority to rely on section 
65-3012 to deny a permit for the Holcomb units rests on the premise that 
KDHE may not deny a permit based on emissions of a pollutant not 
already being regulated under federal or state air pollution legislation.381  
                                                                                                                       
countervailing benefits.  Id. 
 380. See supra notes 31220 (discussing the doctrine of operative construction). 
 381. See, e.g., Petition for Judicial Review of KDHE Denial of Permit Application Under K.S.A. 
§ 65-3012(a), supra note 306, at 6 (stating that Kansas air quality permitting rules do not currently 
contain any restrictions on or other regulations addressing the emission of carbon dioxide and that 
[t]o date, there is no federal or Kansas regulatory program in place that establishes any rule or 
regulation of general application for the management of carbon dioxide emissions); see also 
Petition for Review of KDHE Denial of Permit Application Under K.S.A. § 65-3008a(b), supra note 
308, at 6 (The Permitting Rules do not currently contain any restrictions on or other regulations 
addressing the emission of carbon dioxide.). 
It is not completely clear that CO2 is actually an unregulated pollutant under federal or state law.  
The PSD provisions of the CAA require that a facility seeking a construction permit be subject to 
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the best available control technology . . . subject to regulation under [the CAA] emitted from . . . 
such facility.  42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2000).  Similarly, best available control technology 
(BACT) means an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant 
subject to regulation under [the CAA] emitted from . . . any major emitting facility.  Id. § 7479(3).  
At least one dictionary defines subject to as [c]apable of being or liable to be subjected to 
judgment or test, rather than as actually being liable or covered by a judgment or test.  Websters 
Online Dictionary, http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definition/subject+to (last visited Feb. 
19, 2008).  Under this reading of the statute, CO2 is subject to regulation under the CAA, even 
though it is not currently being regulated by EPA, because it is capable of being regulated.  The 
Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA held that CO2 qualifies as an air pollutant under the CAA.  
127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007).  Additionally, California Attorney General Edmund Brown has 
asserted that CO2 is a pollutant subject to regulation under the CAA and therefore is subject to the 
BACT requirement.  See Brown Letter, supra note 224.  Moreover, the definition of BACT requires 
an agency to consider the overall energy, environmental, and economic impacts of a permitted 
plant.  42 U.S.C. § 7491(3).  The environmental impact arguably includes the impact of CO2 
emissions. 
At least one state agency has rejected the claim that BACT applies to GHG emissions.  In May 
2007, the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) issued an air quality permit to 
Southern Montana Electric for a 270-megawatt coal-fired power plant near Great Falls.  Southern 
Montana Elec. Generation and Transmission Cooperative, Permit #3423-00 (May 11, 2007).  In 
doing so, it refused to designate IGCC as BACT for the plant.  Id. at 14.  It reasoned that GHGs, 
such as CO2, are not currently regulated under the Montana or federal [CAA], so that requiring the 
use of IGCC would result in relatively little increased regulated environmental protection.  Id.  An 
environmental group, the Montana Environmental Information Center, appealed the permit decision 
to the state Board of Environmental Review (BER), arguing that the agency is obliged to determine 
BACT for CO2 because it is subject to regulation.  Montana Environmental Information Center, 
et al.s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. BER-2007-07 AQ, at 
18-19 (Montana Bd. Envtl. Review Nov. 16, 2007) (citing Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 821, 104 Stat. 
2399 (1990)).  The group argued first that any substance that qualifies as an air pollutant under the 
CAA is subject to regulation.  Id.  Second, the group asserted that the 1990 CAA amendments 
directly regulated CO2 by requiring that utilities covered by the acid deposition control program 
monitor and report CO2 emissions.  Id.  Both the permit applicant and the Montana DEQ contested 
that claim, arguing that interpreting the statute to include all substances that qualify as air 
pollutants as subject to regulation, whether or not they are actually being regulated, would render 
the phrase subject to regulation superfluous.  See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Permittee Southern Montana Electric Generation and Transmission 
Cooperative, Inc., Case No. BER 2007-07 AQ, at 17-20 (Mont. Md. Envtl. Review Nov. 16, 2007) 
(equating a pollutant that is subject to regulation with a regulated pollutant, and arguing that 
CO2 is not currently regulated); Department of Environmental Qualitys Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Supporting Brief, Case No. 2007-07 AQ, at 9-10 (Mont. Bd. Envtl. Review Nov. 16, 
2007) (citing Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 370 n.134 (D.C. Cir. 1979); N. County Res. 
Recovery Assn, 2 E.A.D. 229, 230 (Envtl. Appeals Bd. 1986)).  In early 2008, the BER affirmed the 
DEQs decision, concluding that BACT did not apply to CO2 because it is not a regulated pollutant.  
See Karl Puckett, Board Rejects Appeal of Highwood Air-Quality Permit, GREAT FALLS TRIB., Jan. 
12, 2008, at A1; Dennison, supra note 112. 
After reviewing the two conflicting interpretations of the scope of BACT, Professor Stensvaag 
asserts that it has long been settled that the BACT requirement of the PSD program applies only to 
those pollutants currently being regulated by EPA.  John-Mark Stensvaag, Preventing Significant 
Deterioration Under the Clean Air Act: New Facility Permit Triggers, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 
10009 (2008).  Cf. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(12) (2006) (emphasis added) (EPA PSD regulation 
defining best available control technology as an emissions limitation . . . based on the maximum 
degree of reduction for each regulated [new source review] pollutant which would be emitted from 
any proposed major stationary source or major modification).  EPAs Environmental Appeals 
Board does not consider the matter settled.  It refused to address the issue of whether CO2 is a 
pollutant subject to regulation for purposes of the PSD permit program in In re Christian County 
Generation, L.L.C., PSD Appeal No. 07-01 (Jan. 28, 2008), because the party alleging that it is 
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Neither EPA regulations under the CAA nor KDHE regulations under 
the Kansas Air Quality Act restrict CO2 emissions from stationary 
sources.  If, therefore, KDHE may only take steps to abate an 
endangerment caused by the emission of regulated air pollutants, 
Secretary Brembys denial of the Sunflower permits would be 
unauthorized. 
This argument is no more compelled by the plain meaning of the 
Kansas endangerment provision than is the contention that KDHE may 
only take steps to abate a substantial endangerment under section 65-
3012 if the activity responsible for causing it is already taking place.  To 
the contrary, the clear language of the statute does not support it.  Section 
65-3012(a) authorizes KDHE to take actions it deems necessary to 
protect health and the environment [u]pon receipt of information that 
the emission of air pollution presents a substantial endangerment to 
health or the environment.382  The Act defines air pollution to mean 
the presence in the outdoor atmosphere of one or more air contaminants 
in such quantities and duration as is, or tends significantly to be, 
injurious to human health or welfare, animal or plant life, or property, or 
would unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life or property.383  
                                                                                                                       
failed to raise the issue during the public comment period on a draft permit.  In doing so, it remarked 
that before Massachusetts v. EPA, there was no strong precedent in the federal courts that was 
contrary to the position that CO2 qualifies as a pollutant subject to regulation.  Id. at 14 n.18.  It 
added that [w]hether CO2 is a pollutant subject to regulation under the [CAA] remains a matter of 
considerable dispute.  Id. at 17.  Finally, it noted that the issue was pending in another case, In re 
Deseret Power Elec. Coop., PSD Appeal No. 07-03 (Nov. 21, 2007) (Order Granting Review).  Id. at 
1516.  See Steven D. Cook, EPA Permit for Utah Coal-Fired Power Plant Under Challenge at 
Agencys Appeals Board, 39 ENVT REP. (BNA) 344, Feb. 22, 2008 (discussing Deseret Power 
case); In re Deseret Power Elec. Coop., PSD Appeal 07-03, 2008 WL 902877 (E.A.B. Mar. 30, 
2008) (scheduling oral argument in the case). 
KDHEs air quality regulations also arguably are expansive enough to cover CO2, at least in 
certain instances.  For example, the air quality regulations provide that any person who proposes to 
construct or operate a stationary source who is not otherwise required to obtain a construction permit 
must nevertheless obtain approval from KDHE to commence construction if KDHE determines that 
any other air contaminant emissions from the . . . stationary source may cause or contribute to air 
pollution within the state because of its specific chemical or physical nature or because of the 
quantity discharged . . . .  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-19-300(b)(2) (2006).  As the discussion below 
indicates, CO2 emissions qualify as air pollution under the Kansas Air Quality Act.  See infra 
notes 383426 and accompanying text.  See also KAN. ADMIN. REGS  § 28-19-301(e) (stating that 
construction permits may be conditioned upon compliance by the owner or operator with any 
special restrictions that are deemed necessary to insure compliance with these regulations or 
otherwise prevent air pollution (emphasis added)). 
 382. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012(a) (2002). 
 383. Id. § 65-3002(c).  The reference to air contaminants that tend to be injurious also supports 
the conclusion above that the endangerment provision may be triggered by activities and air 
pollution that have not yet begun.  An air contaminant may qualify as air pollution on the basis of 
its tendency to cause harm generally, even if it has not done so in the particular context being 
addressed under the endangerment provision.  Moreover, the ability of tendencies to trigger 
regulatory authority is reflective of the precautionary nature of the state air quality statute. 
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An air contaminant means dust, fumes, smoke, other particulate 
matter, vapor, gas, odorous substances, or any combination thereof, but 
not including water vapor or steam condensate.384  CO2 is a gas (one of 
the GHGs responsible for contributing to climate change), so it clearly 
qualifies.  The explicit exclusion of water vapor or steam condensate 
indicates that the fact that a substance emitted from a plant is one that is 
already present naturally in the ambient air does not take it outside the 
definition of an air contaminant.  If that were so, the exclusion would be 
unnecessary.385  In addition, the statute refers to any combination of 
the listed substances.  The Supreme Court relied in part on the inclusion 
of the word any in the CAAs definition of an air pollutant to 
support its conclusion that GHGs qualify as air pollutants under the 
CAAs capacious definition of that term.386 
Assuming that CO2 is an air contaminant, its emission from a coal-
fired power plant qualifies as air pollution as long as it is emitted in 
such quantities and duration as is, or tends significantly to be, injurious 
to human health or welfare, animal or plant life, or property . . . .387  The 
various ways in which CO2, as the principal GHG, is injurious to health, 
welfare, animal and plant life, and property have been documented by 
countless scientific studies.  Professor Lisa Heinzerling has identified, 
for example, the myriad ways in which climate change caused by GHG 
emissions may adversely affect the public health: 
 More frequent and intense heat waves are only one item on the long 
list of the consequences of climate change that will harm human health.  
According to the latest scientific research, we can expect the following 
in our warming world: disease-carrying insects will alter their ranges, 
appearing in places they have not been before and where humans have 
not developed immunities, causing more widespread incidence of 
vectorborne diseases such as malaria; after a slight uptick, crop 
productivity will decline, causing a concomitant increase in the risk of 
malnutrition; fish stocks will deteriorate, to the same effect; ground-
                                                     
 384. Id. § 65-3002(a). 
 385. This interpretation of the statute is supported by the well-known canon of statutory 
interpretation expressio unius.  The Kansas Supreme Court has described the maxim as follows: 
When an item is not included in a specific list, this court can presume that the legislature intended 
to exclude the item by applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., the inclusion 
of one thing implies the exclusion of another.  Cole v. Mayans, 80 P.3d 384, 39394 (Kan. 2003).  
Because the statutory list of naturally occurring substances that do not qualify as air contaminants 
does not include CO2, a presumption arises that the Kansas legislature did not intend to exclude CO2, 
another naturally occurring substance, from the definition of an air contaminant. 
 386. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460, 1462 (2007) ([A]ny . . . has an expansive 
meaning, that is, one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind (citing Dept of Housing & Urban 
Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002)). 
 387. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3002(c). 
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level ozone will worsen, causing adverse pulmonary and cardiovascular 
events; water supplies will decrease due to reduced snowpack and 
increased drought;388 storms will become more frequent and severe, 
threatening Katrinalike consequences for human health and welfare; 
flooding will grow more frequent and severe due to storms and sea 
level rise;389 diarrhoeal disease will increase due to floods and drought; 
cholera will grow more frequent and toxic due to higher water 
temperatures; sanitation facilities will fail more often due to more 
frequent extreme weather events, leading to increased spread of 
infectious diseases; ozone depletion will worsen with a changing 
climate, leading to increased incidence of skin cancer, cataracts, and 
immune deficiency; increased pollen production will exacerbate 
allergies; hunger and malnutrition will rise due to drought and extreme 
weather events. 
 Reviewing this list, it appears that there is almost no component of 
human health that will be untouched by climate change.  And the list 
does not end here.  The shrinking resource base of a warming world 
will also increase the likelihood of refugee crises, violent conflicts, and 
even wars.390 
                                                     
 388. According to EPA, continued warming could exacerbate water shortages in western Kansas 
and lead to reductions in groundwater levels as withdrawals increase.  Even in the eastern part of the 
state, where water supplies are more abundant, lower stream flows could compromise uses of 
reservoirs for municipal and industrial supply, fish and wildlife habitat, recreation, and irrigation.  
Lower flows and higher temperatures also could impair water quality by increasing pollutant 
concentration levels.  U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Climate Change and Kansas 3, EPA 236-F-98-0071 
(Sept. 1998) [hereinafter Climate Change and Kansas]. 
 389. EPA noted that more than one-half of the communities in Kansas have flood-prone areas.  It 
added that harder rains could increase erosion and exacerbate runoff from mining and agricultural 
activities.  Id. 
 390. Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary Principle, 96 
GEO. L.J. 445, 448 (2008) (citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, WORKING GROUP II CONTRIBUTION 
TO THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, 
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 79 (2007)). 
EPA also has recognized that climate change is likely to affect the public health adversely.  
Citing IPCC studies, EPA has found that the expected key impacts of climate change in North 
America will include adverse impacts on human health: 
[C]limate change impacts on infrastructure and human health and safety in urban centers 
will be compounded by aging infrastructure, maladapted urban form and building stock, 
urban heat islands, air pollution, population growth and an aging population. . . . 
  Severe heat waves are projected to intensify in magnitude and duration over the 
portions of the U.S. where these events already occur, with likely increases in mortality 
and morbidity, especially among the elderly, young and frail.  Ranges of vector-borne 
and tick-borne diseases in North America may expand but with modulation by public 
health measures and other factors. 
. . . 
  The IPCC projects with virtual certainty declining air quality in U.S. and other world 
cities due to warmer and fewer cold days and nights and/or warmer/more frequent hot 
days and nights over most land areas.  Climate change is expected to lead to increases in 
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According to Professor Heinzerling, [t]he human health 
consequences of climate change are not just worries for the remote 
future; they are happening here and now.391  Examples of the 
immediacy of the impacts of climate change appear in the press with 
some frequency.  Physicians at the World Health Organizations Health 
and Environment Program, for example, attributed an outbreak in 2007 
of chikungunya, a tropical disease that is similar to dengue fever, in 
Castiglione di Cervia, Italy to climate change.  The disease is spread by 
tiger mosquitoes, which previously had been unable to live outside of the 
tropics.  As temperatures warmed in Italy, however, portions of the 
country became hospitable to the mosquitoes.  The result was the 
appearance and spread of a disease that had never before occurred in 
Italy.392 
Much closer to home, a December 2007 report issued by the Pew 
Center for Climate Change discussed several case studies of the likely 
impacts of climate change on different regions of the United States.393  
One of the case studies involved the impact of climate change on 
heatwaves in the Midwest.  The report concluded that, under a business 
as usual scenario in which little policy intervention to mitigate GHG 
emissions occurs, the midwestern United States is likely to experience an 
increase in the average frequency and duration of heatwaves this century.  
As one example, the study projected that the average frequency of 
heatwaves would increase by 36% in St. Louis and the average duration 
would increase by 38% there.394  Among those most vulnerable to heat 
cramps, heat exhaustion, heatstroke, and death as a result of these 
                                                                                                                       
ozone pollution, with associated risks in respiratory infection and aggravation of asthma.  
Ozone exposure also may contribute to premature death in people with heart and lung 
disease. 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of 
Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for Californias 2009 and Subsequent 
Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 
12,167 (Mar. 6, 2008) (footnotes omitted). 
 391. Heinzerling, supra note 390, at 449. 
 392. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Editorial, As Earth Warms Up, Virus from Tropics Moves to Italy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, at A16.  Cf. Nils Chr. Stenseth et al., Plague: Past, Present, and Future, 
5 PLOS MEDICINE, no. 1 (Jan. 15, 2008), available at http://medicine.plosjournals.org/ 
perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0050003 (finding that warmer springs 
and wetter summers increase the prevalence of plague in its main host, the great gerbil, and that 
those conditions might become more common in the future).  For discussion of the impact of climate 
change on infectious and respiratory diseases, see generally CENTER FOR HEALTH AND THE GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENT, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, CLIMATE CHANGE FUTURES: HEALTH, ECOLOGICAL 
AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 3252 (P. Epstein & E. Mills eds., 2005). 
 393. KRISTINE L. EBI ET AL., REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: FOUR CASE STUDIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/regional_impacts. 
 394. Id. at 14. 
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heatwaves are the elderly, babies and infants, people taking certain 
prescription medications (such as beta-blockers), the physically unfit, 
those engaged in vigorous exercise outdoors, overweight individuals, 
urban populations, those of lower socio-economic status, and people 
living alone.395  An earlier report by EPA estimated that if temperatures 
increase by 4o F, the number of heat-related deaths in Kansas City in the 
summer could increase by 150%.396  The same report raised the 
possibility that warming temperatures could increase the incidence of 
Lyme disease and other tick-borne diseases and rodent infestations in 
Kansas.  The spread of malaria is even possible if that disease is 
introduced in Kansas and climate changes make the environment 
conducive to the growth of mosquito populations.397 
Similarly, myriad studies document the likely adverse impacts of 
climate change on other components of the statutory definition of air 
pollution.  One recent study found that, even using conservative 
assumptions, losses to non-human life may amount to hundreds of 
billions of dollars annually.398  A study released in 2007 reported that 
CO2-induced enhancement of plant growth suggests that rising 
atmospheric CO2 may be contributing to the encroachment of shrubs into 
grasslands.  If so, this shift may create difficulties for rangeland 
managers and ranchers as grasses, the preferred forage of domestic 
livestock, are replaced by species that are unsuitable for domestic 
livestock grazing.399  Property damage is also likely as a result of the 
increased frequency and severity of violent weather events to which 
climate change may give rise.400 
The Kansas Air Quality Act confines the definition of air pollution 
to the presence of air contaminants in such quantities and duration as is, 
or tends significantly to be injurious to the identified components of 
                                                     
 395. Id. at 811.  See also IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 17, at 10 (finding that during 
the 21st century sites in North America that currently experience heatwaves are expected to be 
further challenged by an increased number, intensity and duration of heatwaves . . . , with potential 
for adverse health impacts). 
 396. Climate Change and Kansas, supra note 388, at 23. 
 397. Id. at 3. 
 398. Wayne Hsiung & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 
1699 (2007).  For examples of the kinds of species that are at risk, see GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra 
note 283, at 55960. 
 399. See Morgan et al., Carbon Dioxide Enrichment Alters Plant Community Structure and 
Accelerates Shrub Growth in the Shortgrass Steppe, 104 GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LTRS. 14724 
(Sept. 11, 2007). 
 400. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 17, at 12 (listing pressures on rural and urban 
infrastructures and property loss as very likely to result due to heavy precipitation events). 
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society.401  One argument that CO2 from a coal-fired power plant such as 
the Holcomb units does not qualify as air pollution is that the emissions 
from one such plant, in and of themselves, are not likely to be injurious 
to health or the environment.  Litigants have advanced various versions 
of this argument in past environmental cases, and it typically meets with 
a hostile judicial reception.  In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, for example, the 
industries challenging EPAs lead phase-out regulations argued that EPA 
could only regulate fuel additives such as lead under the CAAs will 
endanger standard if it could prove that the emission product of the 
additive to be regulated in and of itself, i.e., considered in isolation, 
endangers health.402  EPA responded that the statute allowed it to base 
its regulatory determinations on the impact of lead emissions from the 
burning of automotive fuel together with all other human exposure to 
lead.403 
The challengers based their argument in part on the absence of words 
such as contribute to an endangerment, which were present in other 
provisions of the CAA.404  The D.C. Circuit, which rejected industrys 
argument, responded that none of the relevant provisions of the statute 
made it clear whether emissions appropriately could be regarded as 
endangering health when the endangerment is not caused by that 
pollution alone.405  In that case, EPAs Administrator found an 
endangerment sufficient to justify the phase-out of lead additives, despite 
concluding that health problems due to lead exposure were being caused, 
not by air pollution alone, but by an aggregate of sources, including 
food, water, leaded paint, and dust.  He believed that regulation was 
justified because the aggregate was dangerous, and because leaded 
gasoline was a significant source that was particularly suited to ready 
reduction.406  The court deferred to the agencys approach, 
particularly in light of the realities of human exposure to lead and what 
Congress knew about those realities.  Such consideration demonstrates 
both that, under Ethyls approach, EPA regulation of lead on health 
grounds would be impossible and that Congress could not possibly 
have intended the restrictive by itself reading. . . .  [L]ead enters the 
human body from multiple sources, so that the effect of any one source 
is meaningful only in cumulative terms . . . .  Under Ethyls approach, 
                                                     
 401. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3002(c) (2002). 
 402. 541 F.2d 1, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1(a)(1) (1970) (currently codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
7521(a)(1) (2000))). 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. at 2930. 
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despite obvious endangerment such a cumulative finding is insufficient 
to justify regulation.  Airborne lead, in and of itself, may not be a 
threat.  But the realities of human lead exposure show that no one 
source in and of itself (except possibly leaded paint) is a threat.  Thus, 
under Ethyls tunnel-like reasoning, even if parallel legislation 
permitted regulation of other sources of lead exposure, which it does 
not, no regulation could ever be justified.407 
The court refused to endorse a reading of the statute so at odds with not 
only the physical realities of the way pollution works, but also with the 
purposes of the statute.  The court held that EPAs cumulative impact 
approach was not erroneous.408 
Similarly, it makes no sense to require that a stationary source 
emitting CO2 be responsible for a quantity of emissions that, by itself, is 
or tends to be injurious to health or welfare.  Under that test, no source 
could ever be regulated, given the minimal contribution that any one 
source makes to the worldwide climate change problem. 
Further support for rejecting such a tunnel-like reading of the 
Kansas Air Quality Acts substantial endangerment provision comes 
from the Supreme Courts decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.409  One of 
the arguments EPA made in that case was that the state lacked standing 
to sue.410  A plaintiff seeking to show that it has standing to sue under 
Article III of the Constitution must show that it has or imminently will 
suffer injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is 
likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury.411  EPA asserted 
that, even assuming that the state showed the requisite injury, it could not 
possibly demonstrate causation and redressability because its decision 
not to regulate GHGs from new motor vehicles contributes so 
insignificantly to those injuries that the climate change-related injuries 
(such as the loss of coastal property due to melting glaciers and rising sea 
levels) were not fairly traceable to that decision.412  Similarly, EPA 
claimed that there was no realistic possibility that the relief sought would 
                                                     
 407. Id. at 30. 
 408. Id. at 31.  The court added: 
Congress understood that the body lead burden is caused by multiple sources.  It 
understood that determining the effect of lead automobile emissions, by themselves, on 
human health is of no more practical value than finding the incremental effect on health 
of the fifteenth sleeping pill swallowed by a would-be suicide.  It did not mean for 
endanger to be measured only in incremental terms. 
Id. at 3031. (footnote omitted). 
 409. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
 410. Id. at 1453. 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. at 1457. 
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mitigate global climate change and remedy the states injuries.413  The 
majority rejected the agencys attempt to keep the case out of court 
because its 
argument rests on the erroneous assumption that a small incremental 
step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal 
judicial forum.  Yet accepting that premise would doom most 
challenges to regulatory action.  Agencies, like legislatures, do not 
generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.414 
On analogous reasoning, it would be inappropriate to adopt a reading 
of the Kansas endangerment statute that conditions KDHEs authority to 
abate CO2 emissions on a showing that the targeted activities by 
themselves are or would be responsible for a quantity or duration of 
emissions that, without regard to other sources of CO2, would cause 
climate change-related risks. 
The plain meaning of the endangerment provision undercuts in yet 
another way the argument that KDHE may not use that provision to 
restrict emissions of a pollutant, such as CO2, that is not already being 
regulated under some existing federal or state regulatory program.  The 
statute authorizes the Secretary to take necessary actions to protect health 
and the environment from emissions that present a substantial 
endangerment, [n]otwithstanding any other provisions of this act.415  
On its face, that provision allows KDHE to target emissions of air 
pollution that present the requisite endangerment, no matter what kind of 
regulation is or is not already taking place under other provisions of the 
statute.  The agencys endangerment authority thus stands on its own, 
and is not dependent on the status of CO2 under any other regulatory 
program.416 
This reading of section 65-3012(a) is again reinforced by federal 
judicial interpretation of the substantial endangerment provisions of the 
federal pollution control laws.  A good example is the Fourth Circuits 
decision in United States v. Waste Industries, Inc.417  EPA brought suit in 
federal district court to force the owners of a landfill that was polluting 
nearby waters to abate alleged threats to the public health and the 
                                                     
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. 
 415. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012(a) (2002). 
 416. See supra note 346 and accompanying text (describing the special legal connotation 
afforded by the courts to statutory notwithstanding clauses like the one in § 65-3012(a)). 
 417. 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). 
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environment posed by hazardous chemicals leaking from the site.418  
After the district court dismissed the action, EPA appealed.419  The 
government relied on the endangerment provision of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).420  The landfill argued, and 
the district court agreed, that the endangerment provision did not 
authorize an order requiring corrective action because it applied only to 
the wastes themselves before or as they are produced, and not to 
conditions, such as contamination of nearby water supplies, resulting 
when the wastes leaked out of the landfill.421  The Fourth Circuit was not 
persuaded.  The court found that [t]he fallacy of that contention is 
demonstrated by the indication of Congress that . . . remedies [under the 
endangerment provision] exist apart from the other provisions in the 
Acts structure . . .  [and] is designed to deal with situations in which the 
regulatory schemes break down or have been circumvented.422  The 
court added that the endangerment provision applied to the leakage, 
whether or not those engaging in the endangering acts are subject to any 
other provision of the Act.  Its application notwithstanding any other 
provision of this chapter indicates a congressional intent to include a 
broadly applicable section dealing with the concerns addressed by the 
statute as a whole.423  The court construed the endangerment provision 
as 
a congressional mandate that the former common law of nuisance, as 
applied to situations in which a risk of harm from solid or hazardous 
wastes exists, shall include new terms and concepts which shall be 
developed in a liberal, not a restrictive, manner.  This ensures that 
problems that Congress could not have anticipated when passing the 
Act will be dealt with in a way minimizing the risk of harm to the 
environment and the public.424 
                                                     
 418. Id. at 161. 
 419. Id. 
 420. The statute provided: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of [the statute], upon receipt of evidence that the 
handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous 
waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the 
appropriate District Court to immediately restrain any person contributing to such 
handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to stop such handling, storage, 
treatment, transportation or disposal or to take such other action as may be necessary. 
Id. at 16364 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1980)). 
 421. Id. at 164. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. at 167. 
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At about the same time, a federal district court, interpreting the same 
endangerment provision, found that the imminent hazard provision of 
section 6973 does indeed impose liability, distinct from that imposed by 
any other RCRA provision, on those contributing to activities that may 
present an imminent and substantial endangerment, and that the 
primary purpose of section 6973(a) is to impose liability on any person 
who, although complying with all other provisions of RCRA, conducts 
activities that contribute to an imminent hazard.425  Other federal courts 
have interpreted the endangerment provisions of the pollution control 
statutes along similar lines.426  These cases support the conclusion that 
the substantial endangerment provision of section 65-3012 operates as a 
gap-filling provision to enable KDHE to address environmental problems 
that the legislature could not have anticipated or did not anticipate when 
it adopted the Air Quality Act but that, if left unregulated, would threaten 
to thwart the health and environmental concerns addressed by the statute 
as a whole. 
4. Conclusion on Statutory Authority Issues 
The analysis in this section has developed the argument that the 
substantial endangerment provision of the Kansas Air Quality Act 
empowers KDHE to deny a construction permit for a coal-fired power 
plant even though the basis for the finding of endangerment is the 
projected emissions that the plant would generate if it were allowed to 
operate, rather than emissions that are already occurring.  The analysis 
above also supports the conclusion that it makes no difference that CO2 
is not currently being regulated under other provisions of federal or state 
air pollution control law.  The endangerment provision stands on its own 
as an independent source of regulatory power. 
                                                     
 425. Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 143334 (S.D. Ohio 1984), reconsideration 
denied, 22 Envt Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1447 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
 426. See, e.g., Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Intl, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 26061 (3d Cir. 
2005) (concluding that the same substantial endangerment provision applied even though there was 
no applicable state remedial standard for river sediment chromium, and that [p]roof of 
contamination in excess of state standards may support a finding of liability, and may alone suffice 
for liability in some cases, but its required use is without justification in the statute); Trinity Am. 
Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 150 F.3d 389, 395 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1185, at 35-36 
(1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454, 6487) (EPAs powers under [the substantial 
imminent and endangerment provision of the Safe Drinking Water Act, [42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (2000),] 
are intended to override any limitations upon the Administrators authority found elsewhere in the 
Act). 
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In his opinion, the Kansas Attorney General found no appellate court 
decisions construing the substantial endangerment statute.427  He also 
found that the statute is plain and unambiguous and that it supports the 
denial of an air quality permit for a proposed coal-fired power plant that 
would emit CO2, despite the absence of federal or state regulations 
restricting CO2 emissions.428  As at least one Justice of the Supreme 
Court has noted, ambiguity is apparently in the eye of the beholder.429  
Not everyone would therefore necessarily agree that the statute is plain 
and unambiguous and that the arguments advanced above in support of 
the Secretarys (and the Attorney Generals) position are self-evident. 
The burden of proof in any challenge to Secretary Brembys 
decision, however, is on the challenger.430  Because the issues discussed 
above involve the validity of an administrative agencys statutory 
interpretations, the doctrine of operative construction applies.  As a 
result, under existing Kansas precedents, KDHEs construction of the 
substantial endangerment provision is entitled to deference, particularly 
given the agencys special competence and expertise.431  As long as 
KDHEs interpretation has a rational basis, it should survive a judicial 
challenge, even if it is not the same interpretation that a court would have 
reached in the first instance.432  The analysis here demonstrates the extent 
to which the Secretarys interpretation is supported by existing judicial 
precedents construing analogous statutory provisions, as well as being 
consistent with the plain language of section 65-3012 and the policies 
reflected in the Kansas Air Quality Act.  It is therefore difficult to 
conclude that the agencys interpretation is irrational.  It is more difficult 
still to sustain the contention that the denial of the Sunflower permits 
represents government by administrative fiat433 or that the executive 
branch [made] up the rules434 without any legislative foundation in a 
manner that comprises a grave challenge to separation of powers 
principles. 
                                                     
 427. AG Opinion, supra note 233, at 2. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 572 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 430. See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
 431. See supra notes 31617 and accompanying text. 
 432. See supra note 380 and accompanying text. 
 433. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 434. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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B. Statutory Implementation Challenges 
Sunflower also has challenged KDHEs denial of the Sunflower 
permit on the ground that the agency has applied the substantial 
endangerment statute improperly.  This challenge is based on the charge 
that, even assuming the statute authorizes regulation of new sources of 
air pollution, and even assuming it applies to substances (such as CO2) 
not already being regulated as air pollution under other statutory or 
regulatory provisions, the Secretarys conclusion that a permit denial was 
necessary to prevent the Holcomb units CO2 emissions from presenting 
a substantial endangerment was not based on substantial evidence in the 
record.435  Because of the nature of such a challenge, it is even less likely 
to succeed than the claims that KDHE misinterpreted the statute. 
1. Standard of Review 
The scope of review of a challenge to the manner in which an agency 
applies a statute whose meaning is not in dispute is governed by the 
judicial review statute.  A court is authorized to invalidate agency action 
if the agency has erroneously applied the law, based its action on a 
determination of fact that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the record as a whole, or otherwise acted in an 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious manner.436 
Like review of an agencys statutory interpretations, judicial review 
of a challenge based upon alleged factual errors or arbitrary and 
capricious decisionmaking is deferential.  Indeed, the relative 
competence of agencies and courts in the two contexts would seem to 
support at least as much deference to an agencys statutory 
implementation as to its statutory interpretation.437  A primary task of 
                                                     
 435. See Sunflower Elec. Power Corp. v. Kan. Dept of Health & Envt, Petition for Judicial 
Review of KDHE Denial of Permit Application Under K.S.A. § 65-3012(a), supra note 306, at 11 
(claiming the [o]rder is invalid because it is based upon purported determination affect [sic] that is 
not supported by evidence); Sunflower Elec. Power Corp. v. Kan. Dept of Health & Envt, Petition 
for Review of KDHE Denial of Permit Application Under K.S.A. § 65-3008a(b), supra note 308, at 
910. 
 436. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-621(c)(4), (7), (8) (1997). 
 437. Professor Charles Koch explained the appropriate degrees of deference to different kinds of 
agency determinations: 
  The restraints on review of policymaking and fact-finding should not diminish the 
judicial authority over questions of law.  This principle is well established in general 
legal theory as well as in administrative law.  Since Marbury v. Madison, the courts have 
dominated questions of law.  Administrative law has long recognized judicial dominance 
over questions of law as agencies have administrative dominance over questions of 
policy. . . . 
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courts is to interpret statutes, so review of an agencys interpretation of a 
statute does not require courts to engage in tasks that are foreign to them.  
Courts also engage in fact-finding, but agencies typically have greater 
expertise in making factual determinations and mixed determinations of 
fact and policy438 in their areas of substantive expertise than courts do.439  
As the U.S Supreme Court has stated, a reviewing court must generally 
be at its most deferential when reviewing the validity of an agencys 
scientific determinations that involve making predictions, within [the 
agencys] area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science[,] . . . as 
opposed to simple findings of fact.440  If a court were to evaluate 
KDHEs determination that emissions from the Holcomb units presented 
a substantial endangerment, it would have to assess the scientific 
determinations and predictions that KDHE made (relying in part on the 
expertise of the IPCC)441 concerning the impact of CO2 emissions on 
health and the environment.  It would also have to assess the mixed 
factual and policy determinations that the particular level of risk involved 
in allowing operation of the Holcomb units qualified as a substantial 
endangerment, and that denial of a permit was necessary to protect 
health and the environment in the face of that endangerment.  These are 
the kinds of determinations that typically receive considerable judicial 
deference.442 
                                                                                                                       
  Nothing should diminish the well-established principle of administrative law that in 
reviewing the bundle of issues that comprise an administrative decision the agencys 
determination is dominant as to policy but not as to law. 
Charles H. Koch, Jr., An Issue-Driven Strategy for Review of Agency Decisions, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 
511, 53233 (1991). 
 438. See, e.g., id. at 516 (Policymaking implicates all the aspects of expertise.  Administrative 
agencies . . . have a special claim on expertise.  Foremost, tasks are assigned to the administrative 
process rather than the courts because agencies embody special expertise.  Thus an agencys 
policymaking expertise constitutes a conscious allocation of functions cautioning the courts against 
undue interference.). 
 439. See Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California 
Administrative Agencies,  42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1218 (1995): 
  Deference is particularly appropriate when the agency has a comparative advantage 
over the court in applying law to facts.  In particular, agencies may be more competent to 
apply legal standards to the basic facts where the case falls into the administrative routine 
and the legal standard is relatively indeterminate.  In this situation, an agencys 
competence arises out of the twin factors of expertise and specialization.  Agencies 
frequently develop expertise in the particular area under consideration that is not 
available to generalist courts. 
Professor Asimow warns, however, that [i]t is not easy to distinguish application questions from 
pure questions of law.  Id. at 1223. 
 440. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
 441. See infra note 464 and accompanying text. 
 442. Deference is not, of course, the same thing as abdication of the judicial review function.  
Even under deferential review, courts are obliged to reverse arbitrary or unsupported agency 
determinations.  See supra note 436 and accompanying text. 
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The Kansas courts interpretations of the judicial review statute are 
consistent with affording deferential review to these aspects of KDHEs 
decision.  They have stated, for example, that in an appeal of an 
administrative adjudication, the court should not try the case de novo 
[or] substitute its judgment for that of the agency.443  Courts inquiring 
whether an agencys factual determinations are supported by substantial 
evidence may not reweigh the facts, try the case de novo, or substitute 
their own judgment even if they would have found differently.444  
Indeed, the Kansas Supreme Court has warned that in this context the 
courts are not concerned with evidence contrary to the agency findings 
but must focus solely on evidence in support of the findings.445  
Accordingly, as long as the administrative record contains evidence that 
supports KDHEs determinations, a reviewing court must uphold those 
determinations, even if the record also contains evidence to the contrary. 
2. Judicial Interpretation of Substantial Endangerment and Similar 
Provisions 
This article is not the place to undertake a thorough review of the 
administrative record upon which KDHE based its denial of the 
Sunflower permit application.  The Kansas appellate courts have not 
previously reviewed KDHEs application of section 65-3012 in any 
reported decision, so there is little directly applicable precedent to serve 
as guidance for how the Kansas Supreme Court will approach the task of 
reviewing KDHEs substantial endangerment finding.  Judicial 
interpretation of the application of analogous provisions under the 
federal pollution control laws may provide some guidance, however.  
The Tenth Circuit has held, for example, that a finding of endangerment 
does not require proof of actual harm to health or the environment.446  
Instead, a showing of threatened or potential harmof riskis 
sufficient.447  The same court has ruled that an endangerment qualifies as 
                                                     
 443. Peterson v. Kan. Dept of Health & Envt, 59 P.3d 6, 910 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002). 
 444. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc. v. Praeger, 75 P.3d 226, 246 (Kan. 2003). 
 445. Id. (emphasis added, citation omitted); see also Graham v. Dokter Trucking Group, 161 
P.3d 695, 700 (Kan. 2007) (citation omitted) (stating that under substantial evidence review of 
agency determinations, [w]e review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party 
and do not reweigh competing evidence or assess credibility of witnesses); In re Amoco Prod. Co., 
102 P.3d 1176, 1184 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that this court will uphold findings supported by 
substantial evidence even if the record could have also supported contrary findings). 
 446. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 447. Id.; Price v. U.S. Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (Courts have 
also consistently held that endangerment means a threatened or potential harm and does not require 
proof of actual harm.). 
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substantial when it is serious, or when there is reasonable cause for 
concern that someone or something may be exposed to risk of harm by 
[the targeted activities] in the event remedial action is not taken, even if 
the endangerment is not quantified.448  One federal district court agreed 
with the proposition that courts . . . have had very little difficulty 
finding that such an endangerment exists since the standard necessary to 
establish an imminent and substantial endangerment is minimal.449  If 
the Kansas Supreme Court follows these precedents, the fact that [w]e 
dont have any problems . . . with clean air here450 in terms of 
demonstrated, actual harm that has already occurred, or a quantified 
determination of the harm that climate change will cause in Kansas in the 
future should not preclude it from affirming KDHEs determination that 
the contribution of the Holcomb units to climate change present a 
substantial endangerment. 
A decision by the South Dakota Supreme Court in early 2008 may 
provide some insights into the fate of a challenge to KDHEs substantial 
endangerment findings with respect to the Holcomb units.  Otter Tail 
Power Company applied to South Dakota Public Utilities Commission 
(SDPUC) for permission to construct a 600 megawatt coal-fired 
electric generating plant that would emit 4.7 million tons of CO2 each 
year.451  A state statute requires a permit applicant to show that the 
proposed facility will not pose a serious threat of injury to the 
environment or to social and economic conditions in the siting area and 
that the facility will not substantially impair the health, safety or 
welfare of the inhabitants of that area.452  Several non-profit 
environmental organizations opposed the plant, claiming that the CO2 
emissions would contribute to global warming and pose a threat of 
serious injury.453  The SDPUC issued the permit, finding that the 
proposed plant would produce eighteen percent less CO2 than other 
existing coal-fired plants as a result of the efficiency of the super-critical 
boiler technology it would use.454  In addition, the agency concluded that 
                                                     
 448. Grant, 505 F.3d at 1020 (citing Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Intl, Inc., 399 F.3d 
248, 259 (3d Cir. 2005); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1015 (11th Cir. 
2004)). 
 449. United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1035 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (citation 
omitted).  As noted above, section 65-3012(a) does not even require that the endangerment be 
imminent to trigger KDHEs regulatory authority.  See supra notes 35153 and accompanying text. 
 450. See supra note 274. 
 451. In re Otter Tail Power Co., 744 N.W.2d 594, 59798 (S.D. 2008). 
 452. Id. at 597 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-41B-22). 
 453. Id. at 596, 599. 
 454. Id. at 602. 
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the plant would not contribute materially to the production of 
anthropogenic CO2 because it would increase U.S. emissions of CO2 by 
only about seven-hundredths of one percent.455  Based on these factors, 
the SDPUC concluded that the utility had carried its burden of showing 
that the proposed plant would not pose a threat of serious injury to the 
environment.456 
The environmental groups appealed the decision, but the state 
supreme court upheld the issuance of the permit.  After reviewing the 
voluminous administrative record as a whole, including expert 
testimony proffered by both the environmental groups and the utility,457 
the court held that the SDPUCs decision reflected neither a clear error of 
judgment nor a conclusion unsupported by the law.458  It characterized 
global warming as a momentous and complex threat to our planet, but 
asserted that the social, economic, and environmental consequences of 
climate change implicate policy decisions constitutionally reserved for 
the executive and legislative branches.459  In light of the failure of our 
political leaders to issue emission standards for CO2, the court chose to 
refrain from settling policy questions more properly left for the 
Governor, the Legislature, and Congress.  No matter how grave [the 
courts] concerns on global warming, [it] cannot allow [its] personal 
views to impair [its] role under the Constitution.460  The court noted that 
the South Dakota legislature had designated the SDPUC as the agency 
responsible for ruling on air quality permits for electric utilities.  The 
court was obliged to uphold the agencys determination unless it was 
clearly erroneous in light of the entire record, arbitrary and capricious, or 
an abuse of discretion.461  The court found the SDPUCs decision that the 
plant would not pose a threat of serious injury to the environment to be 
well-reasoned and informed. It refused to upset that determination, given 
the legislatures decision to vest that judgment call in the agency.462 
The statutory standard governing the SDPUCs decision (whether the 
proposed plant will pose a threat of serious injury to the environment) 
is similar to the standard at issue in the Sunflower case (whether the 
emission of air pollution presents a substantial endangerment to the 
                                                     
 455. Id. 
 456. Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-41B-22). 
 457. The record contained more than 1400 pages of documentary evidence.  Id. at 603. 
 458. Id. at 60304. 
 459. Id. at 603. 
 460. Id. 
 461. Id. (citing Korzan v. Mitchell, 708 N.W.2d 683, 686 (S.D. 2006). 
 462. Id. at 604. 
13 - GLICKSMAN FINAL III.DOC 6/17/2008  8:14:17 PM 
602 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
health of persons or to the environment).  The Holcomb units would 
have emitted twice the amount of CO2 as the Otter Tail plant, but the 
percentage of total U.S. CO2 emissions for which the Holcomb units 
would have been responsible would still have been relatively low.  Faced 
with the Holcomb facts, the SDPUC might have come out the same way 
as it did in the Otter Tail case. 
KDHE, however, came out the other way.  The question is whether 
the Kansas Supreme Court is likely to reverse that determination.  The 
SDPUC decision approving the Otter Tail permit was thirty-four pages 
long,463 considerably more extensive than Secretary Brembys decision.  
The entire SDPUC decision was not devoted to a discussion of the global 
warming issue, however.  Further, the thirty-four page decision was but 
part of the enormous administrative record compiled during the 
proceeding.  The same is true of Brembys decision.  In testimony before 
the Kansas legislature, Bremby listed some of the sources on which he 
relied in denying Sunflowers permit application.  These include the U.S. 
Supreme Courts decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Kansas Attorney 
Generals opinion, the reports of the IPCC on climate change, and the 
extensive administrative recordincluding comments submitted at the 
public hearings held in regard to the Sunflower Electric permit 
application.464  A close analysis of the two administrative records would 
be needed to ascertain whether one provides more compelling evidence 
of a threat to health and the environment from the proposed plants CO2 
emissions than the other.  As indicated above, however, only the 
evidence that supports Brembys determination is relevant.465 
One important difference between the two decisions relates to the 
relationships among the relevant branches of government.  The contexts 
in which the two cases proceeded to court were completely different.  
The SDPUC ruled in favor of the utility, while KDHE ruled against it.  
Assuming that KDHE acted within the scope of its statutory authority,466 
the Sunflower case, unlike Otter Tail, is not one in which our political 
leaders have said or done nothing to restrict activities that contribute to 
climate change.  If KDHE has the authority to deny a permit despite the 
fact that threatening activity has not yet begun and CO2 is not currently 
regulated by EPA or KDHE, then the policy decisions reflected in 
KDHEs denial of the Sunflower application have been resolved (or at 
least authorized) by both of the political branches of government.  
                                                     
 463. Id. 
 464. Bremby Testimony, supra note 263, at 23. 
 465. See supra note 445 and accompanying text. 
 466. The statutory authority issues are addressed in Part IV.A. 
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Accordingly, the same separation of powers concerns that impelled the 
South Dakota Supreme Court to refrain from reversing the agencys 
decision to approve the permit should give pause to the Kansas courts as 
they consider whether to reverse KDHEs denial of the permit.  Those 
courts may or may not conclude that KDHEs decision is supported by 
substantial evidence in the record.  The threat of judicial usurpation of 
the policymaking authority of the political branches that was central to 
the Otter Tail decision, however, lies more in overturning than in 
upholding KDHEs decision. 
V. THE FUTURE OF COAL-FIRED POWER IN KANSAS IN THE CLIMATE 
CHANGE ERA 
The impact of KDHEs denial of the Sunflower permits will depend 
most immediately on efforts to reverse the decision, either 
administratively or in post-2008 legislative sessions.467  Even assuming 
the decision stands, its impact on the future of coal-fired power 
production in Kansas is unclear.  Air permits for coal-fired power plants 
in Kansas must be renewed every five years.468  By the end of 2008, 
sixteen coal-fired power plants in the state face permit renewal 
proceedings.  State legislators and business leaders expressed concern 
over the fate of those applications based on the Sunflower precedent.469  
Senate Utilities Committee Chairman Jay Emler stated, for example, that 
[b]ased upon a rather nebulous finding of fact that CO2 is hazardous to 
the public health, I would think that would put every application for 
renewal in jeopardy.470  Secretary Bremby seemed to indicate, however, 
that he would distinguish between renewal of existing plant permits and 
authorization of a large new source of GHGs.471  A decision by KDHE 
not to extend the Sunflower precedent to permit renewals for existing 
coal-fired plants might create the perception that Sunflower was treated 
unfairly,472 especially because, according to some observers, it would 
                                                     
 467. See supra notes 296305 and accompanying text for discussion of the efforts in the 2008 
legislative session to reverse Secretary Brembys decision. 
 468. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-19-514(a) (2006). 
 469. Cf. Mark Fagan, Leader: Coal Ruling Hurts Economy, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Jan. 9, 2008, 
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2008/jan/09/leader_coal_ruling_hurts_economy/ (discussing 
economic concerns regarding the Holcomb decision). 
 470. Associated Press, KDHE to Review Permits for 16 Coal Plants, WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 11, 
2007, at 7B. 
 471. See id.; Associated Press, Legislators Limited in Fighting Coal Ruling, WICHITA EAGLE, 
Nov. 13, 2007, at 3B. 
 472. The same argument was made by attorneys for the utility seeking to build a new coal-fired 
power plant near Great Falls, Montana.  See Karl Puckett, Opponents of Coal Plant Seek CO2 
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have been a more efficient operation than some existing plants dating 
back to the 1950s.473 
Regardless of the fate of the Holcomb units and the existing coal-
fired plants, the larger question is whether Kansas takes steps to increase 
the contribution of cleaner fuels, such as renewable sources, to the states 
energy mix and otherwise to reduce the states reliance on fossil fuel-
based energy.  In early 2008, Governor Sebelius issued an executive 
order creating the Kansas Wind Working Group.474  The order states that 
Kansas has an abundant supply of wind, is invested in making 
renewable energy sources an integral part of the states energy use 
portfolio, and is committed to developing an effective and progressive 
plan to utilize our natural resources for renewable energy to their fullest 
potential.475  The Governor charged the Group with initiating, acting 
upon, and considering all necessary strategies to optimize wind energy 
utilization in Kansas; developing professional and information-sharing 
networks for wind energy stakeholders; promoting Kansas as a leader in 
the development of wind energy resources; and assisting in the 
development, coordination, and execution of the states future wind 
energy policies.476  The strategy seems to play to the states strengths.  
The state may lack the natural resources that allow regions like the 
                                                                                                                       
Limitations, GREAT FALLS TRIB., Dec. 22, 2007, at 1A (stating that utility attorneys argued that it 
would be unfair to apply rules not already in place when the application was filed, even though they 
are likely to be adopted in the future).  The state environmental agency refused to impose CO2 
emission controls on the plant, concluding that it lacked the authority to regulate CO2 emissions, and 
the state environmental review board affirmed that decision.  See supra note 381. 
 473. KDHE to Review Permits for 16 Coal Plants, supra note 470, at 7B.  Sunflower has 
asserted that the permit denial violated its equal protection rights under the federal and state 
constitutions because it prohibits the plants potential CO2 emissions even though those emissions 
are much less than aggregate [CO2] emissions from existing permitted sources and from newly 
permitted sources in Kansas.  Petition for Judicial Review of KDHE Denial of Permit Application 
Under K.S.A. § 65-3012(a), supra note 306, at 11.  See also Petition for Review of KDHE Denial of 
Permit Application Under K.S.A. § 65-3008a(b), supra note 308, at 10.  The merit of this equal 
protection challenge is beyond the scope of this article. 
 474. Kan. Executive Order 08-01 (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.governor.ks.gov/executive/ 
Orders/exec_order0801.htm. 
 475. Id. 
 476. Id. § 5.  Shortly before the Governor issued the order, the Kansas Corporation Commission 
found a utilitys plans to own 149 megawatts of wind generation and to enter into purchased power 
agreements to purchase an additional 146 megawatts of wind generation to be prudent.  At the same 
time, however, the Commission refused to approve the utilitys request for an additional one percent 
rate of return on its wind-related investments.  It found that the uncertainties inherent in wind 
generation did not justify allocating to ratepayers the cost of the additional return sought.  In re 
Petition of Westar Energy, Inc., Docket No. 08-WSEE-309-PRE (Kan. Corp. Commn Dec. 27, 
2007) (final order), available at http://www.kcc.state.ks.us/docket/cal.cgi?docket=08-WSEE-309-
PRE.  In the wake of the decision, Westar Energy announced it was postponing plans to secure an 
additional 200 megawatts of wind energy.  See Scott Rothschild, Sebelius Creates Wind Energy 
Group, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Jan. 8, 2008, http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2008/jan/08/ 
sebelius_creates_wind_energy_group/. 
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Pacific Northwest to rely heavily on non-carbon sources such as 
hydropower facilities, but it has wind aplenty.477 
Another alternative to coal-fired power production is nuclear power.  
Increasing concerns over global climate change have sparked renewed 
interest in the moribund nuclear power industry, not only in the United 
States478 but also in Europe.479  The national security concerns that 
accompany the management and use of nuclear fuel, the lingering 
memories of the Three-Mile Island accident,480 and the absence of a 
permanent solution to the problem of spent fuel and other high-level 
radioactive waste disposal,481 however, continue to make the nuclear 
power option a divisive one.  It is not hard to imagine concrete plans to 
pursue a nuclear power project in Kansas leading to a repeat of the 
controversy surrounding construction, licensing, and ratemaking 
approval of the Wolf Creek plant in Burlington, Kansas in the early 
1980s.482 
Still another option, at least in the short run, would be for Kansas 
utilities to purchase some of their power from utilities in other states.  
After KDHE denied Sunflowers permit for the Holcomb units, it began 
pursuing the possibility of purchasing 125 megawatts of power from a 
                                                     
 477. For a map of ongoing and proposed wind energy projects in Kansas, see Kansas Energy 
Information Network, Kansas Wind Energy, http://www.kansasenergy.org/wind_projects.htm (click 
on Map of Existing and Proposed Wind Projects in Kansas).  See also U.S. Dept of Energy, Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Wind Powering America, Kansas Wind Activities, http://www. 
eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/windpoweringamerica/astate_template.asp?stateab=ks. 
 478. Professor Joe Tomain has described the changed atmosphere as follows: 
Global warming has revived interest in nuclear power.  How much interest remains to be 
seen.  Still, the most significant statement that can be made about nuclear power is that 
this energy source is on the table for discussion more than it has been for over 25 years, 
because of the environmental degradation caused by burning fossil fuels.  Traditional 
nuclear industry and trade association interests have taken advantage of this phenomenon 
to continue to advocate their Promotional Policy regarding nuclear power.  Nuclear 
agnostics have added this issue to their own future energy policies because it is an 
attractive alternative to oil and other fossil fuels, which, in addition to their role in 
climate change, are becoming more difficult to find and secure and, therefore, higher 
priced. 
Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 221, 249 (2005). 
 479. See, e.g., Peter D. Cameron, The Revival of Nuclear Power: An Analysis of the Legal 
Implications, 19 J. ENVTL. L. 71 (2007). 
 480. See generally Eric R. Pogue, The Catastrophe Model of Risk Regulation and the Regulatory 
Legacy of Three-Mile Island and Love Canal, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 463 (2007). 
 481. See Karl S. Coplan, The Intercivilizational Inequities of Nuclear Power Weighed Against 
the Intergenerational Inequities of Carbon Based Energy, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 227, 233
43 (2006); James E. Hickey, Jr., Reviving the Nuclear Power Option in the United States: Using 
Domestic Energy Law to Cure Two Perceptions of International Law Illegality, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
425, 434 (2006). 
 482. See generally Symposium on Regulation of the Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Plant, 33 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 419, 419524 (1985). 
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proposed new coal-fired plant near Norborne, Missouri.483  That option 
might shift some of the conventional pollution (such as SO2 emissions) 
generated by coal-fired plants from Kansas to Missouri and states to the 
east, but it would have no impact on minimizing the contribution of 
Kansas power consumption to GHG emissions that contribute to climate 
change. 
Coal-fired power production could receive a boost if technologies are 
developed to reduce the degree to which the use of coal to produce 
energy generates GHGs or to effectively sequester whatever carbon 
emissions are produced.484  In the absence of such proven technologies, 
the fate of coal-fired power production, in Kansas and elsewhere, is 
uncertain.  The KDHEs decision to deny an air quality permit for the 
proposed Holcomb units is both a product of that uncertainty and a 
contributing factor to future uncertainty over the role of coal in 
generating electricity.  The decision to deny the permits certainly created 
a furor.  It may or may not further an optimal mix of energy or economic 
policies for the state.  This article demonstrates, however, that it is far 
from a radical decision, when viewed in the context of what other states 
are doing to deal with the environmental risks created by coal-fired 
power production.  Instead, it is fully consistent with a nationwide trend 
toward reduced reliance on coal-fired power that includes the 
development of renewable portfolio standards in many states, the 
imposition of restrictions on GHG emissions both by individual states 
and regional organizations, and the denial of individual permits in at least 
three states in 2007 alone.485  That trend has been facilitated by the 
support of groups not traditionally known for their concern over the 
effects of industrial pollution, such as ranchers concerned about the 
impact of climate change on the availability of water they need to 
support their livestock.486 
                                                     
 483. Utility Eyes Proposed Mo. Power Plant, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Jan. 19, 2008, at 3B. 
 484. Coal producing states have a strong interest in the development of effective sequestration 
technology and some of them are staking out positions as leaders in that process.  See, e.g., Bob 
Moen, Panel Backs Carbon Storage Regulation, CASPER STAR TRIB., Jan. 24, 2008, available at 
http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2008/01/24/news/wyoming (describing Wyoming 
governors position that carbon capture and sequestration is vital to the states economy).  For a 
discussion of carbon sequestration technology, see Leslie R. Dubois, Comment, Curiosity and 
Carbon: Examining the Future of Carbon Sequestration and the Accompanying Jurisdictional Issues 
as Outlined in the Indian Energy Title of the 2005 Energy Policy Act, 27 ENERGY L.J. 603 (2006). 
 485. Even in Montana, where the state BER in early 2008 approved the state DEQs omission of 
CO2 controls from a permit issued to a proposed new coal-fired power plant, Board members 
recognized the need to address climate change, anticipated regulation of GHG emissions from power 
plants in the near future, and bemoaned the lack of authority to regulate CO2 emissions under current 
state law.  See Dennison, supra note 112. 
 486. See Editorial, Montana and Kansas Take on Big Coal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007. 
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There is little question that KDHEs denial of the Holcomb air 
quality permit on the basis of the plants potential to contribute to climate 
change was unprecedented in Kansas.  It is also legitimate to question the 
agencys authority to issue that decision in light of the absence of judicial 
interpretation of the applicable statutes.  Nevertheless, there are strong 
arguments to support the conclusion that KDHE had ample authority to 
do exactly what it did.  If the text of the states air quality statute does 
not dictate the conclusion that KDHE acted within the scope of its 
authority in denying the Sunflower permit application, the statute 
certainly is reasonably interpreted to support that conclusion.  KDHEs 
interpretation and application of the statute are also consistent with the 
policies underlying precautionary environmental legislation such as the 
Kansas substantial endangerment provision.  Finally, the deference 
typically afforded agency policy determinations of the sort involved here 
makes it very difficult to characterize KDHEs action as an illegitimate 
administrative fiat that somehow threatens the legislatures primacy in 
fashioning energy, environmental, and economic policy for the state. 
 
